The Impact of Maritime Power on History

Author: Mahan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-01-01
Features: The purpose of writing this book is very clear, which is to seriously study the general history of Europe and America, and to research the impact of naval power on the historical development of Europe and America. Generally speaking, historians know little about maritime conditions. Sometimes they have no special interest in the sea, nor do they have professional knowledge in this area; therefore, they often overlook the profound impact of naval power on major events. Sometimes they have a relatively good understanding of the overall trend of naval power development, but they are not very clear about the role of naval power in specific situations. Generally speaking, it is relatively easy to say that the use and control of the sea, whether now or in the past, have become an important factor in the development of world history; however, it is relatively difficult to identify and explain the exact meaning of naval power in a specific situation. However, unless we achieve this, simply acknowledging the importance of naval power in a general and vague manner will remain vague and unrealistic; because such recognition is not, as it should be, based on collecting some special examples and analyzing the specific environmental conditions of these examples to clearly explain the exact role of naval power. We can take the example of two British writers who underestimated the impact of naval power on major events as evidence. These two examples seem difficult to understand, because compared to other countries, the strength of Britain owes more to the sea. One British writer, Arnold, wrote in his book "History of Rome" that: "In history, there have been two times when unique geniuses fought against the resources and organizations of a large country. But every time, the large country won. Once it was Hannibal① who fought Rome for 17 years; the other was Napoleon who fought Britain for 16 years. Hannibal's fight ended at Zama; Napoleon's fight ended at Waterloo." Another British writer, Sir Edward Creasy, when quoting the book "History of Rome," added: "But almost no sufficient and detailed research has been conducted on the similarities of these two struggles. This is the case of the Roman general Scipio② who finally defeated the powerful Carthage, and the British general Wellington who completely overthrew the French emperor. They were both senior and important commanders for many years, but they were far away from the main battlefield of the war. They each spent their most important military career in the same country—Spain. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, continuously encountered and defeated almost all the generals who were in a secondary position before opposing the main fighters and the conqueror himself. Scipio and Wellington both restored the confidence of their compatriots in the war after a series of defeats, and each of them only ended a long and dangerous war after completely and thoroughly defeating the selected enemy commander and the selected enemy with combat experience." The above two British writers did not mention this even more astonishing coincidence, that in these two wars, the victors all controlled the sea. The Romans controlled the sea routes, forcing Hannibal to undertake the long and dangerous march through Gaul③. During the march, more than half of the veteran soldiers became weak, which allowed Scipio, who was sent from the Rh?ne to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's supply lines, return home, and deal with the invaders at Trebia. Throughout the war, the Roman legions moved back and forth between Hannibal's base in Spain and Italy along the sea routes without interruption, full of vigor. At the decisive battle of the Metaurus River, compared to the armies of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, the Roman troops were in a positional advantage, which should have been the key to determining the outcome of the battle. However, because Hasdrubal, the brother of Hannibal, could only transport reinforcements from Spain to Gaul by land and not by sea, the Roman legions ultimately won this battle. After that, at the decisive moment of the war, the two armies of Carthage were separated in the narrow Italy, one of which was destroyed by the joint actions of two Roman generals. On the other hand, naval historians rarely consider the connection between general history and the specific topic they study—naval history. They are usually limited to simply compiling the chronology of naval events. Compared to the British, the French are not like this; the talented and educated French can seriously investigate the reasons for the extraordinary results and the interrelationships between various events. However, as far as I know, no book has ever been written to teach the specific topic we are discussing here, that is, to evaluate the impact of naval power on historical development and the prosperity and vitality of nations. As for some historical works that discuss the war, politics, society, and economic conditions of various countries, they only occasionally and generally mention some maritime events. The purpose of this book is to place maritime interests in a prominent position, but not to detach them from the causal surrounding environment in the overall history, and to attempt to explain how the surrounding environment affects maritime interests and how maritime interests change the surrounding environment. The historical period covered in this book begins with the unique sailing ship era in 1660 and ends with the end of the American Revolutionary War in 1783. Although the continuity of the general history based on a series of maritime events in this book is not very obvious, it has done its best to provide an accurate and clear outline. As a naval officer who loves his profession, I was not hesitant or restrained when writing this book and went off-topic to discuss naval policy, naval strategy, and naval tactics; I avoided using naval technical terms as much as possible, hoping that the simple issues raised in this book will attract the interest of non-professional readers. a·t Mahan December 1889 This book is a successful work of Mahan's theory of naval power and the th work of the trilogy on naval power. It is divided into fourteen chapters, mainly including the discussion of the components of naval power, the European situation in 1660, the Second Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–1667, the Battle of Lowestoft and the Four Days' Battle, etc.