Central Bank Independence and Monetary Policy

Author: Cai Zhigang
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-02-01
Features: Financial Doctoral Theses Series · Volume 5. This book is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the background, research history, and research methods of the topic, as well as the theoretical foundation of central bank independence. The second part uses mathematical analysis, historical analysis, logical analysis, and game theory analysis to elaborate on the connotation and theory of central bank independence and conducts empirical tests. The third part analyzes the relationship between central bank independence and the objectives and policy effects of monetary policy. The fourth part examines the development history of the People's Bank of China, scholarly evaluations, and the reasons for its weak independence performance today. Through an interactive analysis of central bank independence and monetary policy, combined with the establishment of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, it proposes policy choices to enhance the independence of the central bank.