Early Modernization in Hunan (1860–1916)

Author: Zhang Pengyuan
Publisher:
Publishing Date: 2002-12-01
Features: The first edition of this book was printed in mainland China in the 1970s. A group of historians in Taiwan organized a collective research project named "Regional Research on China's Modernization," and I participated in this project as one of its leaders. We used the then-popular concept of "modernization" as our research framework, dividing the country into seventeen regions, and conducted the study in two phases. In the first phase, we studied ten coastal and river regions, and in the second phase, we studied seven inland regions. Although I am not from Hunan, I chose Hunan as the research scope for the first phase. This book is the result of that research project. Modernization research has passed in the West, and today "post-modernization" is in vogue. It seems that our research is outdated. In fact, it is not. While modernization is rarely discussed in the West, the concept remains very useful in China as a latecomer to modernization. It is particularly suitable for observing changes in the 19th and 20th centuries. Thanks to the recommendation of Professor Ouyang Zhesheng of Peking University and the generous support of the academic community in Hunan, this book has been published in its third edition by Changsha Yuelu Book Society. The society asked me to write a short preface, but I do not intend to repeat the composition and promotion of the regional research plan. Readers can get a general idea by reading the Preface to this book. Here, I would like to talk about the origin and insights of my research on Hunan.
After the war (1946), I moved from Guiyang to Shanghai with my school, passing through Hunan. I stayed in Zhijiang for some time, lingered in Xiangtan for a few days, lived in Changsha for a long time, and then lingered in Hengyang before entering Jiangxi from Chaling and leaving the charming land of fish and rice. During my three-week trip to Hunan, as a young man under twenty, I did not have much understanding, but intentionally or unintentionally, I compared Guizhou with Hunan. Both regions had a fierce folk spirit, but Guizhou was much poorer and more backward, with people living a much harder life, which made me sigh. Hunan was prosperous and had great potential for development, which was my intuition, perhaps the foreshadowing of my involvement in Hunan's research in the regional plan twenty-six years later.
In my early academic career, I focused on the history of political thought. In this book, I wrote "Liang Qichao and the Revolution of the Late Qing," and some people, seeing the title, thought I had made a mistake, saying that Liang Qichao was a monarchist and had nothing to do with the revolution. I replied that I was not mistaken. From 1895 to 1898, during the period of Hunan's new policies, Liang Qichao came to the Tsung-wu College as the chief instructor, and his teaching and preaching were aimed at the revolution. Tan Sitong, Tang Caichang, and Xiong Xiling, a group of Hunanese who worked with Liang, were undeniably revolutionary martyrs. They worked together with Liang to promote the great cause of reviving China. These Hunanese left a deep impression on me. Further understanding of the Hunanese people was the direct motivation for my research on Hunan.
To study the early modernization of Hunan, one must first ask about its development potential and when its modernization began. Second, one must ask about the changes in its politics, economy, and society. Here, I will briefly summarize my personal findings and insights, which can be considered a summary.
(1) Hunan had two major development potentials: First, in the 19th century, the annual output of rice was about 180 million shi, one-third of which was enough to feed the entire province, and the remaining two-thirds was sold as cash crops, the income from which could drive modernization. Second, the character of the Hunanese people is strong and hardworking, with a strong pursuit of achievement, which is an excellent condition for modernization.
(2) While Hunan had the potential for modernization, it also had obstacles to modernization. In the 19th century, Hunan's conservative forces were very stubborn. By 1860, modernization had already begun to sprout in coastal areas and showed signs of activation, but Hunan's conservative forces were strong, opposing the introduction of Western affairs into the province, delaying Hunan's modernization by twenty years compared to coastal areas.
(3) The defeat of the First Sino-Japanese War was a strong stimulus to the Hunanese people. After their awakening, they promoted Hunan's new policies, demanding comprehensive reforms. They established the South Society to practice political participation and the Defense Bureau to establish a police system. They developed underground resources to form capital and established modern schools to cultivate talent. Hunan's new policies left a deep impression, and many of the innovations in the later constitutional movement were also worth praising.
