Rational Choice and Institutional Implementation: A Case Study of Village Committee Elections in Rural China

Author: Hu Rong / Country:
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2001-12-01
Features: The challenges, resistance, and transformation of modernization are the themes of Chinese history in the century since the modern era. Thus, this period of history actually has only one standard—modernization. Those who deviate may have temporary success, but it cannot last. The rational choice institutionalism is an important research orientation within the institutionalism school, which has evolved from the rational choice theory in economics and political science. Rational choice theory (rational choice theory) originated from Adam Smith's classical microeconomics, initially known as the rational actor theory (see Monroe, 1991). Classical economics holds that people rationally pursue maximum material benefits in free market competition, in transactions or exchanges with others. As rational actors in the free market, people gather information, weigh pros and cons, make choices, and strive to engage in activities that maximize material benefits. In short, people use rational thinking to calculate the costs of various choices, estimate the magnitude of the costs and the superiority of material benefits, so as to obtain the greatest rewards or profits with the least cost. Adam Smith believed that in economic activities, everyone pursues personal interests, but under the regulation of the "invisible hand" of the market mechanism, the pursuit of personal interests can enhance collective welfare. Smith solved the problem that has troubled philosophers since Hobbes: how selfish citizens in a society without an authoritarian government can produce collective welfare. Since the 1950s, some scholars (see Arrow, 1951; Downs, 1957; Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965) have begun to use economic methods to study politics. In their view, just as in the economic field, people often compete for scarce resources in the political field. By the 1970s, rational choice theory had become the most important theory in political science research. The seven important assumptions of the rational actor theory in classical economics are (see Monroe, 1991): , actors always pursue goals. Second, these goals reflect the interests that actors recognize. Third, behavior is caused by a conscious choice process. Fourth, the individual is the basic actor. Fifth, actors have consistent and unchanged preference rankings. Sixth, when given a choice, actors choose the action with the greatest expected utility. Seventh, actors have extensive information about available actions and their possible outcomes. Rational actor theory holds that people always pursue certain goals. Anthony Downs defined rational action as "behavior that rationally aims at the achievement of consciously chosen political or economic goals" (1957: 4). Here, "rationally" means "effectively," that is, to achieve valuable outputs with the least input of scarce resources. Downs (1957: 20) wrote: "The rational action we refer to is the action that effectively plans to achieve the consciously chosen political or economic goals of the actor." In both places above, Downs used the word "consciously" to distinguish rational action from other actions. Economics studies goal-oriented behavior, focusing on utility-maximizing voters and politicians. As another source of rational choice theory in political science, game theory also studies purposeful behavior. Unlike general games, all activities in a game are clearly goal-oriented. Game theory has a significant impact on the political coalition theory proposed by W. H. Riker in the rational choice theory of political science. Michael Laver (1981: 21-38) also proposed views similar to Downs in his work. He pointed out that the model of the rational actor must assume (1) actors pursue goals arranged according to the primary utility order, and (2) when choosing among different actions, actors calculate the risks and possible costs of achieving these goals. H. A. Simon, although advocating the use of the concept of satisfaction to replace the concept of optimization in rational choice theory, also emphasized the purposefulness of action. He wrote, " ，" (1985: 297). Actors always pursue certain goals, and these goals are always linked to the individual's own interests. Russell Hardin regards rationality as "the effective pursuit of one's own interests" (1982: 10). As early as in The Wealth of Nations [(1776) 1979: 426], Adam Smith believed that the goal of rationality was to pursue self-interest: although individuals are only interested in their own interests, they contribute to the efficiency of society. Like in many other cases, this action is governed by an "invisible hand" to achieve goals that are not part of individual goals. By pursuing their own interests, individuals promote the interests of society more effectively than if they really aimed to promote the interests of society. Therefore, in Adam Smith's view, the pursuit of self-interest by individuals benefits the entire society. The rational choice theory in political science is based on this view to establish democratic theory. They regard democracy as a procedural government where rational, selfish, and profit-maximizing individuals interact to establish "democratic" power relationships. The core of political rationality is the assumption of self-interest. Self-interest drives the actions of all voters and candidates, making voters choose candidates who are closest to their specific preferences, and making candidates do their best to please voters. According to this theory, self-interest links politicians and voters together. After participating in the election, villagers face another choice: how to select candidates within the range of choices provided by the existing political system and the village committee election system. The characteristics of the rural community where villagers live determine their interests, influencing their choice of candidates in various ways. Candidates' motivations for running for office are diverse. Some want to do something for the village, some want to facilitate the development of individual economy by becoming village cadres, some want to become officials within the national civil service through "recruitment," and some represent the interests of families or factions. However, no matter what, candidates will weigh the relevant costs and benefits when running for office. The relevant costs include not only the time, energy, and financial resources spent on running for office but also the time, energy, and lost opportunities for business success after being elected to hold corresponding positions. The relevant benefits include the power, economic income, prestige, "recruitment" as a formal civil servant, and the convenience for developing the family economy after holding corresponding positions. Only when the relevant benefits outweigh the costs will the rational candidate actively participate in the election. Different places often attract different types of people to run for office due to differences in economic development levels and other conditions. In economically underdeveloped areas, many young people go out to work, so there are relatively fewer people competing for village committee positions. In these places, holding village cadre positions often means losing the opportunity to make a fortune through business, so for villagers with business capabilities, the cost of holding village cadre positions