Never Give Up: Gali's Memoirs

Author: Translator: et al
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Publishing Date: 2001-01-01
Features: "Never Say Die – Kofi Annan's Memoirs" is a significant contribution to United Nations literature, as the author was deeply involved in United Nations affairs. Although Dr. Annan was well-versed in diplomacy and international politics, he learned the harsh lessons of "might makes right" and "power rules all" during his tenure as Secretary-General. He had taught these issues as a university professor but failed to give them the attention they deserved when serving as Minister, and even ignored them during his time as Secretary-General, ultimately becoming a victim himself. Excerpt: Leveraging the Influence of the United Nations I have known Prince Norodom Ranariddh, the son of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, for a long time. He was once my teaching assistant at the University of Bordeaux in France when he was young. Ranariddh carries the demeanor of his father, but lacks his political sophistication. Despite his shortcomings, he and his Funcinpec Party are crucial to the United Nations' goal of establishing a multi-party system in Cambodia. Privately, I told Munetaka Yamanouchi that we should raise funds from Japanese non-governmental organizations to help train and strengthen the capabilities of the candidate parties. This might be criticized as external interference, but I believe it is essential to establish a genuine multi-party competitive mechanism. The Hun Sen regime prevented Ranariddh from traveling across the country for campaigning on his own aircraft; the United Nations forces lent him a helicopter instead. Democratic elections are vital for Cambodia to establish a new legitimate autonomous government. However, the Cambodian people have not been exposed to democratic culture, and they will not be in the coming years. Munetaka Yamanouchi indeed raised some funds and distributed them strategically. However, I believe Hun Sen is the key figure on the Cambodian political stage, whether or not a multi-party system is implemented. He will always be the central decision-maker. I will do my utmost to ensure the true freedom and fairness of the elections. At the same time, regardless of the outcome, Hun Sen will undoubtedly further solidify his position at the center of Cambodian politics. No one else can match his authority, determination, and political skills. Inside the Royal Palace, I repeatedly urged the four Cambodian parties to tolerate each other and reminded them not to take the United Nations' assistance for granted. I said the United Nations would even use force, although I knew the Security Council would not go that far. On April 7, 1993, I arrived in Phnom Penh, and the campaign began as scheduled. By mid-May, the election materials, ballots, and ballot boxes had arrived in Phnom Penh. Observers from 45 countries and the Inter-Parliamentary Union of the Commonwealth sent 900 observers, along with 50,000 Cambodian officials, to monitor the elections. The United Nations radio broadcast for 15 hours a day and established relay stations to expand its reach. The Japanese government donated hundreds of radios, which were distributed across Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge spread threats, saying those who did not vote for them would be retaliated against. The United Nations radio strongly refuted these claims, emphasizing that voting would be secret. On April 8, I addressed the Cambodian people in French on television. I said that over a million people had registered to vote, indicating that the Cambodian people wanted freedom, justice, and democracy. "I have called on your leaders to renounce violence, threats, and intimidation. You should not heed the threats. Remember, your votes are secret, and no one will know which party you voted for. For the sake of your children, for the peace and prosperity of Cambodia in the future, please vote according to your conscience." Despite the United Nations' supervision of the elections, violence and intimidation persisted in the weeks leading up to the vote. Members of the four Cambodian parties were injured or even killed. Officials and journalists repeatedly suggested postponing the elections, but I refused. In the days following April, the Khmer Rouge withdrew their staff from Phnom Penh. Some said this indicated the Khmer Rouge would attack Phnom Penh. My colleagues advised me to withdraw United Nations personnel to safe areas, but I said that family members could evacuate, but staff could not. I believed the Khmer Rouge was too weak to pose a national threat. In reality, I was very concerned about the safety of United Nations personnel, but I had to do this. I felt that I had no choice but to rely on my political intuition, and it told me that the United Nations must take risks to ensure the elections proceeded as planned. On April 28, Munetaka Yamanouchi called to say the situation was deteriorating, and the Khmer Rouge's provocations were intensifying. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia was forced to take special security measures. Earlier, Prince Sihanouk had met with Chou Meng Phan in Pyongyang, where Chou asked the Prince to support the Khmer Rouge. Later, the Prince went to Beijing, saying his doctor had advised him to rest and not to travel. I sent a message to the Prince saying that the venue for the National Supreme Council meeting, scheduled for May 6, could be moved from Phnom Penh to Beijing, and Munetaka Yamanouchi would fly to Beijing to attend. I intended to pressure the Prince to return to Cambodia. On May 21, 1993, the Khmer Rouge attacked a Chinese engineering team under the United Nations, killing two members and injuring seven. The Security Council condemned the attack in unison and called on the Cambodian people to exercise their right to vote. On May 22, as I had hoped, Prince Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh, and the Khmer Rouge's goal of disrupting the elections and forcing the United