(4) By the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Hunan's economy and society had developed, but the turbulent national situation slowed down the progress of modernization. After the Xinhai Revolution (1911), warlords took power, and the modernization process stagnated, requiring continued efforts.
During the writing of this book, due to the separation of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the author could not personally come to Hunan to examine archival materials. Moreover, with limited personal knowledge, errors are inevitable. I humbly ask the advanced scholars of Hunan for their guidance.
Zhang Pengyuan
July 30, 2001, in Nanfang, Taiwan
Any form of society, in the course of its evolution, inevitably faces crises. When crises arise, the ruling class will inevitably try to alleviate them, leading to the emergence of social relief systems and charitable causes. China is a traditional agricultural society with two major crises: natural disasters like floods, droughts, and wars, and the stark disparity between the rich and the poor, both of which have been mentioned earlier. To alleviate these "natural disasters and human misfortunes," storage systems and charitable causes have been continuously improved. This section will briefly discuss these two aspects.
(1) Storage Systems
In China, storage systems originated more than two thousand years ago. In the early Han Dynasty, Jia Yi argued for "accumulating grain to prevent famine," which was perhaps the earliest such proposal. This idea was strongly supported by Chao Cuo and was initially implemented in border prefectures with some success. During the Sui Dynasty, she storage systems were established, and during the Tang Dynasty, yi storage systems were set up, both of which played a role in disaster relief. Wang Anshi, during the Song Dynasty, used the funds of the changping storage system to issue qingmiao money, but due to improper implementation, it faced criticism at the time. However, Zhu Xi reconsidered and promoted the changping storage system in Zhejiang, achieving significant results in grain storage. Since then, establishing storage systems to stabilize prices has become a tradition.
Storage systems are divided into three types: changping, she, and yi. The differences may be due to the location of the storage or the source of the stored rice, but their function is all for relief. Changping and yi storage systems are mostly set up in the seats of prefectures and counties, but yi storage systems are also built in rural areas. She storage systems are completely scattered in rural areas. Changping storage systems are public and funded by the government, but they also accept donations from wealthy families. Yi and she storage systems are entirely funded by private donations, some managed by the government, and others run by the people.
In Hunan, storage systems are called changping and she. The former are built by the government, and the latter are built by the people. In the 43rd year of the Kangxi reign (1704), it was stipulated that large prefectures and counties must store at least 10,000 shi, medium prefectures 8,000 shi, and small prefectures 6,000 shi, which became the custom. The functions of storage systems are twofold: releasing grain and providing relief. The so-called "selling in summer and autumn, buying back in winter and spring" serves the purpose of stabilizing prices. During the lean season, grain is sold at a fair price, ensuring that people have food. In autumn, when the harvest comes, the price of grain falls, and the grain is returned in full for the next year, which is the release of grain. In years of famine, grain is distributed to disaster victims to maintain social stability, which is relief.
Although Hunan's storage system had some management problems, it performed well overall. During the Yongzheng reign, the storage amount was set at 702,133 shi. By the 13th year of the Qianlong reign (1748), the storage reached 1,256,414 shi, with over 500,000 shi overflowing and 49,306 shi lent out, 218,680 shi sold, and 118,925 taels of silver not included. The average storage per prefecture and county was often over 120,000 shi. At that time, Jiangsu and Zhejiang lacked grain and relied on Hunan for supplies, with over 300,000 shi allocated for relief, showing Hunan's wealth.
Generally speaking, the richest prefectures and counties were Changsha, Liujiang, Liling, Xiangtan, Yiyang, Ningxiang, Xiangxiang, Youxian, Chaling, Hengyang, Qingquan, Hengshan, Lingling, Qiyang, Chenzhou, and Jizhou. The poorer prefectures and counties were Huayong, Yongding, Baojing, Yongshun, and Sangzhi. The worst were Yongshui and Qianzhou, but their storage was still no less than several thousand shi.
