The Morality of Law Ping (Chinese Classics Translation)

Author: (USA) Fuller
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-11-01
Features: In this new edition of The Morality of Law, the first four chapters have not undergone significant changes, with only minor corrections. The only substantial alteration is the addition of Chapter 5, which is the final chapter titled "A Response to Critics." The fact that the first four chapters remain largely unchanged does not mean I am entirely satisfied with the presentation or substantive content they contain. It merely indicates that I have not made significant progress in rethinking the issues involved, and thus I have been unable to restate the views first expressed in the 1963 lectures in a way that reflects substantial changes. It also means that I still largely adhere to the positions I articulated in those lectures. I hope the newly added Chapter 5 is not merely seen as a rhetorical exercise. For many years, legal philosophy in the English-speaking world has been dominated by the traditions of Austin, Gray, Holmes, and Kelsen. The central position of their overall legal view does not mean that this perspective has been fully accepted: even its supporters often express discomfort with some of its implications. In the new concluding chapter of this book, I believe I have achieved a better formulation, enabling me to express my dissatisfaction with analytical legal positivism more accurately than before. For this, I am deeply grateful to my critics, especially H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, and Marshall Cohen. They do not always express their criticisms of me in a tactful manner, and precisely for this reason, their critiques are not obscured by the vague self-protective language common in rhetorical attacks. By clearly stating the fundamental premises of their thought, they have also helped me to clarify my own ideas in a similar way. Since some scholars with primary academic interests in legal sociology and anthropology have found value in this edition, I would like to offer a suggestion to readers who approach this book from similar academic interests. I recommend that they first read Chapters 2 and 5 in sequence, while temporarily skipping the other chapters. This reading approach can serve two purposes: on the one hand, it allows them to quickly find potentially valuable content related to their professional interests, and on the other hand, it gives them a general understanding of the fundamental disagreements among legal scholars in defining their research topics.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my secretary, Martha Anne Ellis, and Ruth D. Kaufman of Yale University Press, not only for their contributions to this book but also for saving me from many troubles. Their diligent work and meticulous understanding have freed me from time-consuming and anxiety-inducing details, as such trivial tasks are always part of the process of transforming a manuscript into a final printed product.