A History of Chinese Human Nature Theory: Pre-Qin Period

Author: Xu Fuguan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-04-01
Features: Xu Fuguan is a major representative figure of New Confucianism in China. His work A History of Chinese Human Nature Theory is widely regarded as a counterpart to Tang Junyi's On the Origin of Chinese Philosophy (Part on Nature), often cited as twin pillars of contemporary scholarship in this field. This book, dedicated to the discussion of human nature theory, examines personality as its central focus, particularly emphasizing the use of insights gained from ancient philosophers' own life experiences to grasp the intrinsic connections within the complete life of pre-Qin thinkers. As a result, it achieves a concise yet profound understanding. In this book, the author strives to use inductive methods to clarify the specific meanings of abstract terms used by different schools and individuals, providing them with clear definitions. Additionally, it highlights cases where the same abstract terms are used but refer to different scopes, which helps to dispel unnecessary historical confusion. For instance, the terms "ming" (fate) and "tianming" (divine fate) in the Analects cannot be distinguished through traditional exegesis, leading to many irrelevant debates about Confucius's statement "At fifty, I understood the divine fate." However, by employing inductive methods, the author clarifies their distinct meanings, thereby achieving some degree of clarification. This demonstrates that using inductive methods to supplement the shortcomings of traditional exegesis is an important consideration for those studying the history of thought. Personality differs from ordinary objects. Ordinary objects are quantifiable, divisible, and computable, whereas personality is qualitative, non-quantifiable, and indivisible. Human nature theory is a study centered on personality. The abstract terms in human nature theory are not based on reasoning but on the experiential insights of ancient philosophers in their own lives and experiences. These can be called "qualitative terms." The characteristic of qualitative terms lies in that the content represented by the same term often corresponds to the "hierarchical nature" of personality, thereby exhibiting its own "hierarchical nature." For example, in the Analects, the term "ren" (benevolence) varies in its implications depending on the hierarchical level of the inquirer. However, this is not a parallel difference but a hierarchical one. Parallel differences may involve mutual influence between different things, but these are often external connections. Hierarchical differences, on the other hand, represent an intrinsic connection within a three-dimensional, complete life, whether moving from the lower to the higher or vice versa. Some Western philosophers, writers, and aesthetes who prioritize the body as their foundation often construct philosophical systems based on these intrinsic connections, expressing them through corresponding textual structures. This makes it easier for readers to follow their reasoning and gain a realistic understanding. Chinese ancient philosophers, however, often presented their insights as ready-made facts in simple statements, without consciously constructing a theoretical system. Many of these statements were spontaneous and context-dependent, leading to the intrinsic connections within the complete life being obscured by isolated, standalone phrases. If we fail to collect these scattered statements, use comparative, analytical, and "experiential tracking" methods to discover their intrinsic connections, and construct them accordingly, and instead rely on fragmented insights and Western reasoning frameworks for judgment, it is like arbitrarily cutting a cross-section of a three-dimensional, complete life and concluding that the life is merely this way and never that way. How much more reckless and reckless is this? Feng Youlan's History of Chinese Philosophy claims to represent the orthodox school, but it offers little contribution to the Mohists (Bianzers) and falls far short of understanding Confucius, Laozi, Mencius, and Zhuangzi, especially Confucius and Mencius, even at the most superficial level. This is not due to his dishonesty but rather to his failure to pass this critical threshold. The author's efforts in this regard may not yet yield significant achievements, but through the discovery of intrinsic connections, scattered statements (e.g., "ren" in the Analects) can be integrated into a complete life, fulfilling their role and occupying their proper positions, while also serving as mutual corroboration among themselves.