On the Institutional Structure of Economic Administrative Law—A Perspective of Transaction Costs: A Perspective of Transaction Costs

Author: Song Gongde
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2003-01-01
Features: This book primarily explores the institutional structure of economic administrative law from the perspective of transaction costs. The fundamental stance of this book is that, based on the proper design of economic administrative law mechanisms, an equilibrium institutional structure of economic administrative law, formed through multi-party bargaining, helps to minimize information asymmetry, effectively restrain administrative opportunism while effectively restraining market opportunism, and thereby optimally integrate the institutional goals of maximizing the reduction of total transaction costs and effectively enhancing market efficiency. The book consists of an introduction and eight chapters.
Chapter 1 primarily discusses how the constitution designs the structure of property rights/economic administrative power to provide limited exclusive administrative protection for property rights, thereby maximizing the economic value of property. Chapter 2 successively explores three main issues: the challenges of economic administration to civil litigation, the constraints of judicial review on economic administration, and the comprehensive expansion of economic administration. The aim is to clarify the functions of economic administration within a complex power structure, particularly the relationship between economic administration and the judiciary, and accordingly advocate that the focus of modern market institutional change should shift from civil and commercial law to economic administrative law.
Chapter 3 describes and explains the structural characteristics of economic administrative law from three perspectives: the universality and contextualization of institutional structure, the agency and interaction of subjects within the institutional structure, and the differences and identity within the institutional structure. Chapter 4 directly confirms the core proposition that "an equilibrium institutional structure of economic administrative law optimally resolves transaction cost issues," summarizing the basic meaning of the structural equilibrium of property rights/economic administrative power as asymmetric equilibrium, equilibrium of supply and demand in economic administrative law, overall equality of legal status of subjects, optimal allocation of social resources, and maximization of overall economic interests.
Chapter 5 discusses the normative forms of the equilibrium institutional structure of economic administrative law from three aspects: national legislation and autonomous legislation, central legislation and local legislation, and substantive legal norms and procedural legal norms. Chapter 6 primarily analyzes the imbalance of the institutional structure of economic administrative law, successively discussing four issues: market symptoms of structural imbalance, excess and deficiency of economic administration, the relationship between opportunism and structural imbalance, and absolute imbalance versus relative imbalance.
Chapter 7 introduces the mechanism design theory in economics to explore the equilibrium of economic administrative law, aiming to use the smallest information dimension to provide the greatest behavioral incentives for subjects to achieve institutional goals. This chapter discusses three basic issues: theoretical variables of mechanism design, internal and external coordination of economic administrative law mechanisms, and the compatibility of constraints and incentives in economic administrative law mechanisms.
Chapter 8 primarily explores how to achieve institutional structural equilibrium through multi-party bargaining. This analytical framework mainly consists of four parts: the motivation for participation in bargaining by market subjects/administrative subjects, the game arena constructed by bargaining rules, the bargaining strategies of game subjects, and the equilibrium solution and institutional equilibrium.