Research on Regulation Issues of China's Network Industries under Asymmetric Information

Author: Liu Xuexin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-12-01
Features:
1. Regulation, Information, and Regulation Economics
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Regulation Theory
2. Progress in Regulation Reform of China's Network Industries
2.1 Economic Characteristics of Network Industries
2.2 Progress in Regulation Reform of China's Network Industries
3. Game Analysis of Regulation in China's Network Industries
3.1 Principal-Agent Game in Regulation of China's Network Industries
3.2 Principal-Agent Problems in State-Owned Enterprises of Network Industries During the Transition Period
3.3 Soft Budget Constraint, Excessive Investment, and Market Entry Barriers
3.4 "Soft Policy Constraint" of State-Owned Enterprises in Network Industries
4. Regulation Mechanism Design Under Asymmetric Information
4.1 Theories of Incentive Mechanism Design and Regulation Mechanism Design
4.2 Regulation Mechanism Design Under Adverse Selection
4.3 Regulation Mechanism Design Under Moral Hazard
4.4 Regulation Commitment and Regulation Mechanism Design
4.5 Non-Bayesian Regulation Mechanism Design
4.6 Regulation Methods in Practice
5. Regulation Analysis of China's Network Industries Under Asymmetric Information—Taking the Telecommunications Industry as an Example
5.1 Regulation Reform Analysis of China's Telecommunications Industry Under Asymmetric Information
5.2 Analysis of Monopoly, Competition, and Regulation in China's Telecommunications Industry—Taking "Little Comrade" as an Example
5.3 Price Competition and Regulation Analysis in China's Telecommunications Industry
5.4 Access Pricing in Network Industries and Interconnection Issues in China's Telecommunications Industry
References
Postscript