The Diplomatic Approach of Li Hongzhang

Author: Zheng Jie, Liu Wenpeng
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2002-01-01
Features: It is often said that Li Hongzhang was a traitor who sold the country, but have you ever thought about why all the disastrous consequences of selling the country always fell on his shoulders? Why was the vast late Qing government almost the only one who was qualified to sign unequal treaties? Why didn’t a single “patriot” among the entire court dare to reason with the foreigners? Take a look at the little-known historical truths behind Li Hongzhang’s diplomatic activities!
When you mention Li Hongzhang, the first thing that comes to mind is a traitor, the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the cession of Taiwan, the Boxer Protocol—each a painful chapter of modern Chinese history filled with national humiliation. But is Li Hongzhang that simple? This book, based on detailed and authoritative materials, reveals for the first time the little-known historical details of every diplomatic negotiation Li Hongzhang ever engaged in, restoring the image of a diplomat who was inwardly tormented by contradictions, unafraid of hard work, and undeterred by slander, in the harsh reality of “weak countries have no diplomacy.”
Excerpt: The Complete Defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War
The Significance of the First Sino-Japanese War and the Treaty of Shimonoseki to Li Hongzhang
Li Hongzhang never imagined that the small country of Japan would drag both himself and the Qing government into an irreparable abyss. Having signed numerous unequal treaties before, he had never thought that one day he would have to kowtow to little Japan. But that day truly arrived, becoming a turning point in his life. Some say that if Li Hongzhang had died before the First Sino-Japanese War, public and historical opinion of him would have been much higher. But he didn’t die, and ultimately lived in his own shame and the worldwide condemnation of his time—a great misfortune.
This greatest shame was not only reflected in the humiliation he suffered during the negotiations as a defeated nation but was even more profoundly manifested in the military failure of the First Sino-Japanese War, which also represented the ultimate failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement, a movement he had devoted twenty years to, focusing primarily on military development. The negotiations at the Shinkan-ri Building were also the darkest period in his diplomatic career. In other words, for Li Hongzhang personally, the greatest shame in diplomacy was the Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan. As a diplomat praised by foreign powers, he had to bow to the demands of the junior Japanese diplomat Ito Hirobumi. The greatest shame in the Self-Strengthening Movement was the First Sino-Japanese War at sea, where the Beiyang Navy, which he had painstakingly built for decades, was utterly destroyed.
These two greatest shames both stemmed from the First Sino-Japanese War in the late 19th century, which was also a great shame for all the Chinese people. After that war, Japan seized Taiwan, our precious island. Subsequently, driven by insatiable greed, it advanced step by step, staging the September 18th Incident in 1931 to occupy Northeast China, and then, in 1937, igniting the July 7th Marco Polo Bridge Incident, attempting to the entire country. After eight years of bloody resistance, it wasn’t until 1945 that the commander-in-chief of the Japanese invasion of China, Okamura Yasuhiko, surrendered on behalf of Japan to China, finally avenging this half-century-long humiliation. If Li Hongzhang were to know of this from the afterlife, he would surely be “ecstatic with the rolling of books and scrolls.”
What’s even more regrettable is that under the impact of this greatest shame, Li Hongzhang risked everything by adopting a pro-Russian policy, signing the Sino-Russian Secret Agreement and traveling to Russia. This became the greatest mistake in his diplomatic career, leading to his lifelong regret over the issue of Northeast China. As it happened, the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War was the opportunity for this, showing the immense impact of that battle. Liang Qichao also regarded it as a turning point in Li Hongzhang’s life. Liang lamented that Heaven had been so kind to Li Hongzhang before—when he dealt with foreign powers, they often did not demand excessive territorial concessions due to other matters, and Li Hongzhang was indeed lucky. But now, Heaven had been so cruel to him—after the defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War came the Treaty of Shimonoseki, followed by the Sino-Russian Secret Agreement, which led to the unresolved issue of Northeast China. Additionally, the collapse of national strength and the exposure of weaknesses triggered the scramble for China by foreign powers and the signing of the Boxer Protocol. Li Hongzhang’s diplomatic career after 1894 grew increasingly difficult—truly a case of “when the roof leaks, the rain pours harder,” unbearable suffering!
Below, we will discuss in detail the First Sino-Japanese War and the negotiations for the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which brought the greatest shame to Li Hongzhang and marked the turning point in his diplomatic career. Of course, Li Hongzhang cannot be held entirely responsible for the defeat, , he was not the final decision-maker, second, he was not the commander-in-chief fighting on the front lines, and third, the disadvantages of the Qing army in terms of firearms, warships, etc., were not entirely caused by Li Hongzhang alone. But