Phenomenological Enigma in the Period of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Transformation - Shanghai Social Sciences Doctoral Library [Volume 7]

Author: Xu Yingjin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-12-01
Features: Although having little knowledge of the European phenomenological movement, Wittgenstein independently proposed his own version of "phenomenology" upon his return to Cambridge in early 1929. His view of phenomenology can be summarized as the belief that it is possible to represent directly given phenomena using a so-called "phenomenological language," a task that the everyday-physical language cannot accomplish. However, through an in-depth exploration of the nature of "pre-figuration,"2 Wittgenstein had to admit that any attempt to represent direct experience would inevitably involve expressions of physical language, and this involvement would come at the cost of sacrificing the independence of the "phenomenological language." This discovery ultimately led Wittgenstein to abandon his "phenomenology." The discussion in this book will focus on this brief yet significant "phenomenological stage" in Wittgenstein's philosophical transition. The research is based on the following documents: Wittgenstein's short essay "On Logical Forms," where he explicitly expresses his stance on phenomenology, as well as the newly published collection of Wittgenstein's transitional period documents, "The Vienna Edition," particularly Volume 11, "The Great Typescript." Through the interpretation of these materials, the author will present to the readers the research paths Wittgenstein took under the headings of "phenomenological construction" and "phenomenological critique" in his study of expressions of sense pre-figuration. The key points the book attempts to argue can be summarized as follows:
(1) Wittgenstein's "phenomenological stage" can be regarded as the starting point of his long-term academic interest in "the philosophy of psychology"—an interest that persisted until the end of his life but was not reflected in his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
(2) By interpreting "atomic propositions" as the simplest description of sense pre-figuration (rather than avoiding a positive explanation of what atomic propositions are, as in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), Wittgenstein's "phenomenological stage" reveals an astonishing kinship between his philosophical stance at that time and Russell's empiricist version of "logical atomism."
(3) By denying any attempt to use language to designate or describe pre-figuration and by demonstrating the absolute self-evidence of pre-figuration itself, Wittgenstein's critique of his own "phenomenological" concept actually revives the dichotomy between "the unsayable" and "the sayable" that he had already established in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In "The Great Typescript," this dichotomy is refined in his analysis of temporal expressions, spatial expressions, and personal expressions, leading to distinctions such as "memory time" versus "physical time" and "visual space" versus "Euclidean space," and so on.
(4) From another perspective, Wittgenstein's deconstruction of the concept of "phenomenological language" can also be seen as an inevitable consequence of taking this concept to its ultimate extreme, because this deconstruction actually reinforces rather than weakens the belief he already held when writing "On Logical Forms," namely: the physical system must be strictly distinguished from what is directly given in the phenomenon. In other words, what Wittgenstein does in this deconstruction is merely to expose the inherent contradiction between this belief itself and his insistence on the "sayability" of phenomena—the very illusion of "phenomenological language" arising from this insistence.
(5) However, according to Wittgenstein's intention, the enormous logical difference between sense pre-figuration and physical language (as the only possible language) does not mean that the latter has no connection with the former, but only that their relationship does not follow the so-called "original—copy" model, but rather the "screen presentation—film operation" model. The latter model also implies that phenomena themselves can be evoked (or, more accurately, encompassed) within the physical system—even though phenomena cannot indeed be described by physical language.
(6) In this way, Wittgenstein leads us to bid farewell to the ambitious and outdated goal of "perfectly representing direct pre-figuration," thereby opening up a new realm of thought: a space where both the "overview of grammar" is carried out and his own later philosophy takes shape. However, because he was still reluctant to abandon the term "phenomenology" immediately, Wittgenstein temporarily retained it in "The Great Typescript," though by then its meaning had been equated with "grammar." And in the text of Philosophical Investigations, even this limited retention was abandoned.
(7) The book argues that only with a thorough understanding of Wittgenstein's critique of "phenomenological language" in "The Great Typescript" can the critique of "private language" in Philosophical Investigations be understood productively (because the former critique actually constitutes the prototype of the latter). According to the author's view, the key point of the "private language argument" is not to deny the role of sense pre-figuration in our linguistic games about sense, but to reinterpret the nature of that role. Wittgenstein holds that sense is by no means the referent of a word or the source of the meaning of a name, but rather something that is presented in a specific context, possessing absolute self-evidence—and at the same time, it constitutes the logical premise for the unfolding of our linguistic games about sense. From this proposition, it follows that indexical terms like "I," "now (immediacy)," and "this" do not indicate the characteristics of pre-figuration itself, and it is misleading to speak of the spatio-temporal forms of phenomena or the personal forms of phenomena. Thus, the two cornerstones supporting the "private language" view—"there must exist private pre-figurations that can only be presented to 'I'" and "there must be a specially designed vocabulary to refer to these pre-figurations"—are both undermined.
(8) Building on the point (7), the author of this book will show the readers where traditional interpretations of the "private language argument" miss the mark. It is well known that the popular strategy for interpreting this argument is to link it to Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of "following rules," because it is said that rules cannot be privately formulated and followed. However, the issue that these interpreters overlook is a deeper explanation of why rules that are privately formulated and followed are not truly rules. To explain this "why," the book will guide the readers to revisit the distinction between "memory time" and "physical time" in "The Great Typescript," and on this basis, accuse the proponents of "private language" of misusing the term "rule" and confusing the aforementioned distinction. The author argues that only with an understanding of this premise can we integrate Wittgenstein's emphasis on "following rules" into a complete "private language argument."
(9) Finally, the book will explain why late Wittgenstein cannot be interpreted as a crude relativist—one who is willing to the relative utility of language rules followed by a specific community and advocates removing the role of sense from linguistic games about sense. Because what Wittgenstein rejects is only the sayability of sense impressions, not their existence itself. To put it more clearly, according to Wittgenstein's standards, the following assertion by a relativist—"When a color sample is given to a normal person, what he sees has nothing to do with his corresponding behavior"—is itself a typical expression of skepticism and therefore cannot survive in Wittgenstein's attack on skepticism.