Fantasy and Invention - Personal Return to International Politics

Author: Translator: Qi Runchang et al / Country: France
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2001-05-01
Features: Realists have reaffirmed the doctrines of decision theorists and acknowledged the prospects derived from this theory. This prospect refers to statesmen as the sole authorized representatives of the state, capable of acting independently. In the specific historical context of World War II and the early Cold War, this idea, which was extremely popular among realists, was undoubtedly easily understandable. We need only look at two quotes from the late 1950s that reflect the realist sentiment to see this clearly. The first is a quote by Louis Halle on politicians: "As agents—limited to officials—there is no freedom to handle state affairs solely according to their subjective consciousness." The second is a more concise quote by Kenneth Thompson: "Politicians should follow the quiet path of responsible officials (those who place the safety of the people they represent at the forefront of their decision-making)." These examples demonstrate that in the Anglo-Saxon tradition of good democracy, realists clearly incorporated the representative role of statesmen into the Schmittian exception status of the powers. However, according to the paradigm vigorously advocated by some proponents, statesmen can only embody the indivisible will of the state. The individualism in radical methodology cannot maintain its epistemological commitments, because all the propositions it proposes are always based on the minimal form: individual i completes action k in situation j. The extreme intention embodied in this extremely simple example can only be explained by abandoning all forms of ethnocentrism in sociology, abandoning Marxist agitation, and so on. The premise of Karl Popper's extreme liberal program is that the selection of highly rational actors considers only their personal interests. An "open" society is linked to this radical individualism. Conversely, a "closed" society is consistent with the individual's will being subordinated to collective constraints. But if servitude and authoritarianism are the conditions faced by closed societies, then chaos and "fear of freedom" may well be the prospects for open societies. The fundamental political issue seems to be the relationship between the individual, the state, and democracy. Democracy, whether in its direct form is representative or participatory, is the prototype of political relations composed of individuals, presupposing a whole that can be large or small. And it is from here that the government of the city-state or the state arises. Through democracy, despite changes in the electorate, the individual-citizen-voter becomes the sole source of legitimate power. The state in the West is a miraculous and unimaginable invention. It is precisely this invention that guarantees the autonomy of private enterprise and ensures that the civilian society produces what it needs through spontaneous regulation. In reality, Western states are an invention of an order that corresponds to the democratic nature of man and the nature of democratic institutions. The reunification of the two Germanys, or as the Germans themselves call it, their reunification, brought two social systems into collision—one was a republic built over 40 years, with its political, economic, social, and cultural systems organized according to the "social" spirit; the other was a relatively uniform community whose cohesion did not come from a single structure but from an authoritarian regime. In other words, it was a community state organized according to the "community" spirit. In such a state, we can assume that the degree of individuation is far lower than in West Germany. The "unity" demanded by East Germans was the means by which they constructed their whole; as the authoritarian regime faded, the original community transitioned to an individual society, where individuals could make more choices under liberalism, and "unity" thus became outdated. The individual choices of East Germans were covered by national choices. Three years after the official declaration of reunification, the Federal Republic did indeed become a nation-state, but not "a" German society, "a" German identity; rather, there were two—one was West German, democratic, open, diverse, and multi-identitarian; the other was East German, community-oriented, somewhat authoritarian, even closed, though not all East Germans saw it that way. Ironically, if the calls for reunification and the expression of a German identity in 1989 and 1990 did not carry any excessive nationalist or chauvinistic sentiments, then reunification would first be only a means, a path to the material and spiritual wealth of a free society; and it would be in the name of this German "unity" and "identity" that extremists in the East, unable to reap the fruits of liberalism, would desperately blame foreigners, asylum seekers, and so-called "guest workers." What identity are we talking about? What strategy did this identity represent in 1989? What strategy does it represent now? For a long time, international relations theory has ignored the role of individuals in international life. To correct this tendency, there is now a danger of swinging to the other extreme. If we were to list all these people, we could extend the list indefinitely. If limited to the contemporary era, the inventors of penicillin and the atomic bomb have contributed greatly to changing the world, more than many professional politicians and diplomats. Beyond scientists, we can cite many other examples: spiritual leaders, industrial tycoons, exporters, financiers, editorial writers, and so on. But what is established now was also true in the past. The inventors of gunpowder and smallpox should be evaluated the same as Einstein and Fleming; Columbus should be praised alongside Brazza and Commander Cousteau, and so on. In the relentless and omnipresent flux, the concept of a role has unfortunately been diluted. Many figures, famous or obscure, can be found who never had the