Mao Zedong during the Long March

Author: Jiang Jianong, Zheng Guangjin / Country: Mainland China
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-07-01
Features: After the Zunyi Conference, the situation facing the Central Red Army remained extremely severe. They were still trapped in the encirclement, pursuit, and interception by powerful enemy forces. How to the strong enemy's and seize the initiative? This was the important and urgent task before the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Red Army, and it was a question that constantly preoccupied Mao Zedong's mind. At that time, the disparity in strength between the enemy and us was very significant. Chiang Kai-shek had mobilized a massive force of about 150 regiments, numbering three to four hundred thousand people, comprising the Central Army and local warlord units from Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan. They possessed relatively advanced weaponry, were supported by air forces, had the backing of the national government, and had ample supplies of food, clothing, and ammunition, with convenient transportation. In contrast, the Central Red Army had only over 30,000 soldiers, with outdated weapons, insufficient ammunition, lack of food, clothing, and supplies, no base area to rely on, no air force, and no automobiles. The ratio of enemy to our forces was 10:1, and the situation of the enemy being strong and we being weak was very apparent. To overcome the of being encircled and intercepted by powerful enemies, Mao Zedong employed his highly mobile and flexible strategic and tactical skills, launching and commanding the Battle of the Four. In this battle, the highest commander on the enemy side was Chiang Kai-shek, while the highest commander on the Central Red Army side was Mao Zedong. This was the second direct confrontation between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong on the battlefield. The first was the Third "Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign" against the Central Soviet Area in 1931, when Chiang Kai-shek led a massive army of 300,000 troops in a large-scale offensive against the Red Army. However, the small Red Army of only 30,000, commanded by Mao Zedong, defeated the enemy in a decisive victory, inflicting over 30,000 casualties on the enemy and forcing them to retreat in disarray. Chiang Kai-shek personally experienced the formidable military command skills of Mao Zedong. In this Battle of the Four, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Chongqing and Guiyang, assuming the role of supreme commander and personally directing three to four hundred thousand heavily armed troops, once again employing the fortress policy, which had proven victorious in the Fifth "Encirclement and Annihilation Campaign," to surround and intercept the Central Red Army from all directions. Chiang Kai-shek was not a fool; he was a figure with strong political maneuvering skills and military talent. In November 1938, Mao Zedong once said: "Chiang Kai-shek replaced Sun Yat-sen, creating the golden age of military dominance for the Kuomintang. He regarded the army as his life, having experienced three periods—the Northern Expedition, the Civil War, and the War of Resistance Against Japan. Over the past ten years, Chiang Kai-shek has been a counter-revolutionary. To serve his counter-revolutionary goals, he created a vast 'Central Army.' He firmly believed that with an army comes power, and that war solves everything. In this regard, we should learn from him."① Chiang Kai-shek's learning was extensive. He had studied the "Four Books," "Zuo Zhuan," "Shang Shu," "Yi Jing," "Gangjian," and "Liji," and had learned the philosophies of the scholars from the Zhou and Qin dynasties and the Neo-Confucianism of the Song Dynasty. He also studied "The Art of War by Sun Tzu" and "The Collected Works of Zeng Guofan," which laid a foundation for his understanding of traditional Chinese culture. He was very interested in current affairs, enjoyed reading newspapers, and had studied English, Japanese, and Russian. P102-103