Journal of Economics (Quarterly)

Author: Lin Yifu, Yao Yang
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-10-01
Features: The incentive mechanisms for scientific research funding have long failed to receive the attention they deserve from economists. As a review paper, this article first provides an in-depth analysis of the fundamental characteristics of scientific research activities and the corresponding incentive issues. Building on this foundation, we introduce common incentive mechanisms for scientific research funding and analyze their effectiveness. The article focuses on analyzing the classic research and development (R&D) competition mechanism, its improvements, and the optimal design of R&D competition mechanisms. It also highlights the shortcomings of R&D competition mechanisms and proposes corresponding improvement strategies. As a final implementation, we present relevant policy recommendations.
This article empirically examines the impact of government regulation measures, the rule of law, and the development level of the banking sector on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) worldwide. We find that the level of the rule of law, measured by the formality of judicial procedures for case adjudication, has a positive and stable effect on SME development. In contrast, initial economic development levels, government regulation measures—including entry controls, labor employment controls, credit reference controls, and exit controls—as well as the development level and structure of the banking sector have unstable or insignificant effects on SME development. The research results support the "rule of law theory" of SME development while refuting the "government regulation theory" and the "bank development theory."
Taking two common cases of land speculation as a starting point, this article reveals that the current land expropriation system's unclear definition of public interest, overly broad expropriation scope, and unreasonable compensation may be fertile ground for land speculation and other land-related issues. Subsequently, it discusses in greater detail the definition of public interest, the division of expropriation scope, and the issue of fair compensation. The article's argument is that the core of China's current land expropriation system reform lies in clearly defining the meaning of public interest or explicitly delineating the expropriation scope, and implementing an expropriation compensation system based on land market value.