intention of acting on the international stage, but their discoveries or ideas were applied by others. The latter are considered the only ones with the identity of political actors, though the origins of change and reform do not lie in their actions. However, arguments based on the political specificity should not be overused. Because the boundaries of disciplines are fragile and change over time and space, some issues that are political in one place may not be so in another, and vice versa. There are other reasons that confirm the constraints on the study of individual roles. One is that it is undoubtedly difficult to statistically account for irregular populations and confirm each individual's identity. More challenging is to trace individual trajectories and measure their impact on decision-makers. Even with numerous papers and books, it may still not be sufficient, because various influences interact, reinforcing or canceling each other out. A political analysis that aims to consider all relationships between individuals, even limited to those believed to have the capacity to influence, would inevitably drown in details. Historical research is also equally difficult to escape this. We should also consider whether the new changes in international relations are not conducive to the emergence of new types of individual roles. This is a possibility, but it needs to be carefully examined. It is still too early to determine whether geniuses can detach themselves from the organizational networks that provide them with certain powers. If so, the multiplication and fragmentation of power centers may have significant effects: favoring the emergence of new types of prophets, but at the same time limiting their scope of influence. A review of history provides preliminary applicable models for studying non-state roles. While adapting these models to contemporary realities, we should not forget the wisdom passed down to us by the ancients. Hercules used a fulcrum to use his lever, making him a mighty god and lifting the world. There are always many followers of Hercules, but people do not know how greatly the number of fulcrums has increased. The Gulf Conflict also demonstrated that in such military operations, in political debates or actions, the role of the people of the countries involved is minimal. As for debates, it seems that the evolution of public opinion and the decision to use force have not kept pace. American public opinion showed massive support, but the decision was barely passed in Congress. In France, public support was modest before the fighting began, and there was no substantive debate, not even in Parliament. After the use of force, public opinion swung strongly in favor of the head of state, reaching an unusually high level of support, including those traditionally hostile to the military (such as intellectuals and the youth), and was well-understood among immigrant groups or newly naturalized citizens. Throughout the war, the role of individual soldiers was obscured by the media vacuum (i.e., no news) and automated warfare (computer-controlled weapons, etc.). Casualty statistics were zero, which was perhaps the first time in the history of war. The Gulf War's casualty statistics are still pending, as the casualties of the coalition have been overshadowed by the image of a "zero-casualty mountain" on the battlefield, and Iraq's casualty figures have never been seriously estimated. From a conventional strategic perspective, battlefield warfare is a series of military actions connected in the traditional sense, but the process seems to suggest that these actions are purely abstract operations. Warfare reached its peak in the early part of this century but was frozen between major powers, leaving space for peripheral conflicts. The strategic stalemate in the center forced people to act elsewhere. The more theoretically connected an individual is to the gradual overallization of war, the more practically disconnected or distant they become from it. Now war has returned to us, though it does not directly threaten us. This will not be a regression, and we will not return to the nuclear pre-period of large-scale warfare in Europe. But we will face an extremely complex situation, an extremely complex geography. The return of actual warfare in Europe or elsewhere is unlikely to reverse the trend of individual marginalization in the defense systems of developed countries. Theorists and military strategists may be called upon more than ever before to design specific military actions and forms: the models of military mechanisms (at the national level or cooperatively), the planning of forces, limited-intensity conflicts. A whole new set of military actions will require new implementation strategies. But from a human perspective, they may merely involve the technical departments of the military. Additionally, the public opinion of democratic countries may be affected by two special developments. One is a possible terrorist phenomenon that could reach our shores, not to replace war but to send war signals or serve as a low-key response to war. The other is the greatly expanded demand for international police actions, based on the concept of a world order that guarantees human rights and the rights of minorities. It is worth noting that the concepts of humanitarian intervention or international policing are fundamentally products of political society, not civilian society. One can doubt whether, in the long run, repeatedly taking military action on these grounds will change, in one way or another, the image of war that developed countries' public opinion currently perceives. If the public opinion of our countries has little influence on defense mechanisms and the forms of conflict, it can control certain political debates, thereby having a significant impact on the future of war. How to balance our commitments between the east and the south? How should the goals and speed of European disarmament be determined? How should we cooperate with countries neighboring the Mediterranean? These questions are still under discussion, and the new balance of the world will depend on them.