Theory of Corporate Control Configuration—Institutional and Efficiency Analysis

Author: Zhu Yikun
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2001-08-01
Features: The difference between "one share one vote" and "one person one vote" is just one character, yet it reflects the core differences in the distribution of corporate control. U.S. and European companies choose different corporate development strategies, leading to distinct development paths—U.S. companies adopt an integrated model, while European nations adopt a cartel model, all closely related. It is evident that the allocation of corporate control has not received the attention it deserves, let alone in-depth research. This book takes the allocation of corporate control as its red thread, utilizing rich empirical data to study and explore various corporate control allocation models and their economic performance, while attempting to find ways to enhance the effectiveness of various corporate control mechanisms. The book includes the following chapters:
Ownership and Control Allocation: Through the asymmetric relationship between ownership and control, it reveals the mysteries of the separation of ownership and control, and models the four types of asymmetric relationships between ownership and control.
Financial Markets and Control Allocation: In terms of the role of securities markets, corporate control models can be distinguished. In the market-based control mechanisms of countries, company shares are highly liquid, and the control market is very active, making it easy to exit declining industries, but short-term interests may sacrifice the company's long-term development goals.
Restructuring Power Structures and Control Allocation: The shareholders' meeting and the board of directors are the statutory bodies for shareholders to exercise direct or indirect control over the company. Many continental European countries also implement employee participation through the board of directors or supervisory board.
Transparency and Control Mechanisms: Whether it is market-based control mechanisms or relationship-based control mechanisms, their effective operation requires accurate and reliable information, necessitating high transparency in corporate governance structures and management operations.