Nations to withdraw failed. Afterword: This is a book about how we lost an opportunity to establish a broadly accepted post-Cold War international peace and security structure. Throughout history, each major conflict has required the nations of the world to rebuild a system of relationships that could provide stability, cooperation, and the possibility of progress. In the past, it usually took about five to seven years to establish a new international relationship system after a war. The Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars kept Europe free from major conflicts for several centuries. The Treaty of Versailles and the creation of the "League of Nations" after World War I, however, failed due to significant flaws and led to another global conflict within a generation. After World War II, the United States, which was at the forefront, centered its efforts around the United Nations founded in San Francisco in 1945, attempting to design a stable, just, and cooperative international order. At that time, as a young man, I watched this moment with awe and reverence, and from then on, I developed a deep trust in the United Nations. The United Nations provided an opportunity to achieve the goals that humanity has pursued since the formation of civilized societies: a means for all humanity to rationally negotiate, seek common paths to security, act together to demonstrate forgiveness, defend freedom, pursue justice, and build a better future. However, the passionate and hopeful period that began with the founding of the United Nations in 1945 ended quickly with the onset of the Cold War. After the Cold War, the United Nations, and I as Secretary-General, were duty-bound to fully engage in the process of creating a post-Cold War structure, working with the sole superpower left after the Cold War—the United States. But no new international partnership was formed to face the 21st century. Despite some successes, the United Nations itself suffered serious damage in these years. The post-Cold War international system had not been established when the post-Cold War era had already passed, and a series of dramatic events throughout this period highlighted the relationship between the United Nations and the United States. The coalition led by the United States to force Iraqi forces out of Kuwait was formed under a Security Council mandate, and a series of unprecedented United Nations resolutions set the world's approach to dealing with the consequences of war. By the end of 1995, as this period drew to a close, the negotiations led by the United States in Dayton, Ohio, aimed at establishing a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina deliberately excluded the United Nations. During this period, a fixed pattern repeatedly emerged in the handling of major issues involving key members and the Secretary-General. They knew I had no authority to launch reforms but demanded that I do so. Similarly, they did not provide the armed forces and authorization the United Nations needed but demanded that the United Nations end the conflict. On one hand, they expected the United Nations to take on greater responsibilities, but on the other, they plunged it into a financial crisis. For the first five years of the 1990s, many critical international challenges required close interaction between the United Nations and the United States. When the United States was not substantially involved, allowing the United Nations to take the lead, as in Mozambique, its actions were successful. When the United States had a political need for the United Nations, as in Haiti, its actions also achieved its main goals. But when the United States wanted to intervene actively while avoiding difficult decisions in reality, as in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, the United Nations was misused, overused, and blamed, and its actions tragically and horrifyingly led to failure. Some said I was "pro-Third World" during my time at the United Nations, and the implication often meant "anti-Western." Without a doubt, I came from the Third World, but I was also "pro-Western"; my decades of education, published works, and official positions should clearly demonstrate this. But I still believe that whoever holds the post of Secretary-General, regardless of where they come from in the world, must focus on the goals of developing countries. In a world with many major and wealthy countries, giving attention to those marginalized due to race, gender, religion, age, health, poverty, or other reasons is the duty of the United Nations. This responsibility naturally extends to neglected or overlooked situations, such as the conflicts in Africa, where the level of chaos caused by conflict often exceeds that of the Balkans and the Middle East, which receive extensive international attention and media coverage. For half a century since its founding, the United Nations has dealt with major issues related to the Third World. In the foreseeable future, the United Nations must continue to be the main voice for marginalized or perceived marginalized peoples, protecting them from the adverse effects of globalization and helping them find ways to succeed in the global economic tide. A single superpower hegemony is a transitional phenomenon, but globalization is an irreversible and unprecedented tide of the times. Globalization encompasses many different aspects: capital flows, business, technology, information, environmental changes, drug trafficking, crime, and terrorism. Each aspect of globalization has its own patterns and rhythms, and it presents its own problems. In many cases, the only global institution that truly addresses these issues is the United Nations. The founders of the United Nations envisioned not only that the organization would function as they had imagined in 1945 but also that it could transform itself to adapt effectively to a world that would inevitably change in unpredictable ways. I firmly believe that such a transformation is still possible and can succeed—if the United States allows it to do so.