Phenomenology of Intrinsic Time-Consciousness

Author: (German) Edmund Husserl
Translator: Yang Fubin
Editor-in-Chief: Hu Guihuan
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-03-01
Features:
Fragment:
Mao HuangドΦmu nang?
Undoubtedly, almost every philosopher who regards philosophy as their life would spare no effort to ensure the eternal existence of their "texts." However, this philosophical eternity is like an impartial judge, never "relaxing" its standards, swaying with the subjective efforts of the philosopher. Instead, it meticulously examines each philosophical text, discarding the numerous sloppy and mediocre works into the historical sewer, even revealing the paleness of some once-renowned so-called "philosophical masterpieces." At such times, only the works that still retain the unique intellectual charm of philosophy can truly be considered philosophical treasures with enduring vitality. In my view, Husserl's major philosophical works, including Phenomenology of Intentional Consciousness, possess just such a timeless vitality that transcends time and space.
Regarding Phenomenology of Intentional Consciousness, the reason for this evaluation is not merely that it systematically explores the historical philosophical problem of "intentional consciousness." What is more important and more direct is this: For today's readers, as long as you are not prejudiced—in other words, as long as you truly approach Husserl's research problems in accordance with the fundamental spirit of phenomenology—"towards the things themselves"—and take seriously the issues he investigates, especially the phenomenological method he employs in his inquiries—then when you suddenly realize, after repeated reflection, that you have a profound and lucid understanding of this method, you will feel a strong and enduring impulse from the depths of your soul, which may lead you to clearly recognize that Husserl's exploration of intentional consciousness and the phenomenological method he uses not only belong to history but also belong to today, and may even belong to the future.
It can be said that the insightful questions raised by Husserl, particularly the "tools" he uses—his phenomenological method—are advancing alongside the flow of time, alongside modern people.
To better understand the discourse and profound theoretical implications in this book, it is necessary to briefly outline the main ideas and developmental trajectory of Husserl's phenomenology. Phenomenology emerged in the early 20th century as a philosophical movement in opposition to psychologism. Psychologism attempts to equate psychology with philosophy, reducing rational concepts and logical laws to psychological phenomena. Led by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), some philosophers opposed this psychologism. They argued that psychology is a science of facts and cannot possess absolute certainty. Therefore, psychological empirical methods cannot explain absolutely certain concepts and logical laws. Psychologism inevitably leads to skepticism and relativism in philosophy. To explain the nature of knowledge in an absolutely certain way, philosophy cannot use psychological methods but should instead employ intuitive methods to determine pure conscious phenomena. They called the philosophy that studies pure conscious phenomena "phenomenology."
It is generally believed that the two-volume Logical Investigations published by Husserl in 1900–1901 proposed the famous phenomenological method, marking the beginning of the modern phenomenological movement. In Husserl's view, the main problem that phenomenology addresses is the so-called objectivity of knowledge, namely, how to navigate past the reefs of skepticism and relativism, and on an absolutely certain foundation, explain the possibility of knowledge and the process by which external objects become objects of knowledge, thereby establishing a scientific philosophy.