Khrushchev's Memoirs (Selected Edition)

Author: (Russian) Nikita S. Khrushchev / Translated by Tao
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-02-01
Features: In a little while, every word spoken by those alive today will be worth its weight in gold. How much more so for those who once held the helm. I would like to share my views on a series of issues. Based on my experience, I know that our next generation will desperately seek out every word about this very important period. We lived, created, and built a great nation during that time. I was fortunate to be among them. I participated in many major decisions, in implementing those decisions, and in events of that critical period. Therefore, I believe I have a responsibility to share my views. – Nikita S. Khrushchev
The authoritative and most complete Chinese translation of Khrushchev’s Memoirs (in three volumes), personally edited and compiled by his son, Sergey, will be published by this press. This book is a selected translation of the memoirs of the former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev, documenting major events during his tenure as the highest leader of the USSR and significant experiences in his political career. The book contains approximately 350,000 words, compiled and published by Khrushchev’s son, with Zhang Zuwu of the Central serving as the translator. He is also the primary translator of Mikhail Gorbachev’s memoirs.
The excerpt of my father, Nikita S. Khrushchev’s memoirs, that you are reading is only a part of the vast amount of material he dictated between 1967 and 1971. I became the editor and keeper of the manuscript purely by circumstance. Back then, helping my father write his memoirs could have brought great trouble. Authorities did everything they could to prevent the publication of Khrushchev’s memoirs, and they succeeded, at least in our country. Now everything has changed, but publication faces new obstacles, primarily financial ones. Moreover, in the eyes of superficial readers, the remarks of a deceased politician about a non-existent country and a defunct system hold no practical significance. Khrushchev’s memoirs, in their "obsolescence" and lack of relevance, bear a striking resemblance to the memoirs of another Russian reformer, Sergey Y. Witte. Both were written in secret and against official obstruction. Both were published abroad first, while their homeland saw them only years later, after a regime change, when denying the experience of the previous government and one’s own history had become the norm. Both are reflections of their time, deeply personal accounts of a nation at a crossroads. Both look back to look forward.
When Khrushchev began writing his memoirs, authorities seriously proposed restoring Stalin’s reputation. He believed their decision was extremely unwise and detrimental to the country. He resisted it to the best of his ability, speaking the truth about Stalin and Stalinism. This includes the Twentieth Congress, which exposed the crimes of the system, steering the nation from the path of war to the bumpy road of peaceful coexistence, and turning away from the arms race toward continuous disarmament. This also includes efforts to reform our society and explore a rational economic structure—one that could help our country achieve my father’s ideal of "catching up with America," not in nuclear missiles, but in producing enough goods to provide a decent life. His first priority was to ensure the nation was "well-fed," aiming to match the U.S. in meat, milk, and butter production. The Virgin Lands Campaign, the corn (and soybeans) that drew many laughs, the establishment of large-scale livestock complexes—all were met with devastating criticism at the time. Yet, it was in such complexes, not individual farms, that the U.S. produced chicken (the "Bush drumsticks" that Russians had grown accustomed to), pork, and beef. These topics deserve serious study. Despite errors, the living standards of residents were raised without imports (except for the disastrous year of 1963). Unfortunately, not everything went as planned. Despite all its flaws and mistakes, Western scholars still believe that among Soviet leaders of the 20th century, only Khrushchev left office with a country in better shape than when he took it from his predecessor.
Housing. Five-story apartment buildings, concrete prefabricated panels—what the press called "Khrushchev-style slums." Why this path was chosen is detailed by Khrushchev in his book. He believed that without it, our country would never have escaped shanties and overcrowded public housing.
Economic Reform. The shift from ministries to national economic committees, from vertical centralized management to regional management. This transition initially had a positive impact on the economy but also exposed the conflict between the interests of state owners and regional elites. The final outcome of the reform was the irreversible restoration of the vertical line—no longer the one of the ministries, but that of the pyramid of power in the national economic committees: cross-regional national economic committees, all-union national economic committees.
Military Reform. Khrushchev understood that economically, we could not catch up with the U.S. in the foreseeable future. In this case, symmetrical military strategy, the creation of balanced armed forces, and the resulting arms race would lead to the economic collapse of our country. He believed the solution lay in asymmetrical military strategy—ensuring our security with hundreds (200–300) intercontinental ballistic missiles guarded by a small but well-trained army (about 500,000 soldiers). We should not compete with the U.S. in the navy, air force, tank forces, or tactical nuclear forces. The vast savings should be used to develop the economy. Military reforms began immediately after Stalin’s death. The army was reduced from 5.5 million to 2.5 million personnel. The costly construction of the naval fleet was halted. The air force and artillery were downsized. Tank production was planned to be significantly reduced. For this reason, the military establishment disliked him deeply.
Foreign Policy. How could our country avoid external threats? Khrushchev believed there was only one way: to force the U.S. to treat the USSR as an equal. In the face of economic disparity, the only way to achieve this was to respond strongly to any move by the other side. Crisis politics emerged: from the Suez Crisis of 1956 to the Cuban (Caribbean) Crisis of 1962. If you line them up, it becomes clear: thanks to firm yet cautious responses, the U.S. recognized our country’s superpower status, though only in the military sphere. I do not expect everyone to agree with my assessment. Some may think I am biased. Of course, my views on that era and my father are subjective. They can only be so. But is there a non-subjective perspective? The past is the past, but without the past, there would be no present. The better we learn from the past, the fewer mistakes we will make in the future.
At this point, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Leonora Nikiforovna Fenoghenova for her tireless efforts. She transcribed all of Khrushchev’s dictated tapes into text under extremely difficult and hostile circumstances. I am also deeply grateful to Anatoli Yakovlevich Shevelevko for his efforts to correct the entire manuscript and prepare it for printing. Ahmed Ahmedovich Eskendrov published the full text of the memoirs in the journal Problems of History.