Radical empiricism

Author: William James (USA) / Country of Origin:
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-07-01
Features: "Thought" and "thing" represent two categories of things. In common sense, these two categories are always seen as opposites, and in fact, they are always set in opposition. Philosophy focuses on the aspect of opposition, and in the past, it has offered various interpretations of this, which may continue in the future. Initially, "spirit and matter," "soul and body" represented pairs of equivalent entities, equal in weight and importance. However, later Kant destroyed the soul and introduced the transcendental self, which greatly unbalanced this bipolar relationship. Currently, the transcendental self seems to represent everything in rationalists, while in empiricists, it represents almost nothing. In authors such as Schuppe, Reimke, Natrop, Münsterberg (at least in his early works), Schubert-Solden, and others, the spiritual principle has shrunk to a completely ghostly state, merely serving as a name for the fact that the "content" of experience is known. It has lost its personal form and activity (which have all been transferred to the side of content), becoming a bare consciousness (bewusstheit) or general consciousness (bewusstseinuberhaupt), devoid of any intrinsic right. I believe that once "consciousness" dissolves into such a purely transparent state, it will completely vanish. It is a name without substance, without the right to stand among the ranks of principles. Those who stubbornly cling to consciousness are merely holding onto an echo, a faint whisper of the "soul" that lingers in the air of philosophy as it fades away. Last year, I read many articles in which the authors seemed to be ready to abandon the concept of consciousness [1] and replace it with the concept of absolute experience, not derived from either of the two factors. However, their denial is not thorough or bold enough. Over the past two decades, I have expressed doubt about whether "consciousness" is a substance, and in the past seven or eight years, I have proposed to my students that consciousness does not exist, and planned to tell them that there is something equal in practical value to consciousness within the reality of experience. Now, I feel that the time has come to openly and universally discard consciousness. To completely deny the existence of "consciousness" seems obviously absurd—because, undeniably, "thought" exists—which makes me afraid that some readers will put down my article. So let me quickly clarify. My intention is merely to deny that the term "consciousness" represents a substance, yet I strongly emphasize that it indeed represents a function. My meaning is: material things are made of original matter or properties of existence; P1-2