Prune the Bodhi tree ("The storm of criticizing Buddhism")

Author: (USA) Robert H. Hobbs, (USA) Paul Swanson, edited by Gong Jun et al. translated
Publisher:
Publishing Date: 2004-11-01
Features: This book is divided into three parts. Part "Critique of the Nature and Pratītyasamutpāda of Buddhism," primarily demonstrates the essence of the critical Buddhist thought and its background. Paul Swanson's article "Why Do They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism" provides a detailed overview of the views of critical Buddhism scholars such as Kiyota, Matsumoto, and others, as well as the reactions their works have provoked in academic and sectarian circles. His conclusion is that critical Buddhism at least contains three levels of critique: philosophical, sectarian, and social. In his paper "Critical Buddhism and Return to the Source," Dan Lusthaus interprets critical Buddhism through a broader historical perspective as an inevitable phenomenon of pluralistic historical development and views it as an extension (or repetition) of the debates surrounding the concept of ālayavij?āna since ancient times. In his article "Critical Philosophy Against Situational Philosophy," Kiyota uses the critical method of Descartes (Rene Descartes) in the history of Western philosophy and the emphasis on rhetoric by Giambattista Vico to explain the opposition between critical philosophy and situational philosophy, and accuses Japan of recently favoring situational philosophy of being a disease of thought. He points out that the main danger of this disease lies in "using the voice of authority to promote one's own rhetoric." Kiyota also questions whether he has used the voice of authority in his article. My own paper "Aversion to Situations," attempts to clarify Kiyota's critique of "the critique of situational philosophy." I clarify the original meaning of the concept of "situation" by examining Aristotle's logic, Vico's thought, the ideas of the main eighteenth-century situational philosophers criticized by Kiyota, and the ideological aspects of certain East Asian traditions, such as Taoism and the Japanese philosophy of "wa," which Kiyota attacks as representing consistency or conformity. In the article "Academia as Critique," Kiyota questions the concept of academic objectivity proposed by Weber in his famous essay "Academia as a Vocation." Contrary to Weber—as mentioned above—Kiyota tends somewhat toward the behaviorist direction in contemporary Western academia, and he finds that the so-called ideal of objective scholars is merely another form of the authority advocated by situational philosophy. On the surface, the discovery of what are called "neutral facts" represents the objectivity of academic research, but in reality, this very act is merely the covert use of subjective opinions. Kiyota presents a wealth of evidence to the readers. With a tendency toward postmodern literature and critical theory, Kiyota opposes the demand for objectivist methods in historical research and advocates for a narrative approach to history: "It can be shown that those who value situationality also value objective facts, while those who emphasize critique also value language. What the latter needs to do is to critique through refined linguistic methods, while the former merely discovers facts like situationality." If the critique of academia means for scholars in the classroom to abandon the self-proclaimed objectivity and risk being labeled as agitators, Kiyota argues that this is also a (praiseworthy) path of moral perfection. In the article "The Limits of Critique," Griffith attempts to reposition Kiyota's concept of critique within the more familiar philosophical context of epistemological internal and external analysis. He argues that the situational philosophy criticized by Kiyota approaches epistemological internalism, which is criticized because it has caused many problems. To provide evidence, Griffith examines the debate between Kiyota and Lambert Schmithausen regarding the meaning of the term "nature" (svabhāva) in Buddhism to illustrate the extent to which critique can be meaningful in becoming a Buddhist. The last short essay is a response by Matsumoto to the 1993 religious conference at the special panel on critical Buddhism. The second part is titled "The Search for Genuine Buddhism." In this part, the article "The ālayavij?āna Thought Is Not Buddhism," one of the first aggressive articles published in the critical Buddhism debate, is Matsumoto's paper. This paper was first published in 1986 at a conference on Japanese Indology and Buddhist studies, where Matsumoto began to present the concept of dhatu-vāda as an opposing schema to Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda and anātman, termed "generative monism." He criticizes this thought schema for contradicting the true teachings of Buddhism. The next is Sally King's article, "The Tathāgatagarbha Doctrine Is Genuine Buddhism." The paper argues that the ālayavij?āna or tathāgatagarbha doctrine should be understood as a soteriological plan rather than an ontological metaphysics, hence, as the title suggests, it is "genuine Buddhism." King also finds that there is no natural connection between the ālayavij?