After the Xinhai Revolution, the revolutionaries overthrew the old regime, but the constitutionalists took control of the situation. However, after the second year of the Republic, the constitutionalists joined the Nationalist Party, which gradually gained power. The Nationalist Party controlled the overall situation and took radical actions against Yuan Shikai, but did little for local development. In the third year, Yuan Shikai's power extended into Hunan, and the situation in the province dimmed. In the fifth year, Tan Yancheng took charge of Hunan again but did not have time to make any achievements before leaving office again. Later, Hunan fell under the rule of the Northern Army generals Fu Liangju and Zhang Jingyao, making the people of Hunan even more suffering. In the ninth year, Wu Peifu left Hunan, and the people of Hunan united to drive out Zhang Jingyao. Tan Yancheng took charge of Lingling and returned to Changsha in September, proposing the idea of provincial autonomy and taking charge of Hunan for the third time. However, he was soon replaced by his subordinate Zhao Hengtai, marking the end of Tan Yanchao's era in Hunan.
Hunan was not peaceful after the Republic, largely because of the conflict between the North and the South, making it a victim. During this period, there was no construction, and the progress of modernization was hindered. A political scientist said, "Internal turmoil has lost the spirit of governance, destroyed political systems, and ignored the public interest." In other words, internal turmoil delayed the progress of modernization, and Hunan is a good example.
The above briefly discusses the major trends of the late Qing and early Republic, which can be considered an introduction to this chapter. The following discussion will be divided into topics such as political participation, educational reform, judicial independence, and military reform, interwoven with the concept of modernization to explore substantive changes. A regional change may only have regional effects or may even cause nationwide impacts, and this should be observed and explained.
### Section 2: The Emergence of Political Participation
Most political scientists believe that "political participation" is an important part of political development, and some even call it a revolution in political science, triggered by the outbreak of participation. Participation generally includes a sound representative system and independent public opinion. The representative system is particularly important because representatives are elected directly by the people and are the focus of modern political development. Under the influence of this trend, China experienced the emergence of participation. Long before the Wuxu Reform, figures like Zheng Guanying, Chen Chi, Chen Qiu, Tang Zhen, He Qi, and Hu Liyuan all discussed the issue of the national assembly. Kang Youwei even clearly stated: "Establishing a parliament to communicate with the people and base everything on public opinion," and even conveyed this idea directly to the emperor. However, such discussions were merely a prelude, and the Wuxu Reform failed without achieving anything. After the failure of the reform, the Qing court temporarily turned conservative, rejecting modernization. However, several years later, it could no longer resist the trend of the times and, under the demand of the constitutionalists and external factors, voluntarily implemented preparatory constitutionalism, allowing political participation to emerge.
After the establishment of the Republic, under the influence of the democratic and republican trend, participation was further encouraged. There were the two houses of parliament at the center and provincial and county assemblies at the local level. Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai did not tolerate the existence of political parties and arbitrarily closed the national assembly, making political participation a fleeting phenomenon. After Yuan Shikai exposed his imperial ambitions, local assemblies were also destroyed, and China reverted to a state of autocracy. After Yuan Shikai's death, the national assembly was reopened, and local assemblies were also restored, but soon political struggles resumed, and the national assembly was dissolved again.
The second election in the seventh year of the Republic was held when the North and the South had already split. The third election in the eleventh year of the Republic saw only 11 provinces participate, merely a hollow name. The third reopening of the old national assembly in the twelfth year saw Cao Kun bribe the election, making representatives "piglet" legislators, and the national assembly had no substance of participation. After the war between the Northern Warlords, the Northern Expedition of the Nationalist Party, and until 1936, when the Nationalist Party returned power to the people, there was no national assembly again. This is a general outline of the evolution of political participation in the late Qing and the Republic.
