"Red Fourth Front Army's Campaign Chronicle - The Complete History of the Long March of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (Part 3)"

Author: Xu Zhanquan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-05-01
Features: From mid-November 1933 to mid-September 1934, during the Central Soviet Red Army's fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression," the Red Fourth Front Army launched an unprecedented anti-"Six Route Encirclement" campaign. Unlike the Central Soviet Red Army's fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression," which ended in failure, the anti-"Six Route Encirclement" concluded with the victory of the Red Fourth Front Army. Over a grueling 10-month battle, the Red Fourth Front Army systematically tightened its positions and launched timely counterattacks, achieving brilliant results. It killed or wounded over 60,000 Sichuan army soldiers, captured over 20,000, seized over 30,000 rifles and machine guns, and over 100 artillery pieces, while also shooting down one Nationalist aircraft. The Red Fourth Front Army largely restored the territory of the base area after the Xuan Da Campaign and expanded some new areas. The Sichuan warlord, battered by the Red Army, was thrown into chaos and showed signs of collapse. Faced with the heavy defeat, Liu Xiang, the Sichuan "Suppression Bandit" commander who had boasted of "completely eliminating" the Sichuan-Shaanxi Red Army within three months before the encirclement, was helpless and had to cable Chiang Kai-shek to apologize, stating he was "at his wit's end" and requesting the removal of his concurrent positions. On his way back to Chongqing from Chengdu, he felt too ashamed to face his compatriots and even staged a fake suicide attempt. Sitting in Nanchang to direct the "suppression of communism," Chiang Kai-shek, though shocked and furious at the failure of the "Six Route Encirclement," was forced to cable Liu Xiang on September 30 to "resume your duties immediately, reorganize, and advance to suppress, in order to boost morale." At the same time, he ordered Yang Huicheng of the Northwest Army to "promptly attack the enemy's rear in southern Shaanxi to support the operation." Two days later, he flew to Xi'an personally to plan the "Sichuan-Shaanxi Joint Suppression," despite the fact that the operation against the Central Soviet base area was in its final, tense stages. Under Chiang Kai-shek's reassurance and encouragement, Liu Xiang seemed to regain his spirits and announced his return to office on October 22. Soon after, he personally rushed to Nanjing, meeting Chiang Kai-shek three times to seek guidance on "stabilizing Sichuan" and accelerating the planning of the "Sichuan-Shaanxi Joint Suppression."
Facing the severe enemy situation, what actions should the Red Army take next? Leaders of the Red Fourth Front Army, such as Zhang Guotao and Xu Forward, were deeply contemplating and deliberating. After 10 months of the anti-"Six Route Encirclement" campaign, the Sichuan-Shaanxi base area had suffered damage and depletion due to the war, with its vitality weakened, farmland neglected, food shortages, and widespread destruction. This was the harsh reality the Red Army had to face when deciding its next strategic direction. However, after the anti-"Six Route Encirclement" campaign, the Red Fourth Front Army, as well as the base area's Party organizations and people, had gained richer combat experience, their revolutionary enthusiasm had reached unprecedented heights, and their courage and confidence in victory had been greatly boosted. This also created favorable conditions for the Red Army to overcome economic difficulties in the base area and achieve greater victories. P5