The economic nature of the enterprise

Author: Louis Putterman
Publisher:
Publication Date: 2000-06-01
Features: Except for this preface and introduction, the content in this collection is selected from self-published books or professional journals. Each article in the collection includes a source introduction, which comprehensively introduces the original literature publisher and expresses gratitude to the authors for authorizing the use of these materials. Regarding papers, the completeness and excerpt procedures are indicated by terms such as "reprinted from," "slightly abridged," "abridged," and "excerpts from" depending on the extent of the abridgment. Regarding this book, the selected content is only a very small part of the original. The chapter or section from the original book that each article is excerpted from is mentioned in the title of the article. This book is divided into four parts, with the main content including the editor's preface, "The Economic Nature of the Firm: Second Edition Introduction," "Introduction to the Chinese Edition," and Part I: Within and Between Firms: Labor Division, Relevant Discussions in The Wealth of Nations, Relevant Discussions in The Capital, Relevant Discussions in Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, The Use of Knowledge in Society, Relational Transactions: Economics and Complex Contracts, Relevant Discussions in The Visible Hand
Part II: The Scope of the Firm, The Nature of the Firm, Vertical Integration, Exploitable Rent and Competitive Contracting Processes, Governance of Contractual Relationships, Industrial Organization, The Constraints of the Firm: Incentives and Administrative Characteristics, Negotiation Costs, Influence Costs and the Organization of Economic Activity, A Theory of Multiproduct Firms
Part III: Employment Relationships, Human Factors and Internal Organization, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, Competitive Exchange: A New Microfoundation for the Political Economy of Capitalism, Understanding Employment Relationships: An Analysis of Specificity in Exchange, Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job Design, The Prisoner's Dilemma in The Visible Hand: An Analysis of Intrafirm Labor Productivity, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, Profit Sharing and Labor Productivity
Part IV: The Financing and Control of the Firm, Mergers and Corporate Control Markets, Agency Problems and Firm Theory, Firm Theory: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions, Ownership Structure and Firm Theory, Firm Theory: An Economist's Perspective, Ownership and the Nature of the Firm, References.