What do we really want?

Author: Wen Tiejun
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-05-01
Features: Although China has repeatedly pledged to adopt a "sustainable development strategy," until the 21st century, local government officials still identified their goal as the "world factory." Especially after racing to join globalization at any cost, the focus of development shifted more towards leapfrogging high growth and achieving rapid GDP growth. This means that our country, a global population giant but a resource small one, will continue to engage in a self-destructive "drinking poison to quench thirst," which will inevitably lead to more resource consumption, environmental destruction, and greater exploitation by international financial capital. Perhaps all of this is unavoidable—do we have any other choices? When most people are eager to follow the Western model of modernization, the author is introspecting: As Chinese people at the turn of the century, what kind of "modernization path" should we choose? What do we truly want? Chinese industrialization is not easy, because millions of people have already paid the price with their lives. True reform in China is even harder, as it is often closely associated with "flesh-tearing." However, we must reform. If reform fails, China will inevitably face revolution or turmoil. We all know from personal experience that whether it is revolution or reform, it is often forced upon us—it is not pre-approved or designed beforehand. In the past century, China has never had a British-style "Glorious Revolution" where the ruling class voluntarily relinquished some power and interests due to the influence of the aristocracy. Moreover, China's traditional aristocracy, which valued traditional values, has long been destroyed in wars and revolutions, and the new aristocracy is still in the chaotic stage of self-enrichment. Additionally, traditional intellectuals, as "spiritual aristocrats," either "lost their voice" or self-destructed during the two Cultural Revolutions in 1919 and 1966. Those who survived are often shallow in the technical-thinking mindset of the new generation of intellectuals in the industrialization process, choosing to play it safe. Those who still have some "local cultural sense" are often easily excluded by the mainstream. Moreover, there has never been any fertile ground for true leftists to emerge in China. This is because the scattered laborers under the pressure of absolute labor surplus lack the conditions to confront capital. As a result, intellectuals have no opportunity to "combine with workers and peasants," unless there is a special situation of external threats, internal crises, national emergencies, and severe mismanagement by the rulers. The new generation of technical intellectuals derived from New China's industrialization is humorously called "learned but lacking thoughts, knowledgeable but culturally shallow." Most of them are essentially similar to the new aristocracy. Moreover, the mainstream of modern intellectuals, who emphasize the value of "education leading to officialdom," are always actively and desperately aligning themselves with the rulers (regardless of who they are) unless they are pushed to the brink. The masses are certainly not foolish enough to lose their sense of being exploited. But since intellectuals have abandoned their social responsibilities, they lack new ideas to guide them. Those with ideas often turn to tradition in search of answers, while the majority without ideas become "criminal elements with a tendency toward crime." The latter is the objective foundation for China's long-term decline in the peak of the fifth "criminal crime peak period" since 1989.