History of Chinese Human Nature Theory: Pre-Qin Period

Author: Xu Fuguan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2002-07-01
Features: Xu Fuguan, a major representative of New Confucianism in China, is renowned for his work A History of Chinese Human Nature Theory, which is often hailed alongside Tang Junyi's On the Origin of Chinese Philosophy (Part on Nature) as the twin pillars of contemporary scholarship in this field. This book, dedicated to the discussion of human nature theory, examines personality as its central focus, particularly emphasizing the insights gained from the life experiences of ancient philosophers. It aims to grasp the intrinsic connections within the complete life of pre-Qin thinkers, thereby achieving a concise yet profound understanding.
In this book, the author primarily employs inductive methods to clarify the specific meanings of abstract terms used by different schools and individuals, providing them with clear definitions. Additionally, it highlights the differences in scope when the same abstract terms are used by different thinkers, which helps to dispel unnecessary historical confusion. For instance, the terms "ming" (fate) and "tianming" (divine fate) in the Analects are often interpreted as identical in traditional exegesis, leading to many irrelevant debates about Confucius's statement "At fifty, I understood the divine fate." However, through inductive analysis, the author distinguishes their distinct meanings, thereby achieving some degree of clarification.
This demonstrates that supplementing traditional exegesis with inductive methods is an essential consideration for scholars of intellectual history. Personality differs from ordinary objects. Ordinary objects are quantifiable and divisible, whereas personality is qualitative and cannot be measured or divided. Human nature theory is centered on the study of personality. The abstract terms in human nature theory are not derived from logical reasoning but from the experiential insights of ancient philosophers in their lives. These can be termed "qualitative terms." The characteristic of qualitative terms lies in that the content represented by the same term often corresponds to the "hierarchical nature" of personality, thereby exhibiting its own hierarchy.
For example, in the Analects, the term "ren" (benevolence) varies in its implications depending on the hierarchical level of the inquirer. However, this is not a parallel difference but a hierarchical one. Parallel differences may involve reciprocal influences between distinct entities, but these are often external connections. Hierarchical differences, on the other hand, represent internal connections within a three-dimensional, complete life, whether moving upward or downward. Some Western philosophers and great writers and aesthetes, who stand on the basis of the body (substance), often organize these internal connections into philosophical systems, expressing them through corresponding textual structures. This allows readers to follow the logical progression of their words and gain an accurate understanding.
Chinese ancient philosophers, however, often presented their insights as ready-made facts in simple statements, without consciously constructing a theoretical system. Many of their statements were spontaneous and context-dependent, scattering the internal connections of the three-dimensional, complete life among isolated phrases. If we fail to collect these scattered statements, use comparative, analytical, and "experiential tracing" methods to uncover their internal connections, and construct them accordingly, and instead rely on fragments and apply Western logical frameworks as criteria, we are essentially slicing through a cross-section of the complete life and arbitrarily concluding that it is this way and not that. The recklessness and fragmentation of such an approach are self-evident.
Feng Youlan's A History of Chinese Philosophy claims to represent the orthodox school, but it offers little contribution to the study of the School of Names (Bianzers) and fails to grasp even the basics of Confucianism, Laozi, Mencius, or Zhuangzi, particularly the relationship between Confucius and Mencius. This is not due to his dishonesty but rather to his inability to pass this critical threshold.
The author acknowledges that his efforts in this area may not yet yield significant achievements. However, through the discovery of internal connections, he has strived to ensure that scattered statements (e.g., "ren" in the Analects) can fulfill their role in constructing a complete life, occupy their proper positions, and serve as mutual corroboration among themselves.