Early Modernization in Hunan [1860--1916]

Author: Zhang Pengyuan
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Features: In any form of society, during its evolutionary process, crises are inevitable; with crises, the ruling class inevitably attempts to alleviate them, leading to the emergence of social relief systems and charitable undertakings. China is a traditional agricultural society, with its two greatest crises being natural disasters (floods, droughts, and wars) and the stark wealth disparity, both of which have been previously mentioned. To address these "natural and human calamities," storage systems and charitable efforts have continuously been improved. This section will briefly discuss these two aspects.
(1) Storage Systems
Storage systems in China originated over two thousand years ago. In the early Han Dynasty, Jia Yi advocated for grain storage to prevent famine, considered one of the earliest proponents of the "grain accumulation to prevent hunger" theory. This idea was strongly supported by Chao Cuo and initially implemented in border regions with considerable success. During the Sui Dynasty, the Shè Cāng (Social Storage) system was established, and in the Tang Dynasty, the Yì Cāng (Charitable Storage) system was introduced, both proving effective in disaster relief. In the Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi used the funds of the Chángpíng Cāng (Stabilizing Price Granary) to establish the Qīngmiáo Cāng (Youth Grain Fund), but due to improper implementation, it faced widespread criticism. However, Zhu Xi later revised and promoted the Chángpíng Cāng system in Zhejiang, achieving remarkable results in grain storage. From then on, establishing storage systems to stabilize grain prices became a tradition.
Storage systems are divided into three categories: Chángpíng Cāng (Stabilizing Price Granary), Shè Cāng (Social Storage), and Yì Cāng (Charitable Storage). Their names may vary depending on their location or the source of the stored grain, but their purpose remains relief. The Chángpíng Cāng and Yì Cāng are mostly established in county seats, while the Shè Cāng are entirely located in rural areas. The Chángpíng Cāng is a public granary, funded by the government and accepting donations from wealthy families. The Yì Cāng and Shè Cāng are entirely funded by private donations, with some managed by the government and others run by local communities. In Hunan, storage systems are referred to as Chángpíng Cāng and Shè Cāng, with the former being government-run and the latter privately established. In 1704 (the 43rd year of the Kangxi reign), it was stipulated that large counties must store at least 10,000 dan of grain, medium counties 8,000 dan, and small counties 6,000 dan, which became standard practice.
The functions of these granaries are twofold: releasing grain and providing relief. The principle of "selling grain in spring and autumn" serves to stabilize prices. During the lean season, grain is sold at subsidized prices, ensuring the people have food. In autumn, when grain prices fall, the stored grain is repurchased to meet the next year's needs. In years of famine, grain is distributed to disaster victims to maintain social stability.
Although Hunan's storage system faced occasional management issues, it generally performed effectively. During the Yongzheng era, the storage capacity was set at 702,133 dan, and by 1748 (the 13th year of the Qianlong reign), it reached 1,256,414 dan, with over 500,000 dan in surplus. Additionally, 49,306 dan had been lent out, 218,680 dan sold, and 118,925 taels of silver stored (excluding these figures). On average, each county stored over 120,000 dan. At that time, Jiangsu and Zhejiang faced grain shortages, and Hunan provided over 300,000 dan in aid, showcasing its wealth. Generally, the wealthiest counties included Changsha, Liuyang, Liling, Xiangtan, Yiyang, Ningxiang, Xiangxiang, You County, Chaling, Hengyang, Qingquan, Hengshan, Lingling, Qiyang, Chenzhou, Jingzhou, Cili, and Guiyang, all storing over 10,000 dan. The least affluent counties were Huayong, Yongding, Baojing, Yongshun, and Sangzhi. The poorest were Yongshui and Qianzhou, but their storage levels remained above several thousand dan.
The Xinhai Revolution overthrew the old regime led by the revolutionaries, but the constitutionalists took control. After 1912, the constitutionalists joined the Nationalist Party, which gradually gained power. The Nationalists controlled the situation with radical actions against Yuan Shikai but achieved little in local governance. In 1913, Yuan Shikai's influence expanded into Hunan, dimming the province's prospects. In 1915, Tan Yenchun took control of Hunan again but left before making any significant changes. Later, rule by the Northern Army generals Fu Liangju and Zhang Jingyao made Hunan's people even more suffering. In 1918, Wu Peifu left Hunan, and the people united to drive out Zhang Jingyao. Tan Yenchun returned to Changsha in September and proposed the idea of provincial autonomy, marking his third term as governor. However, he was soon replaced by his general Zhao Hengtai, ending Tan's era in Hunan.
Hunan's instability after the Republic was largely due to the Northern-Southern conflicts, making it a victim of the struggle. During this period, little progress was made, and modernization was hindered. A political scientist remarked, "Internal turmoil destroyed the spirit of governance, disrupted political systems, and neglected public interests." In other words, internal chaos delayed modernization, with Hunan serving as a prime example. This section briefly outlines the major trends of the late Qing and early Republican era, serving as an introduction to the chapter. The following discussion will cover political participation, educational reforms, judicial independence, and military reforms, all intertwined with modernization to explore substantive changes. A regional change may have only local effects or trigger nationwide impacts, and this should be observed and explained.
