Constitutionalism and Democracy--Rationality and Social Change Research

Author: (American) Elster
Translator: Pan Qin / Xie Pengcheng
Editor-in-Chief: Liang Zhiping / He Weifang
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-03-01
Features: The discussion about the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy has never ceased since the events that led to the U.S. Constitution—starting with figures like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. The role of the constitution is to limit the ruling power of the majority; hence, it is naturally perceived as anti-democratic. But is that really the case? As a collection of essays exploring the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy, the authors' views diverge more than they converge, yet the common thread is why a society would limit its own highest power and why a democratic society would tolerate what appear to be arbitrary historical judgments against the present. Democracy, constitutionalism, and private property are inseparable concepts.
Excerpt: There is no issue more frequently labeled as "something to be avoided" than religion. It is understandable that sectarianism—seen as a severe threat to cooperation within a community—is considered divisive. It is said that religious disputes cannot all be resolved politically, or rationally. Under this premise, many societies have decided to draw a "line" between the public and private spheres—classifying religious beliefs as non-political and beyond the jurisdiction of majorities or officials. At first glance, this division seems paradoxical, yet it is believed to strengthen social cohesion. As long as religious divisions do not turn into political factions, other disagreements are relatively easier to resolve. If this is true, this argument could lead to a more interesting understanding of the principle of church-state separation. From this perspective, the "wall" between the church and the state not only protects the private sphere from harmful intrusions but also allows the public sphere to escape certain irresolvable issues. Generally speaking, students of "negative liberty" overlook the emancipating and agenda-clearing functions of private rights. People typically argue for the justification of limiting government jurisdiction by citing the fragility and intrinsic value of protected domains. But what if we consider the benefits that excluding certain issues from the public agenda could bring to public life? When one area is obscured, private rights may simultaneously lighten the burden on another. Negative liberty "privatizes" certain issues, removing them from the list of problems requiring political resolution. This deflection makes it easier to reach compromises on the remaining controversies. If we slightly shift our perspective, what were once seen as protective methods now appear as emancipatory strategies. By restricting their own religious statements—as the earlier example illustrates—officials seem to gain as much freedom as sect members. Political autonomy and religious autonomy complement each other. As Isaiah Berlin put it, "There is no necessary connection between individual liberty and democratic rule." In his view, this connection is far more fragile than many of its advocates claim.
If my argument has any merit, Berlin was at least partially mistaken: private rights play a crucial role in democratic politics by eliminating irresolvable disputes from the public forum. By narrowing the political agenda to issues that can be discussed, certain private rights can also be said to promote autonomy. To reiterate, their function is not only to protect the private sphere but also to lighten the burden on public institutions.
The term "issue suppression" may sound authoritarian: restricting speech is seen as stifling expression. But self-restraint may be necessary for self-governing political entities. On one hand, resolving conflicts often requires avoiding them as a prerequisite. According to many democratic theorists, only by removing certain emotional allegiances and promises from the political sphere can democracy become possible. By excluding religious issues from the legislative agenda—as I argued—church-state separation may help shape a certain type of public—one that is more receptive to democratic methods of conflict resolution. Thus, self-silence is a form of self-control, not self-asphyxiation. To reiterate, by privatizing religious issues, a divided citizenry can reasonably resolve (through public discussion and compromise) their other disagreements.
People tend to associate democracy with openness, freedom of speech with the abolition of censorship. Therefore, emphasizing the role of speech restrictions in promoting autonomy seems absurd, yet it is not. The form of democratic politics undoubtedly depends on the strategic exclusion of certain matters from the democratic agenda. Some theorists even argue that issue suppression is a necessary condition for the emergence and maintenance of democracy. For instance, according to Joseph Schumpeter, one of the fundamental prerequisites for a successful democratic system is that "the range of political decision-making must not be too broad." Robert Dahl believes that moral conflicts do not undermine democracy: as long as a society maintains sufficient group autonomy, meaning that groups can pursue their goals undisturbed through various means, disagreements over goals can coexist harmoniously with collective autonomy. Because Samuel Huntington views religion as the primary source of conflicts that cannot be rationally resolved, he claims that cultures where religion and politics, the spiritual realm and the secular world, are not strictly separated are "not suited for democracy." When the colors of ultimate goals permeate all concrete political actions, compromise or incremental reform becomes nearly impossible. From this perspective, if there is no socially recognized boundary between religion and politics, democratization is doomed to fail from the outset.