Research on Regulation Issues of China's Network Industries under Asymmetric Information

Author: Liu Xuexin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-12-01
Features:
1. Regulation, Information, and Regulation Economics
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Regulation Theory
2. Progress of Regulation Reform in China's Network Industries
2.1 Economic Characteristics of Network Industries
2.2 Progress of Regulation Reform in China's Network Industries
3. Game Analysis of Regulation in China's Network Industries
3.1 Principal-Agent Game in Regulation of China's Network Industries
3.2 Principal-Agent Problems in State-Owned Enterprises of Network Industries During the Transition Period
3.3 Soft Budget Constraint, Excessive Investment, and Market Entry Barriers
3.4 "Soft Policy Constraint" in State-Owned Enterprises of Network Industries
4. Regulation Mechanism Design Under Asymmetric Information
4.1 Incentive Mechanism Design Theory and Regulation Mechanism Design
4.2 Regulation Mechanism Design Under Adverse Selection
4.3 Regulation Mechanism Design Under Moral Hazard
4.4 Regulation Commitment and Regulation Mechanism Design
4.5 Non-Bayesian Regulation Mechanism Design
4.6 Regulation Methods in Practice
5. Analysis of Regulation in China's Network Industries Under Asymmetric Information—Taking the Telecommunications Industry as an Example
5.1 Analysis of Regulation Reform in China's Telecommunications Industry Under Asymmetric Information
5.2 Analysis of Monopoly, Competition, and Regulation in China's Telecommunications Industry—Taking "Little Comrade" as an Example
5.3 Price Competition and Regulation in China's Telecommunications Industry
5.4 Access Pricing in Network Industries and Interconnection Issues in China's Telecommunications Industry
References
Afterword
This book fully considers the premise of asymmetric information. By analyzing the economic characteristics of network industries, it reviews the development of regulation theory and examines the institutional structure of network industry regulation from the perspective of game theory. It establishes regulation mechanisms under different conditions of asymmetric information, reveals the interest process between regulators and regulated enterprises under asymmetric information, and demonstrates that any regulation system and policy is the result of interest among all parties involved in regulation. Asymmetric information influences the design and outcomes of regulation mechanisms.
Additionally, the book analyzes the theoretical and practical issues caused by asymmetric information in China's regulation reform of network industries, providing a theoretical foundation and policy recommendations for the next phase of regulation reform in China's network industries. The research attempted in this book holds significant theoretical meaning and also provides very important practical guidance.