āna tathāgatagarbha thought and social discrimination; on the contrary, they are precisely used to prove and inspire social participation. One of the methods sought by Matsumoto and Terao to prove their point is the traditional Buddhist hermeneutical method of annotating scriptures. The article by Yamabe Narisato and the subsequent discussion with Matsumoto, "The Concept of Basis in Yogācāra and ālayavij?āna Texts," is of this type. In the article, Yamabe argues that generative monism leads to unfair pluralism, and the characteristics of the dhatu-vāda thought defined by Matsumoto are not actually found in the Yogācāra texts cited by him. Although we could read Matsumoto's articles on these issues more carefully, Matsumoto's response and Yamabe's rebuttal (in the "Commentary Exchange" article) both indicate the complexity and subtlety of the issues they explore. Although both sides express a desire for further discussion and clarification of their respective positions, due to space limitations, it is not possible to elaborate on them here. "Critical Buddhism" is usually associated with the controversial works of Kiyota and Matsumoto, but they are not the only scholars engaged in critical Buddhist studies. The renowned Tibetan Buddhist scholar Yamabe Ryūgen is such a critical scholar. Kiyota and Matsumoto often mention their mentor as the guide of critical Buddhist thought. Yamabe's article "The Core Factors of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet" is one of the early papers that inspired Kiyota and Matsumoto. The paper examines Buddhist thought from the perspective of the famous "Sangye Monastic Debate." The Sangye Monastic Debate was a famous debate between the Chinese Chan master Mahayana and the Indian monk Dharmagupta. Mahayana believed that self-nature is originally pure and that the path is absolute, advocating sudden enlightenment; Dharmagupta emphasized the practice of the Six Perfections of Buddhism. Yamabe equates the critique of the concept of bodhi wisdom with the critique of the mystical intuition of "liberation" or "enlightenment," pointing out that "the purpose of Buddhism is not liberation (mukta, vimoksa) but the attainment of bodhi for the sake of great compassion (mahākaru?ā)." Therefore, he takes the side of Dharmagupta, arguing that Buddhism must practice perfect charity, which is one of the Six Perfections. Of course, the critique of Chan sudden enlightenment is not a new idea. As scholars of the Caodong sect and instructors at Caodong University, Kiyota and Matsumoto naturally should clarify the concept of Chan. In his book "A Critical Study of Zen Thought," published in 1993, Matsumoto critiques those traditional Chan concepts considered sacred and unshakable, particularly the very concept of "Zen" itself. As shown in the included article "The Meaning of Zen," Matsumoto points out that "if Zen (or the practice of Zen meditation) means the termination of all conceptual thought, then such a thought is a negation of Buddhism itself." Similarly, Kiyota, in his book "Dōgen and Buddhism," published in 1992, launches a strong critique of the understanding of Dōgen's master within the Caodong sect. Kiyota argues that the critique of Dōgen's theory of self-awakening (hongaku) is the key to understanding his thought, and that Dōgen's critique is primarily not reflected in the standard 75-volume "Seirigangyō" but in the 12-volume "Seirigangyō" compiled after his death, intended to replace the 75-volume version. Steven Heine's paper "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's (Seirigangyō): The 75-Volume vs. 12-Volume Debate" examines this evidence in detail. Heine finds that the methods favored by different sects and academic interpretations are always intertwined with contemporary social concerns, making it very difficult to absolutize any one method. He advocates applying historical, linguistic, philosophical, and ethical methods when the boundary between academic discourse and apologetic discourse is still unclear. The last four articles in the second part evaluate the value of critical Buddhism from different perspectives. Gregory's "Is Critical Buddhism Truly Critical?" uses the thought of Zongmi as a case study to explore whether the search for "genuine Buddhism" by critical Buddhism itself presupposes certain conceptual frameworks, such as the essence of Buddhism, making it a target of its own critique. Gregory tends to view Buddhism as "a product of complex changes." What he seeks in Zongmi's thought is not whether it is "genuine Buddhism" but rather the reasons and conditions that gave rise to it. Similar to King's conclusion, Gregory argues that the tathāgatagarbha thought can be understood as a positive driving force for social change. He finds that Zongmi's theory of self-awakening is not associated with transcendentalism but emphasizes the meaning of language, responding to the more intense criticism of language in the Praj?