The End of Senior Commanders of the Japanese Invading Army (Part 1, Part 2)

Author: Liu Zhonggang
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-05-01
Features: While Guo Songling's forces were successfully advancing, the Kwantung Army of Japan, under the command of Takahashi Korekiyo, rapidly gathered from Tieling, Liaoyang, Haicheng, and other areas to guard in Fengtianfu on December 7, declaring non-interference in China's internal affairs. On December 8, Takahashi Korekiyo, acting as an intermediary, simultaneously warned both Guo Songling's forces and Fengtian Army not to disturb the South Manchurian Railway (SMBE) and Japanese-occupied areas. This was essentially a warning that restricted Guo Songling's actions. On December 13, when Guo's army of over 2,000 prepared to cross the Liao River to attack Yingkou, Takahashi Korekiyo ordered the Japanese army to prevent Guo's forces from crossing. On the 14th, he again banned Guo's army from entering Yingkou under the guise of maintaining public order. To this, Guo Songling lodged a serious protest. On December 15, under Takahashi Korekiyo's active efforts, the Japanese Cabinet decided to mobilize a large number of Japanese troops from their homeland and Korea to Manchuria to reinforce Zhang Zuolin. At the same time, Takahashi Korekiyo issued a second warning, prohibiting direct combat actions within 20 Chinese li of the South Manchurian Railway and nearby areas, and banning military actions that could disrupt the security of the, otherwise all weapons would be confiscated. On the 18th, the commander of the Kwantung Army, Takahashi Korekiyo, moved his headquarters to Fengtianfu, taking command of the Japanese forces. By December 19, the Kwantung Army's reinforcement had fully arrived in Fengtianfu, taking over the defense of Fengtianfu for Zhang Zuolin's forces, while Zhang's troops were all sent to the front lines. On December 22, Guo's army clashed fiercely with the Fengtian Army. On one hand, the Japanese army used 80 planes carrying heavy bombs to bomb and support the Fengtian Army's front-line battle. On the other hand, they blocked Guo's advance under the pretext of "not interfering with the South Manchurian Railway." Meanwhile, they disguised themselves as Fengtian Army troops to pressure Guo's army from the left and cover the Fengtian cavalry's flanking attack on Guo's rear. On December 23, Guo's army suffered a devastating defeat. Guo Songling soon met his end in Xinmin. Although Guo Songling failed, Takahashi Korekiyo successfully deployed the Kwantung Army to large areas of Fengtian and Northeast China, and also set a precedent for the Kwantung Army to act unilaterally without the approval of the Japanese central government.
Minister of War: The Mastermind Behind the Jinan Massacre, Who Protected Takahashi Korekiyo
On March 28, 1925, Takahashi Korekiyo was promoted to General of the Imperial Japanese Army. On July 28, 1926, he returned to Japan and was appointed as the Chief of the Imperial General Headquarters. On April 20, 1927, he was promoted to Minister of War. During Takahashi Korekiyo's tenure as Minister of War, China was undergoing significant changes, with the Nationalist Party group led by Chiang Kai-shek gradually becoming the center of power in China. In 1927, the Ninghan Unity occurred. In the power struggle, Chiang Kai-shek "retreated to advance," resigned, and went to Japan to seek understanding and support from Japan. Through negotiations, the Prime Minister of Japan, Tanaka Giichi, and the Minister of War, Takahashi Korekiyo, among others, held secret talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Through these talks, Japan's military and political circles expressed their support for Chiang Kai-shek, and both sides made a secret agreement: (1) Chiang acknowledged Japan's special interests in Manchuria and fulfilled Sun Yat-sen's early promises to Japan; (2) Chiang would firmly oppose communism; (3) Japan would support Chiang's regime; (4) Japan would lend Chiang 40 million yen to help stabilize China, and after that, China and Japan would engage in economic cooperation. Regarding Chiang Kai-shek, Japan's policy was a combination of carrot and stick. Japan firmly supported Chiang's anti-communist stance but strongly opposed the Nationalist Party's northern expedition, believing it would threaten Japan's interests in Shandong and Northeast China. The Tanaka Cabinet also conveyed this intention to Chiang Kai-shek through various channels. By the end of 1927, Chiang Kai-shek returned to Shanghai, married Song Meiling, and established relations with the United States and Britain through the Jiangsu-Zhejiang financial clique. In April 1928, Chiang Kai-shek, upon his return, led his forces to begin the northern expedition. The Japanese-backed forces of Zhang Zuolin, Zhang Zongchang, and Sun Chuanfang were defeated in the face of the Nationalist Party's advance. In this situation, the Japanese Cabinet held a meeting on April 17. At the meeting, the Minister of War, Takahashi Korekiyo, strongly advocated for sending troops to Shandong under the pretext of protecting Japanese citizens, shouting that "the time to send troops had come." For this, he also clashed fiercely with the Minister of Finance, who proposed that a large-scale deployment of troops would be financially difficult and could provoke China. The next day, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi