Battlefield Notes -- Future Warfare Through the Eyes of a Chinese General

Author: Zhu Zengquan
Author Country: China
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-05-01
Features: The similarity between future wars and modern wars lies in the fact that both strategic formulation and war implementation must be operated by humans. War remains the highest form of political struggle among humans. Future wars place greater emphasis on the use of information—global information, strategic information, operational information, battlefield information, and the analysis and application of various types of information—all of which directly influence the outcome of battles. The advanced or outdated means of transmitting this information often determine the outcome of the war even before it begins. However, Zhu Zengquan, with his sharp insight, points out that the Iraq War, as a new-generation war in the information age, was "unintelligible," leading many experts to analyze it with the of traditional wars, resulting in "great observation errors" and many outdated war concepts. He meticulously analyzes these errors and offers bold, incisive insights into future wars, addressing issues such as U.S. new warfare tactics, information warfare, the U.S.-British "intelligence scandal," and prisoner-related matters. His analysis provides unique perspectives on highly controversial modern and future wars.
Excerpt: Understanding New-Generation Warfare (1)
The operational forms of future wars will occur more frequently indoors. Baghdad had fallen for several days, and the Iraq War was nearing its end. People had enthusiastically followed the nearly month-long live war coverage on TV, but upon reflection, they realized a problem: the Iraq War was an "unintelligible war," and the Battle of Baghdad (tentatively called a "battle") was also an "unintelligible battle." Military experts, international affairs experts, and even some foreign generals, military commentators, and media outlets who daily analyzed the war's progress had largely failed in their assessments, especially regarding their predictions about the Battle of Baghdad, which were almost entirely incorrect. Everyone said the U.S.-British coalition would wait for the newly arrived 100,000 reinforcements before attacking Baghdad. Yet, the U.S. Third Mechanized Division and the First Marine Division advanced without waiting for support, moving at an extraordinary speed straight into the outskirts of Baghdad. Everyone said the Iraqi Republican Guard was a crack force, and their combat power should not be underestimated. Yet, the Iraqi Republican Guard was completely defeated and "disappeared." Everyone said there would be fierce urban warfare in Baghdad, and the U.S. military would face heavy casualties, while Bush would be besieged by Congress. Yet, the U.S. capture of Baghdad was unexpectedly swift, easy, and smooth. And so on. At this point, people suddenly found themselves holding an exam paper: Can you understand new-generation warfare? Facing this question, many felt awkward: "I don’t understand," "I don’t quite understand," "I don’t fully understand." Everyone could imagine Iraq’s defeat, but why did the war unfold this way? It wasn’t clear, not very clear, not at all clear. The Iraqi army was defeated too quickly, too miserably, too shamefully; the U.S.-British coalition won too quickly, too easily, and it was far too lenient toward them. The Iraq War was somewhat "unintelligible" for many reasons. A fundamental reason is that the Iraq War was a new-generation war in the information age, yet people continued to view it through the of traditional wars, resulting in "great observation errors" and a sense that it defied the norms of war, making it "unintelligible." Some say, "War is hard to explain and unpredictable," and wars will always have some "unanswerable mysteries." But on the other hand, striving to find and grasp the general patterns of war progress amidst unpredictability is an inevitable requirement of any military theory. Defining this Iraq War can be done in three ways: information warfare, informatized warfare, or warfare in the information age. The term "information warfare" has various interpretations from different branches of the military, schools of thought, scholars, and disciplines, leading to endless debates and no consensus, making it difficult to unify. Some scholars advocate using the broader term "informatized warfare." However, applying it to define the Iraq War presents problems. Because the U.S. Fourth Mechanized Division, the digital force that best represents the characteristics of informatized warfare, was unable to participate in the main battles due to the blocked plan to "pass through" Turkey and the rapid development of the war, it did not have the opportunity to be fully tested in actual combat. As a result, directly naming the Iraq War "informatized warfare" would be somewhat misleading. However, the Iraq War undoubtedly reflects many basic characteristics of informatized warfare, so I will temporarily refer to it as a new-generation war in the information age.
New-generation warfare is becoming a "culture," a live TV broadcast program, a ratings hit, and it has already "entered" households. This is one of the "new life" contents brought to humanity by the media tools of the information age. In the past, "participating in war" meant saying goodbye to family, rushing to the front lines, and bleeding and sacrificing. In the information age, the concept of "participating in war" has also become broader. Perhaps the computer on your desk is a war, and the moment you log on, you have arrived at a battlefield thousands of miles away. Clicking a mouse is like pulling the trigger, and sending an email is like firing a cannon at the enemy. All of this is no longer science fiction but the increasingly clear reality of new-generation warfare demonstrated by the Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the Afghanistan War, and even the Iraq War. Foreign scholars call this trend "the civilianization of war" and say, "The civilianization of war is an important feature of 21st-century warfare."
Worldwide, war correspondents and military commentators from various countries have extensively reported on and commented on the Iraq War. The knowledge of informatized warfare possessed by these special groups from different countries reveals a gap. Do not underestimate this gap; it must be viewed from the overall quality of a nation and its people. Because this overall quality is closely related to a nation’s and people’s ability to accept challenges and endure storms in the future. Those who want to win wars and those who want to avoid wars must all strive to understand today’s new-generation warfare. If you don’t understand, you will definitely lose; if you don’t understand, you won’t know how to avoid it. Sun Tzu said, "Know yourself and know your enemy, and you will not be in danger in a hundred battles." We aim to develop and seek peace, not "hundred battles." It is advisable to slightly modify this to say, "Know yourself and know your enemy, and war can be avoided." If war comes, you won’t be panicked or make inappropriate responses, driving you off course, into chaos, and beyond salvation. If that happens, the problem would be far worse.
There is a saying that has been around for many years: "Lag behind and suffer humiliation." The Chinese say this with firsthand pain, and the taste of humiliation is deeply engraved in their bones. The fear is that after shouting for 10 or 20 years, they have not truly understood in which areas they lag, how they lag, or to what extent they lag. Economic and technological backwardness is fundamental, but we are gratified that both areas are developing rapidly. Weaponry backwardness will give you a "color" on the battlefield, which is common sense and easy to understand. There is one more thing: outdated concepts, which are even more dangerous. But it is often easily ignored or underestimated, making it even more, even more dangerous.