āpāramitā tradition. As mentioned above, the interesting aspect of Kiyota and Matsumoto's thought is that they are not limited by a narrow Buddhist theological scope but actively engage with contemporary intellectual and moral issues. Perhaps for this reason, their thought has provoked strong reactions from scholars worldwide. This response is well demonstrated in Lin Zhianguo's article "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Delight in Buddhism." In the article, Lin applies Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, Habermas, and the earlier "critical Buddhism" example in modern China to explain the conflict between the modernization project and postmodernism, pointing out a path beyond the opposition between situationality and critical Buddhism. In the article "The Dhatu-vāda Thought and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies," Takakura Naomichi, a scholar of the ālayavij?āna tradition and a teacher of Kiyota and Matsumoto, provides an overview of the dhatu-vāda concept from the perspective of Buddhist tradition while also reflecting on the role of critical Buddhist methods in current Buddhist studies. Kiyoto University's Matsuki Fumimichi is one of the scholars who have recently responded to Kiyota and Matsumoto's critique. His article "A Reconsideration of Critical Buddhism" offers valuable comments on many of the issues involved and his views on the debate. He reflects on the role of Buddhist academia in cultural critique. One of the important features of Kiyota and Matsumoto's critique is its connection to social critique. The third part "Social Critique" provides four papers that directly address this issue. Kiyota's article "On the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" was first published at the Tribal Liberation Center, at a time when the Caodong sect was experiencing turmoil due to long-standing institutional discrimination. Kiyota critiques the preachers of the Caodong sect who use the Buddhist concepts of prātītyasamutpāda and karma to justify social inequality. If affirming the doctrines of karma and prātītyasamutpāda is the main goal of critical Buddhism, does this mean that social injustice can, or must, be understood as an inevitable result of individual past karma? Kiyota argues that the individual's understanding or experience of karma is entirely different from the authoritative use of karma as an ideology that takes the "status quo" of social inequality for granted. In his article "Buddhism and Kami: A Critique of Japanese Nationalism," Matsumoto critiques those who promote extreme Japanese nationalists, including famous figures like Kawabata Yasunari and, because they link the glory of Japanese culture to militaristic nationalism through the concept of the "essence of the state." Matsumoto also sees themes similar to Yogācāra in the later works of Mishima Yukio, finding that Mishima has moved from the rational world of literary intellectualism into a world of pure action—undoubtedly the one that led to his death—because "pure Japanese nationalism must be a philosophy of death." The role of the Japanese intellectual world in promoting Japanese racial centrism and cultural chauvinism has recently been studied by an increasing number of scholars. As mentioned above, Kiyota particularly points out that the prātītyasamutpāda doctrine provides the ideological background for this tendency. In the article "Tendai prātītyasamutpāda Thought and the Japanese Nationalist Turn," Habito (Ruben Habito) draws attention to a large number of medieval documents. As Tanaka Yoshiro discovered the popularity of prātītyasamutpāda, Kuroda Toshio discussed its support for power structures, Habito reiterates these ideas, and finds that the unconditional affirmation of the real world by prātītyasamutpāda doctrine leads to an "inverted Copernican revolution," placing Japan at the center of the universe rather than the periphery of Buddhist history relative to India; viewing Japan as a blessed land that will be protected by the gods and the eternal realm of the "Amaterasu descendants," rather than falling into the Buddhist concept of the "mappo" (). The last article in the book is Matsumoto's "The (Lotus Sutra) and Japanese Culture." The paper continues to discuss Japanese cultural chauvinism and challenges the notion that the thought of the "Lotus Sutra" is imbued with harmonious inclusivism. Matsumoto argues that the "Lotus Sutra" indicates a Mahāyāna Buddhist teaching that is entirely opposed to the so-called harmonious ideology ascribed to it. Matsumoto also examines the issue of in the context of the "Lotus Sutra," pointing out that " is merely the worship of the Buddha's miracles. This is the symbolization of a vāna () concept." He argues that this is precisely what stands in opposition to Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda and the thought of the "Lotus Sutra." In the final reflection on how the concept of dhatu-vāda permeates the "Lotus Sutra" and affects the interpretation of Japanese culture, Matsumoto criticizes the view that the uniqueness of Japanese culture stems from the mystical concept of the unity of heaven and humanity. He says: "The Japanese are not always in a mystical state surrounded by flowers and trees, nor are we vegetarian humans. What makes us a unique nation, as the Westerners are Westerners, is that we can think."