held a special meeting with Takahashi Korekiyo, and under Takahashi's strong urging, Tanaka finally decided to transfer the 33rd Brigade of the 10th Infantry Division stationed in Northeast China to Qingdao. However, sending only one brigade did not satisfy Takahashi. On the 19th, at a special cabinet meeting to commemorate the first anniversary of the Tanaka Cabinet, Takahashi again demanded the deployment of more troops, ultimately the 6th Division and the "Temporary Jinan Detachment" to Shandong. On the 25th, the 6th Division arrived in Qingdao, and according to the request of the Japanese military attaché, Iwai Takashi, they marched to Jinan. On May 1, the Nationalist Party's northern expedition army occupied Jinan. On the same day, Japanese troops arbitrarily arrested northern expedition soldiers and killed the northern expedition transport commander, sparking a conflict between Japan and China. When the news returned to Japan, Takahashi Korekiyo had even more justification to continue deploying troops. He again demanded that the cabinet draft two more brigades from the Kwantung Army and the Korean Army to Shandong. On May 4, the cabinet approved Takahashi's plan and urgently deployed more than 2,000 soldiers from the 28th Brigade of the 14th Division of the Kwantung Army and other special forces to Jinan. On the 7th, Takahashi Korekiyo and the leadership of the Imperial General Headquarters jointly drafted the "Plan for China," which claimed that the Jinan incident was "a concrete manifestation of the Chinese people's long-standing contempt for the Japanese." It aimed to "display the might of the Imperial Army and shock the entire China," eliminate the Chinese sense of contempt for Japan, and "lay the foundation for the development of the nation throughout China." To discuss this plan, the Imperial General Headquarters and the Ministry of War held a special military advisory meeting. On the 8th, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi presided over a cabinet meeting, and under the persistent insistence of Takahashi and others, the cabinet decided to adopt the "Plan for China" and launch a full-scale attack on Chinese forces. The next day, the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order to deploy the 3rd Division and other special forces, numbering 20,000, to implement the third deployment of troops to Shandong. Supported by military leaders like Takahashi Korekiyo, the 6th Division of the Japanese army quickly occupied Jinan City on the 11th, where they committed atrocities of rape, murder, and looting, creating the internationally shocking "Jinan Massacre." The blood debt of the Jinan Massacre was directly linked to Takahashi Korekiyo! Shortly after the Jinan Massacre, the Japanese Kwantung Army's staff officer, Takahashi Korekiyo, masterminded the "Kwangtung Incident" on June 4, assassinating Zhang Zuolin. This caused a stir in Japan's military and political circles. Military leaders like Takahashi Korekiyo took advantage of the situation to demand the right to deploy troops for the Kwantung Army and put pressure on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, this time, influenced by international and domestic public opinion and the political situation, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi rejected Takahashi's proposal at the cabinet meeting on June 7. As a result, the division between the military and political circles over the handling of Takahashi began to become public. Military leaders like Takahashi Korekiyo strongly advocated for protecting Takahashi Korekiyo. On June 2, the leadership of the Ministry of War recalled Takahashi Korekiyo to Japan for a week of interrogation. The elder statesman Saionji Kimmochi demanded the revelation of the truth and the strict punishment of the perpetrators. Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi also put pressure on the military. However, Takahashi Korekiyo continued to cover up the truth and refused to punish Takahashi. Instead, he punished those within the military who held differing opinions. By June 27, 1929, Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi again demanded that Takahashi Korekiyo expand the scope of punishment for the perpetrators, and Takahashi threatened to resign in return. On the 28th, the cabinet meeting passed Takahashi's proposal for punishing the perpetrators and disclosing the details of the incident. During the meeting, Takahashi Korekiyo went to the Imperial Palace to request the Emperor's decision, asking only for administrative punishments for the perpetrators. On July 1, while announcing Takahashi Korekiyo's suspension, the Tanaka Cabinet announced its downfall. Takahashi Korekiyo also resigned as Minister of War and took up the position of Military Advisor to the new cabinet.
Military Advisor: Struggling to Resolve the "Manchurian Incident"
After the "September 18 Incident" of 1931, Japan's military leaders and the Kwantung Army had disagreements on how to handle the post-incident matters. In the 1931 annual situation analysis of the Imperial General Headquarters, the resolution of the Manchurian issue was divided into three stages: The first stage was to establish a pro-Japanese regime under the recognition of the Nationalist government's sovereignty; the second stage was to establish an independent country; the third stage was to occupy Manchuria.