Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility

Author: John Martin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2002-12-01
Features: Let's revisit the dialectics here. We first considered an argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. This argument uses a principle (the non-transfer of responsibility principle), which is claimed to be widely accepted—meaning, accepted by those who are candid in evaluating compatibilism. However, this principle can be challenged by counterexamples. One can seek to restate this principle to avoid these counterexamples. But in doing so, there is a risk that the principle will lack sufficient persuasive force; that is, the restated principle does not yield the general result of the compatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility. Keep this issue in mind. One can then provide a later restatement of the principle previously proposed. However, the problem with this restatement is that the principle is no longer widely accepted: for anyone inclined toward compatibilism, it is clearly and directly unacceptable. What should be accepted by an individual who is candid in evaluating the debate between causal determinism and moral responsibility (but has not yet addressed a unique aspect of this debate) is not this principle. Thus, it is quite pointless to seek the use of this principle—or a similar one—in the direct argument for the incompatibility of causal determinism and moral responsibility.