Senior Diplomat Views the World

Author: Wang Yusheng Yang Jian
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-12-01
Features:
II. The Emerging "Quasi-Alliance" Relationship Between France, Germany, and Russia
After the Cold War, the EU, centered around France and Germany, adopted a policy toward Russia that was both similar to and different from that of the United States. The similarity lay in both the EU and the U.S. seeking to expand eastward and occupy the former Soviet sphere of influence. The difference was that the U.S. focused on squeezing Russia's strategic space, while the EU, considering its own economic interests and regional stability, and especially aiming to counterbalance the U.S. with Russia, took a relatively lenient stance toward Russia. The Iraq War further brought France, Germany, and Russia together. Driven by the common need to protect their interests and resist U.S. unilateralism, the three countries strengthened mutual consultations and coordination, as well as developed their cooperation. The U.S. had attempted to divide the trilateral relationship through differential treatment but failed. The "joint front" formed by France, Germany, and Russia over the Iraq War continues to be effective and shows a trend of further developing into a kind of "quasi-alliance." In 2004, as the U.S. celebrated the expansion of NATO with seven newly joined Central and Eastern European countries in Washington, the leaders of Germany and France successively visited Moscow, highlighting their shared desire to strengthen cooperation. Recently, when a series of terrorist incidents occurred in Russia, the three leaders met several times. After the Beslan incident, the U.S. and Russia engaged in sharp exchanges over the issue of Chechnya, while Schr?der and Chirac made statements of "understanding Putin" different from those of the U.S. Faced with the U.S.'s serious efforts to split the EU and squeeze Russia, France, Germany, and Russia all have strategic needs. Whether for France and Germany, which seek to accelerate European integration, or for Russia, which aims to revitalize its great-power status, the U.S.'s global strategy of monopolistic dominance poses a major external threat. Despite the numerous disagreements between France, Germany, and Russia, they have both the necessity and the possibility to rely on and coordinate with each other, forming a kind of "quasi-alliance" to counter the U.S.
III. Although the EU's Internal Cohesion Has Declined, the Trend of Unification Is Irreversible
In May 2004, the EU finally achieved its largest fifth expansion. After half a century of effort, it has become the most integrated and comprehensive power bloc in the world today. However, further progress in advancing European unification faces many challenges, one of the most important being the decline in the EU's internal cohesion. The reasons for this situation are multifaceted. Compared to the early stages of the European unification process, the current external environment has changed significantly. The Soviet threat no longer exists. The U.S. has changed its stance on European unification, shifting from support to obstruction. Internally, conditions have also changed. First, the disagreements over the ultimate goals of European unification remain unresolved. Initially, the UK was half-hearted, and now more countries hold a similar attitude. Whether it's the "Schengen Agreement" or the "Eurozone," there are still countries that choose to "not participate." As for advancing common foreign and security policy and deepening cooperation in the social sector, the obstacles and disagreements are even greater. Second, there have always been conflicts over interest distribution between countries at different development levels within the EU. The expansion of the EU has intensified this conflict, as it has suddenly added a large number of new members, most of whom are economically less prosperous. Third, with the addition of new members, the issue of stark wealth disparities within the EU has