Overall, China's parliamentary politics is still in its infancy. The following discussion will start from local self-government and conclude with national participation. The people of Hunan engaged in local parliamentary construction at home and sent representatives to participate in central politics. Therefore, urban and rural self-government, provincial and county assemblies, and the national assembly are all included in the discussion, and three questions are attempted to be answered: First, since political participation is still in its infancy, what is the level of its emergence? This is the issue of people's political awareness. For example, in voting, do people understand the sacredness of their ballots? How many people voted? Second, did the elected representatives act? Did they truly speak for the people's interests? Third, China must industrialize, do the members of parliament recognize this issue? How much of their discussion in the assembly involves social and economic construction? If these questions can be answered reasonably, the future of political participation can be envisioned.
Hunan's modern education also faced some resistance. The development of the past ten years in the late Qing Dynasty was impressive, but not entirely satisfactory, due to the following reasons: First, financial difficulties. As mentioned in the section on finance and budget, the various difficulties and chaos of finance affected education significantly. In the 27th year of the Guangxu reign (1901), the Qing court issued an edict ordering all provinces to establish large and middle schools, but regarding financial sources, it emphasized "raising funds locally" for primary schools and "allowing private donations" for nurseries. Due to financial difficulties at the center, the only source of funds for local governments was school land, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, school land was extremely limited and could not support large-scale schooling. Taking Lanshan County as an example, the county had 100 shi of school land, worth no more than 300 to 400 taels of silver, making the financial situation very difficult. The county had only a few primary schools with poor facilities and low teacher salaries. The Lanshan County Gazetteer states: "The salary of the principal of a high primary school is not as high as that of a government clerk, and the salary of a primary school teacher is not as high as that of a rural laborer." Therefore, the quality of teachers was poor, and the level was low. The situation in Cili County was even worse. By the 12th year of the Republic, the county had one high school, nine high primary schools, and 133 primary schools, the numbers of which seemed impressive. However, except for the annual funds of two or three million jian for high schools and high primary schools, the funds for national primary schools were "too heavy to lift a tripod or too light to carry a bowl," or they had to beg from door to door and let them rise or fall on their own, with some even like mayflies, born in the morning and dead by the evening.
Second, difficulties in finding teachers. As mentioned earlier, the difficulties in finding teachers were various. In a transforming society, the difficulty of emerging enterprises lies in their initial stages: Yu Liansan, governor of the province, stated in the 28th year of the Guangxu reign (1902) that the difficulty of establishing schools was not in their crude scale but in finding qualified teachers. In reality, schools could not even achieve a crude scale, let alone find enough teachers, so they had to start by sending students abroad and limited to Changsha alone. Most of the overseas studies were for short-term courses, and at this critical time of urgent need for teachers, short-term courses were an unavoidable measure.
Third, local turmoil destroyed education. The late Qing and early Republic were an era of great turmoil in local areas, with frequent banditry, affecting schools and causing them to open and close repeatedly. Some were occupied by troops as barracks, with door panels used as beds and desks as firewood, and various forms of destruction made schools unable to hold classes, eventually leading to closure.
Fourth, the conflict between the old and the new affected the development of education. The conflict between the old and the new in Hunan was more obvious than in other provinces. Wang Xiansheng, leading the conservative forces, opposed the new policies, which led to their failure. Without the promotion of the court, modern education would have been difficult to develop. Although they could not openly oppose, they secretly resisted everywhere, and the failure of Hunan's education to achieve expected progress was greatly related to the obstruction of conservative scholars. Taking textbooks as an example, Wang Xiansheng said he did not oppose modern education, but there was no need to compile textbooks. He said: "Primary schools can read the Four Books and Five Classics," so there is no need for other textbooks. High schools have the Five Classics for reading and the Canon of the Hundred Schools and Historical Records for exploration, so there is no need for textbooks. Universities have books that have been studied daily, which are already classified by subject, with classics, history, ethics, and literary studies all classified, leisurely and satisfied, deepening and self-fulfilling, enough for a lifetime, so why would there be any need for other textbooks?" He opposed the teaching of natural sciences in textbooks, saying: "The study of craftsmanship is something that is below the realm of the world, different from the metaphysics of high schools, and not the key to governing the world." The delay in compiling textbooks was related to Wang's attitude.