Aristotle. Reason. Freedom

Author: Wang Zisong
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2003-09-01
Features: The fundamental problem of materialism and idealism in philosophy is the relationship between matter and consciousness. Therefore, philosophical propositions, principles, and systems ultimately have a question of whether they are materialist or idealist. Many philosophical debates often focus on whether something is materialist or idealist (of course, there are also struggles between idealism opposing idealism and materialism opposing materialism). In this sense, it is acceptable to say that the history of philosophy is the history of the development of the struggle between materialism and idealism. The important point is not to simplify or formulaize this proposition and apply it everywhere. One should recognize that the distinction between materialism and idealism lies in whether it acknowledges the nature of matter or the nature of consciousness. This criterion is an abstract generalization, but it indeed grasps the essence of the difference between materialism and idealism in an abstract way, so it is a scientific abstraction. However, , this abstraction was formally expressed by Marxism. Before Engels clearly stated the fundamental problem of philosophy, although many philosophers and historians of philosophy actually classified materialism and idealism according to this standard and debated this issue, some of them acknowledged this criterion to some extent, while most did not consciously recognize it or acknowledge it. Even Feuerbach before Marx was like this. He confused materialism with one of its specific forms—vulgar materialism. Therefore, later, Schadik called Feuerbach an idealist. He followed the prevailing prejudice at the time, calling those who pursued ideals "idealists" and those who focused on material enjoyment "materialists." This shows that the division between materialism and idealism in terms of which is the nature of matter and consciousness is a Marxist concept. It is a scientific concept, but it is not universally acknowledged by all philosophers and historians of philosophy throughout history. Therefore, philosophers outside Marxism do not all consciously uphold this division principle. Idealists do not consciously uphold "consciousness" and carry it through consistently, and materialists are the same. This situation is widespread in the history of philosophy. Some idealist philosophers have a stronger "party spirit," fiercely attacking materialist thought at the sight of it, such as Socrates, Plato, and Hegel, who all firmly opposed materialism. Many other idealist philosophers have a weaker "party spirit." Even Socrates, Plato, and Hegel did not necessarily consistently uphold the principle of consciousness in every philosophical proposition and principle of theirs. We cannot demand this of them. Look, even us Marxists, who understand the scientific concept of distinguishing between materialism and idealism and consciously claim to uphold it, can we say that there is absolutely no idealist element in our theory? Of course, we cannot say that. In reality, even the masters of Marxist theory have not also made idealist mistakes, or even serious mistakes?! Therefore, when we study the history of philosophy, we cannot simply label someone an idealist and then claim that all their theories are one hundred percent idealist, abandoning the principle of seeking truth from facts. There is also the second point: the criterion for distinguishing between materialism and idealism is a scientific abstraction. What is called abstraction is the generalization of the common characteristics of a category of things. In all materialist philosophies, there is a commonality that matter is and consciousness is secondary. Abstracting this commonality (the general), it reflects the essence of materialism, that is, what makes materialism materialist—this is the fundamental point. If this point is violated, it is no longer materialism. However, this abstracted commonality, although it reflects the essence of the thing, is scientific, it is ultimately an abstraction. Compared to the concrete, any abstraction is ultimately impoverished and empty. Scientific abstraction is very important, and scientific research cannot be separated from it. Of course, when we study the history of philosophy, we cannot be separated from this scientific standard for distinguishing between materialism and idealism, without it, the study of the history of philosophy cannot proceed. However, it must be seen that abstraction and the concrete are different. All objective things are concrete, not abstract. Things are concrete, which means they have not only commonality but also individuality; compared to individuality and commonality, individuality is infinitely rich and complex. Any specific philosopher or philosophical system is both common and individual. If one only studies its commonality without studying its individuality, the content of the history of philosophy becomes impoverished. In past research on the history of philosophy, there have been cases where philosophers' propositions or systems were classified as materialist or idealist, as if the task was already completed. This is what is meant by "labeling." It must be admitted that this was necessary at a certain time because our previous research on the history of philosophy was influenced by bourgeois philosophy, not valuing, or even completely ignoring, the opposition between materialism and idealism, belittling or even completely ignoring materialist philosophy. Therefore, emphasizing the opposition between materialism and idealism, clarifying the boundaries, and emphasizing the importance of materialism was necessary at a certain stage. This indeed transformed the history of bourgeois idealist philosophy into a Marxist perspective. However, it is not enough to stop there. The scientific research method of Marxism is both from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract back to the concrete. Classifying a philosopher's or philosophical system as materialist or idealist only completes the work from the concrete to the abstract, which is only half of the scientific research, and a relatively small half; it must also return from the abstract to the concrete, which requires a specific study of the philosopher or philosophical system, analyzing its rich content, identifying its internal and external connections, and making a realistic evaluation. Studying the history of philosophy in this way is not about labeling but has rich and diverse