Corporate Cross-Holding (Endogeneity·Efficiency·Regulation)

Author: Gao Yu
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-01-01
Features: The main research content of this book is the endogeneity, efficiency, and regulatory issues of corporate cross-shareholding, as well as its implications for Chinese corporate reform. The research approach followed in this book is: using comparative institutional analysis, transaction cost analysis, and game theory analysis, etc., to first analyze the endogeneity of the corporate cross-shareholding system and examine the reasons for its emergence. Next, the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system is studied as the focus. The research on the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system is carried out from two aspects: ① From the perspective of internal incentives, analyzing the changes in the principal-agent problem within the enterprise under the condition of cross-shareholding, as well as the resulting changes in internal incentive issues. ② From the perspective of industrial organization, analyzing the efficiency of transaction cost savings and the inefficiency of anti-competitive issues in vertical and horizontal cross-shareholding. Then, based on the analysis of the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system, combined with the regulatory policies of the United States and Japan on corporate cross-shareholding, the regulatory issues of the corporate cross-shareholding system are analyzed. Finally, the implications of corporate cross-shareholding for Chinese corporate reform are examined. The main research content of this book is the endogeneity, efficiency, and regulatory issues of corporate cross-shareholding, as well as its implications for Chinese corporate reform. The research approach followed in this book is: using comparative institutional analysis, transaction cost analysis, and game theory analysis, etc., to first analyze the endogeneity of the corporate cross-shareholding system and examine the reasons for its emergence. Next, the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system is studied as the focus. The research on the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system is carried out from two aspects: ① From the perspective of internal incentives, analyzing the changes in the principal-agent problem within the enterprise under the condition of cross-shareholding, as well as the resulting changes in internal incentive issues. ② From the perspective of industrial organization, analyzing the efficiency of transaction cost savings and the inefficiency of anti-competitive issues in vertical and horizontal cross-shareholding. Then, based on the analysis of the efficiency of the corporate cross-shareholding system, combined with the regulatory policies of the United States and Japan on corporate cross-shareholding, the regulatory issues of the corporate cross-shareholding system are analyzed. Finally, the implications of corporate cross-shareholding for Chinese corporate reform are examined.