The concept of politics

Author: Schmitt
Publisher:
Publication Date: 2003-09-01
Features: This is the first volume of the Chinese edition of Schmitt's Collected Works, containing 6 of Schmitt's shorter but highly influential essays, along with 3 appendices, making a total of 9 papers. Among them, The Concept of the Political was translated into 15 languages by 1997 (a Russian translation has recently been added), Political Theology into 13 languages, and Roman Catholicism and Political Forms even has two English translations. The 6 essays are arranged in chronological order of their first publication, but the translations are based on the latest versions, which include prefaces or postfaces added by the author after the initial publication. Political Theology, published in 1922, was reprinted multiple times after its 1933 second edition, with no changes. This edition is based on the 6th edition of 1993, translated by Dr. Zongkun Liu. Although the title includes the word "theology," it is not a theological work in the conventional sense but rather a public law treatise in Schmitt's political legal sense, with strong polemical intent against pure jurisprudence. Roman Catholicism and Political Forms (Romischer Katholizismus und Politische Form) was first published in 1923 and translated into English in 1931 (The Necessity of Politics: An Essay on Representative Deputies in Church and Modern Europe, trans. by E.M. Codd, London: Sheed & Ward). It is the earliest of Schmitt's works to be translated into English. The translator was a scholar in the Catholic community, indicating that the work was not highly valued by political theorists in the U.S. and Britain at the time. In the 1980s, academic interest in Schmitt surged in the Anglo-American world, and this English translation was revised and republished as The Idea of Representation (Washington D.C., 1988). However, scholars still considered this translation unreliable, and several years later, a new translation (Roman Catholicism and Political Form, trans. by G.L. Ulmen, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996) was produced. Although this book is relatively short, it addresses fundamental issues of modern political philosophy—the representativeness of politics—making it quite significant. It was translated by Professor Feng Liu based on the 1963 German edition and referencing the two English translations. Excerpt: Sovereignty is the decision on the exception. Only this definition suits the conceptual nature (Grenzbegriff) of this term. Unlike the lax usage in general literature, a concept's being situational does not mean it is ambiguous but rather that it has broad applicability. Therefore, the definition of sovereignty must be tied to the situational case (Grenzfall), not the conventional. The exceptional state (Ausnahmezustand) is understood as a common concept in state theory, not merely a concept used for emergency decrees or crisis situations, and this will become clear shortly. The exceptional state truly fits the juridical definition of sovereignty, and this claim has systematic juridical foundations. Making a decision on the exception is a decision in the true sense. Since the general norms represented by the conventional state can never encompass a radical exception, the decision made in a true exception cannot be derived from the conventional at all. When Robert von Mohl said that the verification of whether an emergency state (Notstand) exists cannot be a juridical verification (Monographien, S. 626), he was assuming that juridical decisions are entirely derived from normative content. But the problem lies here. When Mohl elaborated his argument in general terms, his thought was merely an expression of liberal constitutionalism (rechtsstaatlichem Liberalismus), failing to grasp the unique meaning of the decision. Whether, practically or theoretically, one accepts the proposal to define sovereignty as the highest power rather than derivative authority is indeed irrelevant. Generally, abstract concepts are not subject to debate, especially in the history of sovereignty. What is debatable is how it is applied, i.e., who makes the decision in cases involving public interest, national interest, and public safety (les salut public). The exceptional state is not incorporated into existing legal systems; it is best described as an extreme danger threatening the survival of the state, or similar situations. However, this concept cannot be concretely defined or made to fit any existing legal framework. Only states of emergency (Ausnahmezustand) truly align with the theme of sovereignty, i.e., with the entire issue of sovereignty. One cannot predict the exact details of an emergency state or what will happen in such a situation, especially when dealing with extreme emergencies and seeking to eliminate them. In such cases, the premise and content of judicial authority (Kompetenz) must be unlimited. From the perspective of liberal constitutionalism, there is no judicial authority at all. The guiding role of the constitution can at most indicate who can act in such situations. If such actions are not subject to various controls, or are not restricted and balanced as in a constitutional state, then the ruler is self-evident. The ruler decides whether an extreme emergency exists and what measures to take to eliminate it. He stands outside the formally effective legal order and does not belong to it, because it is he who decides whether the constitution should be completely suspended. All trends in modern constitutional development tend to limit the ruler in this sense. The ideas of Hugo Krabbe and Hans Kelsen, which will be discussed in later chapters, are consistent with this development. However, whether such extreme exceptions can be eradicated from the world is not a juridical issue. Whether someone believes or hopes that such exceptions can be eliminated depends on philosophy, particularly philosophical-historical or metaphysical beliefs.