Journal of the Theory of History and Historiography (Volume 2002)

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Features: The report "Social Class in Contemporary China" states: "Since 1978, with the implementation of reform and opening-up, the economic system has been continuously deepened. The original working class, peasant class, and intellectual class have been differentiated, giving rise to new social strata such as the managerial class, private entrepreneurs, and migrant workers. The political and economic relationships among these strata have undergone and continue to undergo various changes." "Different stages of social development have different social class structures. The social class structure of industrialized and modern societies is completely different from that of traditional agricultural societies, although the former has evolved gradually from the latter." The book "proposes a theoretical framework for classifying social strata based on occupational classification, with the possession of organizational resources, economic resources, and cultural resources as criteria." According to this standard, it divides the social class structure of Chinese society into ten strata: the state and society administrators, managerial personnel, private entrepreneurs, professional and technical personnel, clerical workers, self-employed industrial and commercial households, commercial service workers, industrial workers, agricultural laborers, and urban and rural unemployed, semi-unemployed, and underemployed. The book also points out: "Using only the indicator of the ownership of means of production to explain social class differentiation is incomplete." "Regardless of whether people agree with the book's division of China's current social class structure into ten strata, the profound and fundamental changes in China's class structure are undeniable. And this change has already occurred in advanced countries in Europe and America. Therefore, using the ownership of means of production as the only standard for classifying strata cannot fully explain the complex social class structure of today. And this is precisely the fundamental and basic point that Chinese scholars have always understood in the dialectical materialism of history. The dialectical materialism of history is a theory that observes human history by examining the changes in social structure. The social class structure is an important part of the overall social structure. The changes in the social structure of human society must inevitably affect the dialectical materialism of history itself. Therefore, it can be seen that the gap between the 'humanities' and the 'social sciences' or the 'sciences of man,' which has existed since the 19th century, still exists today. As the Chinese edition of the Concise Encyclopedia Britannica summarizes the differences between the two, one view holds that 'the distinction between the sciences and the humanities lies in their methods of analysis and interpretation. The sciences move from diversity and specificity toward unity, consistency, simplicity, and necessity; conversely, the humanities emphasize uniqueness, unpredictability, complexity, and creativity.' Another view it summarizes is that 'the sciences and the humanities differ fundamentally in their methods of inquiry and explanation. The sciences are the product of reason, using concepts such as facts, laws, and causes, and communicate information through objective language; the humanities are the product of imagination, using concepts such as phenomenon and reality, fate and free will, and express themselves through emotional and purposeful language.' These arguments are not essentially different from those proposed by neo-Kantian philosophers over 100 years ago. What is the reason for this chasm between the two? How can it be bridged? We believe that the deep root of this chasm lies in the opposition between mechanical materialism and idealism in social history and methodology; from another perspective, it is also the manifestation of the opposition between humanism and scientism in worldviews and methodologies. The social historical view of mechanical materialism holds that human destiny is determined by external living conditions—Including the living conditions inadvertently created by people themselves in the past—People's production and living methods, ways of thinking, and behavior patterns are unconsciously dominated by these conditions, and they have no initiative choice. People who hold this social historical view will adopt scientism in methodology, and in the social sciences, it is reflected in the use of structural-functional analysis methods, summarizing various external conditions or material factors that affect human survival—Even including spiritual factors such as attitudes and beliefs formed in the 'collective unconscious'—Into various 'models' or 'structures' and conducting functional analysis. They believe that the knowledge system composed of such structural-functional analysis is science. The social historical view of idealism generally holds that human destiny is ultimately determined by divine will, but at the same time, it holds that specific human behavior is dominated by their motives and will, giving them full autonomy and initiative, and that the social historical process is the process of the manifestation of the motives and will of people, especially elite figures. People who hold the social historical view of idealism will adopt humanism in methodology, treating every individual in the research object as an individual with unique personality, values, and free will, emphasizing that researchers can only restore the original appearance of these unique personality, values, and free will through 'empathetic' 'insight' and 'introspection,' and oppose the use of scientism's inductive methods to induce 'models,' 'structures,' or 'laws,' believing that this would obscure the unique personality, values, and free will of the research object. To be fair, both of these social historical views and methodologies have each seen one side of the truth. The fact is that in the history of human survival and development, people are constrained by objective conditions that are beyond their will, hence the 'unwillingness' aspect; but at the same time, people are constantly changing objective conditions according to their will, hence the 'autonomous choice' aspect. The problem is that neither side has seen that in the process of seeking survival and development, people are constantly accumulating and developing their material and spiritual strength, gradually reducing the degree of 'unwillingness' and increasing the degree of freedom in 'autonomous choice.' Because neither side has seen this central link of driving and transformation, only seeing the side they are on, neither can answer the fundamental questions they face: mechanical materialists cannot answer how the 'structures' and 'models' they discover are generated and changed, so they either avoid answering or ultimately attribute them to God; idealists cannot answer how the motives and will of the elite figures they mention that determine the historical process are generated, why the motives and will of elite figures from different eras and classes are so different; faced with such questions, idealists are either the same or avoid answering, or ultimately attribute them to God. Once God appears, there is no place for science. Unfortunately, God cannot bridge the gap between the 'humanities' and the 'sciences of man' or the 'social sciences,' nor can it overcome the opposition between humanism and scientism. How can we get out of this predicament? According to the statement of Wiener cited earlier, it means finding 'a key to unlock the door of historical generation and change, a driving force for historical development.' If that key and driving force are