Auditing Collusion in the Securities Market (Identification and Regulation)

Author: Lei Guangyong
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-12-01
Features: To date, this is the first specialized work in China that systematically refines and conducts in-depth research on the issue of audit collusion in the securities market. The book primarily employs the basic ideas and methods of modern non-cooperative game theory, public choice theory, and the principles of biological symbiosis to thoroughly investigate the problem of audit collusion in the modern securities market. Starting from an analysis of the economic consequences of audit collusion in the securities market, the book offers insightful and profound discussions on the formation mechanism, external environment, and identification process of audit collusion. It argues that audit collusion is the result of an equilibrium outcome resulting from the interaction and coupling of audit rent-seeking parties, audit suppliers, and the supporting environment. The construction of audit collusion identification mechanisms requires an approach from three perspectives: the demand side of audit opinions, the supply side of audit opinions, and the securities regulatory environment. Based on the context of the Chinese securities market, the regulatory strategies and measures proposed in this book will play a unique and important role in standardizing the investment order of China's capital market and protecting the interests of investors.