Subject hermeneutics

Author: Michel Foucault
Translator: She Biping
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-05-01
Features: The Hermeneutics of the Subject is a transcript of Michel Foucault's lectures at the Collège de France during the academic year 1981–1982. In this book, Foucault conducts a detailed study of "taking care of oneself." For Foucault, "taking care of oneself" is not merely the famous Delphic maxim "Know thyself," but also encompasses various philosophical practices. It aims to demonstrate how the ethical subject is shaped through means, steps, and historical purposes in relation to its own predetermined relationships. This research extends beyond the strict confines of the history of philosophy. While describing ancient modes of subjectivation, Foucault also seeks to reveal the temporality of modern subjectivation. Because interpreting ancient subjects allows us to explore the identity of these modern subjects. Foucault's entire work is intended to illustrate that we are strangers to ourselves. In other words, our relationship with ourselves is historical and ever-changing. We can say that in Plato, the relationship between taking care of oneself and taking care of others is largely established through three ways. Or, to return to what I will subsequently discuss, in Plato, knowing oneself is an aspect, an element, and a form of the universal and fundamental law of "taking care of oneself"—undoubtedly the primary one, but only one form. Neoplatonism subverts this relationship. However, conversely, in Plato, catharsis and politics are not mutually distinct. On the contrary, catharsis and politics belong to the same method. There are three ways. Because through taking care of oneself (as I just told you), a person enables themselves to take care of others. It can be said that there is a teleological relationship between taking care of oneself and taking care of others. I take care of myself in order to be able to take care of others. I will take the "catharsis" spoken of by Neoplatonists, and I will use this cathartic method in order to become a political subject. A political subject is one who knows what politics is and is capable of ruling. The relationship is teleological. The second relationship is a reciprocal relationship. Because if, in the sense of Neoplatonism, I purify myself through taking care of myself and practicing catharsis, then as I wish, I will do good to the city-state I govern. If, through taking care of myself, I ensure the salvation, property, and victory of my fellow citizens, then conversely, I will also benefit from the property, salvation, and victory I ensure for everyone, because I belong to the community of the city-state. In saving the city-state, taking care of oneself is compensated and secured. Humanity also saves itself, because the city-state is saved, because through taking care of oneself, humanity saves the city-state. This cycle is clearly evident throughout the entire structure of The Republic. Finally, there is the third relationship, following the teleological and reciprocal relationships: we can call it a primary implication relationship. Because the soul, through taking care of itself and practicing "purifying itself" (this is not Plato's term, but that of the Neoplatonists), simultaneously discovers what it is and what it knows, or: what it has always known. Moreover, it simultaneously discovers its existence and its knowledge. It discovers what it is, and it discovers what it meditates upon in recollection. It thus becomes able to reach the contemplation of truth through this act of recollection, thereby re-establishing the order of the city-state justly. From this perspective, in Plato, there are three connections, bearing the ways in which Neoplatonists speak of catharsis and politics: the teleological relationship in political technology (I must take care of myself in order to properly understand the political technology that allows me to take care of others), the reciprocal relationship in the form of the city-state (because by saving myself, I save the city-state, and conversely, by saving the city-state, I save myself), and the implication relationship in the form of recollection. This is the general relationship between taking care of oneself and taking care of others, and this is the relationship established in Plato, which is firm and difficult to unravel. However, if we now place ourselves in the era I have determined (i.e., the 1st–2nd centuries AD), this relationship has largely been dissolved. Seeing oneself gradually free from constraints (as well as the techniques of self-cultivation and the self-cultivation practices considered by Plato as taking care of oneself), as a self-sufficient end, while taking care of others is a non-ultimate end and a guide that emphasizes taking care of oneself, this may be one of the most important phenomena in the history of self-cultivation practices and ancient cultural history. , the self that a person takes care of is no longer one of the elements, or, if it appears to be one of the elements, you will see this—that is, after a set of reasoning or specific forms of knowledge. The self that a person takes care of is no longer a hinge. It is no longer a station. It is no longer an element that turns toward other things (the city-state or others). The self is the precise and sole target of taking care of oneself. Therefore, this activity, this practice of taking care of oneself, cannot be considered purely as preparation for taking care of others. It is an activity centered solely on itself, and it achieves self-perfection only within itself, that is, in the activity of self-cultivation. A person takes care of itself for itself, and this concern achieves its reward and punishment only within the concern for oneself. It can be said that in the practice called taking care of oneself, there is both the abstraction of the self (please excuse my use of the term) as the object of concern, and the activity of the self taking itself as its own end. In summary, in Plato, taking care of oneself is clearly open to issues concerning the city-state, others, "politics" (politeia), and justice (dikaiosunê); it is self-contained (at least in the 1st century AD that I have described).