found, the gap between the 'humanities' and the 'social sciences' or the 'sciences of man,' which has existed for over 100 years, can be bridged, and the opposition between humanism and scientism can also be eliminated. Where can we find that 'key' and 'driving force'? In fact, the dialectical materialism of history has long pointed out where they are, but due to the long-term emphasis on class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the 'law of the replacement of the five production modes' in the past, various dogmatic teachings have covered them with a thick layer of historical dust, completely concealing them. Today, the great tide of reform and opening-up inspires us to clear away that historical dust, and the long-sealed 'key' and 'driving force' begin to reveal their scientific rational brilliance once again. In fact, Marx and Engels long ago pointed out that the dialectical materialism of history is 'a theory that has found the key to understanding the entire history of society in the history of labor development.' The starting point of its grand scientific system is a simple fact that is well-known to all and would not be doubted by anyone: humans must eat, drink, live, and wear; to eat, drink, live, and wear, they must inevitably engage in labor production. Then, it expands its entire system from here: as humans engage in labor production generation after generation, they must inevitably improve their material and spiritual qualities while continuously improving the objective conditions of their survival: 'In the act of reproduction itself, not only do objective conditions change, such as villages becoming cities, wilderness becoming cleared farmland, but the producers themselves also change, forging new qualities, developing and transforming themselves through production, creating new strength and new concepts, new ways of interaction, new needs, and new languages'; thus, it also inevitably promotes human nature to gradually move away from the barbarism of animals and become more civilized; thus, it also inevitably pushes society forward from a lower level to a higher level. This is the fundamental and universal law of human historical development revealed by the dialectical materialism of history. It is not the law that governs human destiny from something outside of humans, but rather the law that human beings, through their own practice, promote the development of their material and spiritual qualities and abilities from a lower level to a higher level, and thus also promote their society from a lower level to a higher level. Therefore, Marx and Engels summarized all history as 'nothing more than the history of the development of their individualities,' and called the dialectical materialism of history 'the science of the real person and his historical development.' Enlightenment refers to a series of social characteristics relative to primitive and barbarism. Modern Europe not only saw itself as one of the most outstanding civilizations among several civilizations but also considered itself a (unique, at least) 'civilized' world. What are the characteristics of this civilized state, there is no clear consensus so far, even among Europeans themselves. For some, civilization is contained in 'modernity,' that is, technological progress, increased productivity, and cultural beliefs that have developed and progressed in history; for some, civilization means the enhancement of 'individual autonomy' relative to other social factors—family, community, state, religious groups; for some, civilization means non-abusive behavior in daily life and a broad sense of social etiquette; and for others, civilization means reducing the scope of legal violence and expanding the restrictions on cruel behavior. Of course, for many people, civilization includes one or all of the characteristics mentioned above. When 19th-century French colonialists spoke of the 'mission to spread civilization' (la mission civilisatrice), they meant that through colonial conquest, France (or all of Europe) imposed the values and norms contained in these definitions of civilization on non-European peoples. In the 1990s, various groups in Western countries spoke of the 'right to intervene' (right to interfere) in the political situations of countries around the world, mainly non-Western countries, on the same grounds of these civilized values. Such values, whether we like to call them civilized values, secular humanitarian values, or modern values, since the social sciences are the product of the same historical system that elevates these values to the forefront, they also spread throughout the social sciences as some people hope. Social scientists incorporate these values into the definition of the topics they consider worth studying (social problems, ideological problems), into the concepts they invent to analyze such problems, and into the standards they use to measure these concepts. There is no doubt that most social scientists adhere to the idea of value neutrality, claiming that they do not want to misunderstand or distort research data due to their own social and political tendencies. However, this kind of value neutrality does not mean that values do not play a role when evaluating the historical significance of the research object. Of course, this is the core argument of Heinrich Rickert in his discussion of the logical characteristics of what is known as 'cultural sciences' (1913). When evaluating the social significance of things, they cannot ignore 'values.' Indeed, the definition of 'civilization' by Westerners and the social sciences is inevitably influenced by the concept of the diversity of civilization. However, whenever the question of the origin of civilized values is raised, that is, how they first (or so some claim) emerged in the modern Western world, the answer is almost unavoidable that they are the product of the long-term unique development trend of the past Western world; or, they are described as the legacy of classical antiquity and (or) the medieval Christian world, the legacy of the Jewish world, or the combination of the two legacies—the latter is sometimes named the Jewish-Christian legacy. Many objections have been raised and have already been raised to these assumptions. Whether the modern world, or the modern European world, is as 'civilized' as described in European discourse, has been questioned. Mahatma Gandhi had a famous satire on this. Someone asked him, 'Mahatma Gandhi, how do you view Western civilization?' He replied, 'That's a good question.' Additionally, the assertion that the values of ancient Greece and Rome, or the values of ancient Israel, are more conducive to laying the foundation for what are called modern values than the values of other ancient civilizations, has also been questioned. Moreover, whether modern Europe can be said to have originated from ancient Greece and Rome on the one hand and from ancient Israel on the other is not self-evident. In fact, people have long been debating which is the cultural origin, ancient Greece or Israel. Both sides of the debate deny the rationality of the other's view. The debate itself is enough to cast doubt on the rationality of this origin theory. Anyway, who would say that ancient Indian civilization is the birthplace of Buddhism, and Buddhism has become the core of Japanese cultural history, so Japan can claim that ancient Indian civilization is its predecessor? Is it true today that the United States is culturally closer to ancient Greece and Rome or ancient Israel than Japan is to Indian civilization? After all, it can be proven that Christianity is far from representing a continuation, but rather marks a clear break with ancient Greek, Roman, and Israeli civilizations. In fact, until the Renaissance, Christianity unambiguously asserted this claim. Moreover, the break with classical antiquity is still?