Research on Audit Opinion Selection Behavior in Principal-Agent Relationships

Author: Cao Jianxin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-08-01
Features: The innovative points of this book mainly include:
It studies the relationship between the agency costs of Chinese listed companies and their audit opinion selection behavior in the principal-agent relationship from a new perspective. Based on a game theory model, it derives research hypotheses regarding the relationship between agency costs and audit opinion selection behavior in the principal-agent relationship of Chinese listed companies. It then collects empirical data from Chinese listed companies for an empirical study. The factor analysis method is used to comprehensively evaluate individual indicators affecting audit opinion selection behavior, and the factor-weighted total scores of each accounting firm are calculated. This is used as a substitute variable for "external auditor's audit opinion selection behavior," which is named the "Comprehensive Indicator of External Auditor's Audit Opinion Selection Behavior (T)." New methods are proposed for the selection of control variables, empirical research methods, and data processing. Based on the analysis of the research results, three insights can be drawn: First, China's securities regulatory authorities should effectively support external auditors in issuing truthful audit opinions. Second, the China Institute of Certified Public Accountants must strengthen self-regulation. Finally, achieving a balance of interests among principals, agents, and external auditors must be realized through specific institutional arrangements. These three insights provide a new perspective for future research on this topic.