Rationality and Value

Author: Yang Guorong
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-04-01
Features: In the contemplation of existence, reason and value have always been one of the central concerns of philosophy. In terms of connotation, reason and value are two ambiguous and complex categories. Taking reason as an example, when it is contrasted with sensibility, it can refer to the capacity and form of cognition, or it can represent the universal essence distinct from individual existence (as compared to sensibility, reason more profoundly embodies the universal essence of the species). In Kant's three-dimensional structure of sensibility, understanding, and reason, reason points to metaphysical objects. In a broad sense of the cognitive process, reason also reveals different dimensions of cognition and evaluation. Related to this is the distinction between instrumental reason and value reason. Similarly, corresponding to the multiple dimensions of human existence, value also takes on different forms, ranging from the narrow utilitarian form to the broader truth, goodness, and beauty. Value manifests itself in different domains of existence and contains multifaceted meanings. As dimensions of human existence and cultural creation, reason and value have an interwoven and integrated aspect. Rational contemplation is often linked with concerns for value; the interaction between cognition and evaluation in the cognitive process, the fusion of reason and value in value reason, and so on, all indicate this. On the other hand, the focus on value often contains a rational dimension. This is not only because reason itself has a value but also because the evaluation process, which takes value as its content, is always permeated with rational consideration. At the ultimate level, value is always linked to needs. Ancient Chinese philosophy defined goodness as follows: "That which is desirable is called good" (Mencius·Mind-Heart Chapter). Goodness is a positive value, while desire involves human needs, which can be extended to desires in a narrow sense and, in a broader sense, include rational pursuits. From the latter perspective, the rational dimension constitutes the inherent content of value concerns. Of course, in a relative sense, reason and value also have their respective emphases. If the exploration of reason more directly points to the process of seeking truth, then the concern for value is more closely associated with the process of seeking goodness. In the process of seeking truth, issues always involve the heart and object, knower and known, knowledge and action, subject and object, as well as modes of thinking, cognitive stages, and logical inference, etc. In this sense, reason often appears in the form of pure reason or theoretical reason. In fact, since Kant, the critique of reason has been linked to the examination of the cognitive process. As a process pointing to the realm of facts, cognition primarily aims to attain truth. In contrast, the concern for value, which seeks goodness as its object, often cannot avoid issues such as behavioral norms, evaluation criteria, life ideals, and personal realms. The latter primarily involves broad ethics or moral philosophy. Theoretically, the construction of normative systems always presupposes the confirmation of value: people first define evaluation criteria based on value. Broadly speaking, value can be divided into two forms: intrinsic and extrinsic. Formal ethics or deontology emphasizes that certain norms themselves possess intrinsic value (are inherently good), and thus as long as behavior conforms to certain norms, it is considered good. Substantive ethics takes different forms, among which teleology highlights extrinsic value, emphasizing that the meaning of behavior is determined by its extrinsic outcomes. A reasonable approach lies in the unity of intrinsic and extrinsic value. In terms of the original significance of value for ethics, value theory seems to constitute the meta-theory (Meta-theory) of ethics or moral philosophy. Since the dawn of philosophical thought, reason and value, along with the dimensions of truth and goodness they contain, have been inseparably linked to the pursuit of wisdom. Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers, under different cultural and historical contexts and from their respective perspectives, have examined and positioned truth and goodness, reason and value differently. Some philosophers have emphasized the cognitive dimension of reason more, introducing cognitive reason into the realm of facts, making the pursuit of truth the central focus of philosophical concern. Others have placed greater emphasis on the pursuit of goodness and the ultimate concern for value, with goodness itself being divided into extrinsic utilitarian value and intrinsic virtue. The different understandings and emphases on reason and value, as well as the distinction between truth and goodness, gradually gave rise to the tension and opposition between scientism and humanism in modern times. Scientism has focused more on the realm of facts, but it has often rejected value concerns through the cognition of facts. Humanism has primarily focused on the realm of value, but it has also often led to the dissolution of truth in the name of goodness. How to reasonably position truth and goodness, reason and value, constitutes an enduring puzzle in the history of philosophy. Philosophical problems are often ancient yet ever-new. Although the way of asking questions and the approach to solving problems may vary depending on historical contexts, the problems faced or their connotations often have similarities. In the intellectual evolution since modern times, we can repeatedly observe various rebellions against reason. From philosophy to the broader cultural sphere, under banners such as anti-essentialism, deconstruction of the logos, and farewell to modernity, the irrational dimension has received increasing attention, and the depreciation and critique of reason seem to have become an emerging trend of the times. On the other hand, with the rise of instrumental reason and the gradual formation of a technologically driven society, the value of human existence has also begun to be challenged: in the triumphant march of technical reason, humans seem to gradually lose their subjectivity and tend toward objectification or even toolization, which is often accompanied by the loss of existential meaning and a crisis of value. This paradoxical historical phenomenon shows that problems in history have not become past. Philosophy cannot be reduced to narrow epistemology or ontology; narrow epistemology or ontology can primarily examine how to seek truth in the realm of facts, but as the doctrine of wisdom, philosophy takes the dual questioning of ultimate being (being) and human existence (existence) as its essence, making it difficult to transcend concerns for value. Similarly, philosophy cannot be understood merely as transcendental speculation disconnected from knowledge or irrational mystical insight. As mentioned earlier, in its original form, knowledge and wisdom, reason and value, truth and goodness are not separate from each other. The tensions and oppositions that emerged in the historical process should not be eternalized. From the history of philosophy, alongside the phenomenon of the division between truth and goodness, reason and value, there has always been a tendency to integrate the two. This tendency also provides historical guidance for today's reconstruction of the unity of reason and value, knowledge and wisdom, truth and goodness.