Equal

Author: Alex Callinicos (USA), translated by Xu Chaoyou
Translator: Xu Chaoyou / Country:
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2003-07-01
Features: In a more recent discussion, Giddens combined a controversial critique of the "long-standing left-wing obsession with egalitarianism at any cost" with the biased interpretation of poverty and equality research cited in the chapter. These questionable views were used to support a "dynamic concept of equality," which, from a policy perspective, seems not very different from the strategy proposed by Brown. Giddens' lack of interest in principled discussions of equality and justice can in no way be said not to be a typical feature of contemporary social democracy. After the 1992 election, then Labor Party leader John Smith formed a Social Justice Commission. G.A. Cohen harshly criticized the commission's "yielding to the atmosphere of market support and opposition to equality." The absence of systematic analysis of the concept of equality in the Third Way literature suggests that examining the rich philosophical explorations of egalitarian liberals on issues of equality in their writings might yield some political benefits. Brown himself not only cited Rawls but also the authoritative views of Amartya Sen and Michael Walzer, although he did not clarify in any precise way the relationship between their contributions and his own political stance. So, what can philosophers teach us about equality?
Rawls and the Difference Principle
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is a grand, complex, and structurally bewildering work. Since its publication nearly 30 years ago—during which time he has continuously published various papers to elaborate or timely correct some of its arguments; many of which are included in the 1993 revised edition Political Liberalism—it has been the subject of philosophical study. I am not here to join this chorus. My focus is on the aspects of the book that directly address issues of equality. To fully understand a theory, we often begin by examining what it opposes. In the case of Rawls' theory, it opposes utilitarianism. Over the past two centuries, utilitarianism may have been the most influential cultural tradition in the theoretical critique of just policies in English-speaking countries. It conceives of the concept of the good as the greatest possible welfare: initially, welfare (or utility) is equivalent to a state of pleasure, but in more formal modern texts, it tends to be seen as satisfying a person's preferences for certain states over others. Individuals are seen as rational choosers, and after ordering their preferences, they pursue the greatest possible welfare defined by these preferences. The idea of human agency has permeated neoclassical orthodoxy in economics. As an ethical theory, utilitarianism measures actions by their outcomes: we seek to maximize the overall results for society. In Jeremy Bentham's words, "An action can be called fulfilling the principle of utility when the tendency it has to increase the happiness of the society is greater than any tendency it has to diminish it." Since utilitarianism was given its standard and definitive expression by Jeremy Bentham in the American and French revolutionary eras, in a very important sense, its spirit is egalitarian, as reflected in his famous maxim, "everyone is to have his due, and no one more." However, the goal of maximizing welfare does not require equal distribution of income and wealth. If, due to a high degree of unequal distribution, the satisfaction of the rich greatly exceeds that of the poor, and the quantity of satisfaction of their preferences exceeds that of any other more equal distribution, then the utilitarian has no reason to reject this state of affairs. Moreover, utilitarianism can lead to some perverse results, because there may be cases where the total welfare of society increases at the expense of the interests of its individual members. As Rawls put it, "There is no principle, in principle, why the greater gain of some should not compensate the smaller loss of others; or more importantly, why the violation of the freedom of a few should not be corrected by a greater gain shared by many." For Rawls, this reflects the fact that utilitarianism extends a model of individual choice to society: "Just as it is reasonable for an individual to maximize his series of desires, it is equally reasonable for society to maximize the net balance of satisfaction of all its members." This view of social choice requires "uniting all people into one." As a result, "utilitarianism does not value the differences between individuals." Another way to put the same point is that utilitarianism violates the third schema of the categorical necessity of Kant: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, always as an end and never as a means only." If utilitarianism prevents me from achieving my ideal goals—because failing to do so would lead to a greater total quantity of satisfactory things—then I am merely regarded as a means rather than an end. Liberal-minded philosophers often appeal to Kant's principle to ground individual rights. For example, Robert Nozick argues that these rights should be conceived as "side constraints" that provide moral protection to individuals against social actions: "They cannot be sacrificed or used for the sake of other goals without their prior consent, which indicates the inviolability of others." Nozick further rejects redistribution based on some egalitarian "end-state principles," as this would violate individual rights and thereby undermine individual autonomy. A striking feature of Rawls' philosophical strategy is that he also begins with a Kantian critique of utilitarianism, but he constructs an egalitarian theory of justice based on this starting point. In his framework, as Brian Barry puts it, "rights are conclusions, not premises." In other words, individual rights are not conceived as fundamental constraints on collective action but as a result of the requirements of a just social order. Rawls attempts to revive the social contract traditions of Locke, Rousseau, and Kant for further discussion. His principles of justice are those that are available to the parties in a hypothetical "original position." The parties in the original position are, in the narrow sense of traditional utilitarian interpretation, conceived as rational agents, meaning they order their preferences and pursue the outcomes that would maximize the welfare defined by these preferences. However, the parties must make their choices "from behind a veil of ignorance," particularly, no one knows their place in society, whether their class position or social status; nor do they know their luck in terms of talents and abilities, including intelligence, physical strength, etc. At the same time, no one knows what their conception of the good is, what their specific life plans are, or even what their particular psychological traits are, such as aversion to risk or a tendency toward pessimism or optimism. Moreover, I assume that the parties know nothing about the characteristics of their own society. The relationship between the parties and the original position must further confront what Hume called the "state of justice"—"when parties who are indifferent to each other make conflicting claims about the distribution of social advantages in relatively scarce circumstances," this "state of justice" prevails. The principle of distributive justice is to provide a basis that can be accepted by all relevant parties to adjust such conflicts.