Game Learning Theory (Contemporary World Academic Classics · Economics Series)

Author: J?rgen W. Fudenberg
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-07-01
Features: In economics, the vast majority of non-cooperative game theory focuses on the study of equilibrium in games, particularly Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and why equilibria arise is that they are the result of players' analysis and introspection under the assumption that the rules of the game, players' rationality, and players' payoff functions are common knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this theory faces many problems. In the book Learning to Play Games, J?rgen W. Fudenberg and David K. Levine propose an alternative explanation: equilibria are the long-term outcomes of non-completely rational players seeking to optimize the process over time. The models they study provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and offer useful methods for economists to evaluate and improve traditional equilibrium concepts.