content. The living soul of Marxism is the concrete analysis of specific things. However, such work is not easy. Take the distinction between materialism and idealism as an example. It is relatively easy to abstractly discuss whether matter is or consciousness is . But when it comes to the specific analysis of philosophers, philosophical propositions, and philosophical systems, it will not be easy. For example, every philosopher's system contains several important and fundamental terms. These terms, taken by themselves, are difficult to determine whether they are materialist or idealist. In the history of philosophy, the same term can sometimes be interpreted and used materialistically and sometimes idealistically; even when the same philosopher uses the same term, it can sometimes be interpreted idealistically and sometimes materialistically. Based on this term alone, it is difficult to say whether it is materialist or idealist; only by connecting it with other propositions can one make a judgment. In the history of Western philosophy, for example, in ancient Greek philosophy, terms like "logos," "nous," and even "existence" face the same issue—they can be interpreted materialistically or idealistically. For example, the term "substance" in Aristotle's philosophy underwent a transition from materialism to idealism. In his earlier work, Categories, he believed that objectively independent concrete things are the nature of substance, while their commonality ("species" and "genus," i.e., "form" and "idea") is secondary, placing him on the side of materialism. However, in his later work, Metaphysics, he believed that only form is the nature of substance, while concrete things are secondary, shifting him to the side of idealism. Are there similar situations in other philosophers? For example, theoretically, materialist epistemology should affirm that cognition begins with sensory experience and should belong to empiricism, not rationalism. Yet we also acknowledge Spinoza as a materialist rationalist—how to understand this? Since we believe that Spinoza's "God" is materialist, why is Leibniz's "monad" necessarily idealist? Many comrades have now raised many such questions, doubting some of the past statements, and we need to liberate our minds and conduct in-depth, specific research on such issues. Recently, some comrades have proposed that for most philosophers, their materialism or idealism can be determined from the main aspects of their doctrines, but for some philosophers, like Aristotle, it is not necessary to definitively label them as materialist or idealist. Instead, it is sufficient to point out in which aspects they are materialist and in which aspects they are idealist, as Lenin said, they are wavering between materialism and idealism, which is enough. These opinions are worth considering. Studying the history of philosophy, if one only speaks abstractly, materialism and idealism should have clear boundaries, with distinct divisions. However, due to the above two aspects, when we specifically analyze philosophers and their propositions, principles, and systems, we often find that materialism and idealism indeed exist in a situation of mutual penetration and transformation, with "you in me and me in you," not something that can be simply cut into two. As the history of human cognition, the history of philosophy must summarize the experience and lessons of the development of human cognition. It is necessary to conduct a two-sided analysis of past thought, affirming its correct aspects and negating its incorrect aspects, upholding truth and correcting errors, in order to achieve development. For example, regarding mechanical materialism, we must affirm its materialism, affirm its scientific significance at the time, and the progressive role it played in history, while also negating its metaphysical mechanicism and the aspects that led it to fall into idealism. We do not categorically deny idealism either. Regarding the idealist aspects of idealist philosophy and its unscientific aspects, we must negate them; however, for the theoretical contributions of idealism to supplement materialism, such as the above-mentioned emphasis on subjective initiative, like Hegel's dialectics, it is necessary to critically absorb them; furthermore, as Lenin pointed out, the critique of idealism by idealism often benefits materialism. Analyzing the shortcomings of idealism, analyzing their cognitive roots, and allowing idealism to serve as a negative teacher are particularly important. This can enhance our theoretical thinking ability and help avoid or reduce the repetition of the same mistakes. Human cognition is constantly changing and developing, from the low to the high, from the unknown to the known, from knowing little to knowing more. When we study the history of philosophy, we cannot demand the understanding of the present from the ancients in history; if so, we can only negate the past and completely discard history. This brings us back to the purpose of studying the history of philosophy. We study the history of human cognition to summarize the experience and lessons of historical development. Any thought that has played a positive role in the development of human cognition, even if it is idealist or metaphysical, must be affirmed; of course, this is not a simple or absolute affirmation but an affirmation of its historical significance and value. For any thought that has had a negative effect on the development of human cognition, even if it is materialist, must be historically negated. Studying the history of philosophy, understanding the historical process of human cognition, seeing how human cognition gradually accumulated to reach the level it is at today, can help us more deeply understand why only dialectical materialism and historical materialism are truly scientific theories. Therefore, only by adhering to the principle of seeking truth from facts and evaluating each philosopher and their philosophical system in their proper historical context can we say that we are adhering to the party principle of the history of philosophy. Dialectical materialism and historical materialism have not yet exhausted the truth; they must continue to develop. We still have many unresolved problems, and new problems will continue to arise in the future. To study and solve these problems, we still need to draw experience and inspiration from the history of philosophy. What is important is also to continuously improve our theoretical thinking ability. Learning the history of philosophy is the best method for this exercise.