### Section 2: The Emergence of Political Participation
Most political scientists consider "political participation" a crucial aspect of political development, with some even calling it a "revolution in political science" brought about by participation. Participation typically encompasses a healthy representative system and independent public opinion. Representative systems are particularly important because their representatives are elected directly by the people, a cornerstone of modern political development. Under the influence of this trend, participation emerged in China. Even before the Wuxu Reform, figures like Zheng Guanying, Chen Chi, Chen Qiu, Tang Zhen, He Qi, and Hu Liyuan discussed the issue of the national assembly. Kang Youwei even clearly stated: "Establishing assemblies to communicate with the people and base decisions on public opinion," and conveyed this idea directly to the emperor. However, such discussions were merely a prelude; the Wuxu Reform failed before achieving anything. After its failure, the Qing court turned reactionary, rejecting modernization. Yet years later, unable to resist the tide of the times, it reluctantly implemented preparatory constitutionalism under pressure from the constitutionalist faction and external factors, marking the emergence of political participation.
After the establishment of the Republic, under the democratic trend, participation was further encouraged. There were central assemblies with both the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as provincial and county assemblies. Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai tolerated no party politics and arbitrarily dissolved the national assembly, making political participation a fleeting phenomenon. After revealing his imperial ambitions, Yuan also suppressed local assemblies, returning China to a state of autocracy. After Yuan's death, the national assembly was reopened, and local assemblies were restored, but political struggles soon resumed, leading to another dissolution. The second election in 1918 occurred amid the Northern-Southern split. The third election in 1922 saw only 11 provinces participate, rendering it largely symbolic. The third reopening of the old national assembly in 1923 was marred by Cao Kun's bribery of legislators, turning representatives into "pigs" in the assembly, devoid of genuine participation. Later, amid the chaos of Northern Warlord conflicts and the Nationalist Northern Expedition, it wasn't until 1937 that the Nationalists returned power to the people, restoring the national assembly. This summarizes the evolution of political participation in the late Qing and Republican eras.
In general, China's parliamentary politics was still in its infancy. The following discussion will start with local autonomy and progress to national participation. The people of Hunan engaged in local parliamentary construction at home while also sending representatives to participate in central politics. Thus, discussions will cover urban-rural autonomy, provincial and county assemblies, and the national assembly, attempting to answer three questions: First, at the nascent stage of political participation, what is its current level? This concerns public political awareness, such as whether people understand the sanctity of their ballots and the number of voters. Second, have elected officials acted effectively? Do they genuinely represent the people's interests? Third, China must industrialize—do legislators recognize this issue? How much of their parliamentary discourse addresses social and economic development? If reasonable answers can be provided, the future of political participation can be envisioned.
Hunan's modern education also faced resistance. Although the decade of development in the late Qing Dynasty left a strong impression, it was far from satisfactory, due to several reasons: First, financial difficulties. As mentioned in the section on finance and budgets, the various fiscal challenges and chaos severely impacted education. In 1901 (the 27th year of the Guangxu reign), the Qing court ordered all provinces to establish primary and secondary schools, emphasizing "raising funds locally" for schools and "allowing private donations" for kindergartens. Due to central fiscal constraints, this became the only option. Local governments, however, struggled to implement these orders. The only source of revenue was school land, yet, as previously discussed, school land was extremely limited, hindering large-scale education. Take Lanshan County as an example: it had 100 dan of school land, worth only a few hundred taels of silver, making funds extremely scarce. The county had only a few schools with poor facilities and meager teacher salaries. The Lanshan County Records stated: "The principal of a high primary school earns less than a government clerk, and primary school teachers earn less than rural laborers." Thus, teacher quality was low, and standards were poor. Cili County fared even worse. By 1912, it had one secondary school, nine high primary schools, and 133 primary schools, but excluding the annual funds of 20,000 to 30,000 strings of cash for secondary and high primary schools, the primary schools "were like lifting a tripod to break an arm or begging door-to-door, left to their own devices." Some even ceased to exist overnight.
Second, teacher shortages. As previously mentioned, teacher shortages were a persistent issue. In a transforming society, the difficulty of new endeavors often lies in their initial stages. In 1902 (the 28th year of the Guangxu reign), Governor Yu Liansan reported the challenges of establishing schools: "It is not difficult to establish basic facilities but difficult to find qualified teachers." In reality, schools struggled to achieve even basic scale, let alone secure enough teachers, leading to the necessity of sending students abroad for studies and limiting efforts to Changsha alone. Most overseas studies were short-term crash courses, but given the urgent need for teachers, such programs were a temporary solution.
Third, local turmoil disrupted education. The late Qing and early Republican era was one of significant regional instability, with frequent banditry affecting schools, leading to their frequent closure. Some were occupied by troops as barracks, with doors used as beds and desks as firewood, rendering schools unable to function and eventually closing.
Fourth, conflicts between tradition and modernity hindered education development. Hunan's conflict between tradition and modernity was more pronounced than in other provinces. The conservative faction led by Wang Xianshan opposed reforms, contributing to their failure. Without imperial support, modern education struggled to advance. Although they could not openly oppose it, they covertly resisted everywhere, significantly hindering Hunan's educational progress. Take textbooks as an example. Wang Xianshan claimed not to oppose modern education but argued that compiling textbooks was unnecessary. He said: "Primary schools can read the Four Books and Five Classics," so there was no need for separate textbooks. Secondary schools "have the Five Classics for reading and the Canon of the Hundred Schools and historical texts for exploration," so textbooks were also unnecessary. For universities, "students have already studied books by subject, with classics, histories, ethics, and literary studies all divided into categories, allowing for leisurely and thorough learning throughout life—why would they need additional textbooks?" He opposed teaching natural sciences, saying: "The study of craftsmanship is materialistic, differing from the metaphysical focus of secondary education, and not a priority for governing the state." The delay in textbook compilation was partly due to Wang's stance.