outweighs the benefits, and they are generally reluctant to run for office. Sometimes, these people are pushed by villagers to run for office due to other reasons, but they are only willing to serve for one term. In economically developed areas, not only do village committees control more resources, but holding village cadre positions also provides many opportunities for personal economic development, so there are relatively more people competing for office. When running for office, candidates must consider not only the costs and benefits of running but also the likelihood of winning. If there are fewer candidates, the chance of winning for each candidate is greater; if there are more candidates, the chance of winning for each candidate is smaller. In reality, each candidate always decides whether to run and how much time and energy to invest after considering the situation of other candidates and the extent to which they may receive voter support. If the two sides have a significant disparity in strength, neither will spend too much effort trying to win votes. If the competition between the two sides is relatively balanced, both have a greater chance of winning, and the competition becomes very fierce. The active participation of candidates is a necessary condition for competitive elections. Only when the number of candidates competing exceeds the number of positions to be filled can voters compare and choose among different candidates, and the election can be a selective one. Although the extent to which villagers in different regions participate in competing for village committee positions and their motivations vary, many villagers are nominated as candidates to compete. Therefore, it is the active participation of candidates that has led to the implementation of a series of village committee election systems, including differential elections, campaign speeches, and voting methods. If the participation of more candidates than the number of positions to be filled is the prerequisite for the implementation of differential elections, then the fierce competition between candidates gives birth to campaign speeches. In fact, campaign speeches were spontaneously proposed by voters and candidates in some villages with particularly fierce competition in Fujian Province in 1994. This effective form of promoting candidate views was later recognized by the provincial civil affairs department and promoted across the province in the 1997 elections. The quality of campaign speeches in a village depends largely on the level of election competition and whether capable people in the village have come forward to run. Similarly, in areas with fierce competition, new regulations by the provincial civil affairs department, such as the one-person-one-vote system and the absence of mobile ballot boxes, can also be strictly implemented. Running for office is the initial choice of candidates, and after running, candidates face a series of strategic choices. In the campaign speech at the preliminary meeting, candidates must promise to do practical things for the villagers after taking office but cannot make empty promises or exaggerate. They must highlight their strengths and expose the weaknesses of opponents but cannot be too aggressive or lack strategy. Some candidates also use big-character posters and small-character posters to attack opponents, but such attacks must be measured. To win votes, candidates use various legal means, such as "pulling votes" through friends and relatives. Of course, these strategic choices of candidates are made within certain institutional constraints. The social system is an important basis for rational actors to evaluate their potential strategies and choose their rational actions. Institutional rules achieve this by providing two types of information: , the nature of the punishment for norm-violating behavior; second, the possible actions of other actors in the future. In village committee elections, since many institutional regulations are still being implemented, there are two types of institutional regulations that restrict candidates' strategic choices: one is the established institutional regulations, and the other is the institutional regulations currently being implemented. If the information provided by the established institutional regulations is certain, the institutional regulations currently being implemented have a certain flexibility and depend on the relevant actors to clarify through further interaction. Taking campaign speeches as an example, the initial election regulations did not stipulate that preliminary candidates for director could give campaign speeches. After villagers in some parts of Fujian Province spontaneously used this form to promote candidates in 1994, this practice was recognized by the provincial civil affairs department and widely promoted in the 1997 elections. Election regulations did not specify that candidates could "pull votes," but only stipulated that candidates could "introduce" themselves at some meetings and that "introductions" should stop on election day. In fact, "pulling votes" has been widely recognized by villagers and the election leadership, as long as candidates do not buy votes. The rational choice institutionalism regards institutions as a collection of rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality, thereby establishing the "political space" (Peters, 1999: 44) in which many interdependent political actors operate. The rational choice institutionalism regards institutions as mechanisms that guide and restrict individual behavior. The establishment of village committee election institutions has largely changed the incentive mechanisms for village cadres. As rational actors, village cadres always strive to maximize their own interests under possible conditions. If the appointment of village cadres is controlled by townships or if elections are merely a formality, with villagers only marking circles within predetermined frames, then village cadres seeking re-election will focus their attention on how to maintain good relations with superiors rather than on the interests and ideas of villagers. Elections change the source of power for village cadres, determining whether they can continue to serve as village cadres not by the opinion of superiors but by the votes of villagers. This change in the incentive mechanism has a profound impact on the behavior of village cadres. Unlike the past when cadres were completely appointed by superiors, elected village cadres must first gain the support and trust of villagers. Therefore, elected village cadres will work hard to achieve some practical results to win the trust of villagers. Due to the characteristic of rural communities where people have lived in the same area for generations, village cadres must also handle the relationship between doing their jobs well and "making enemies" in order to gain the support of villagers. They must do their jobs as well as possible while minimizing the number of enemies. Of course, on the other hand, village cadres must also maintain good relations with superiors. Under the current system, village cadres seeking re-election need not only the trust of villagers but also the support of superiors. However, the way village cadres try to maintain good relations with township leaders is very different from the past. In the past, village cadres maintained good relations with superiors because superiors held the power over their stay or departure. Now, village cadres still need to maintain good relations with superiors because they can only do the affairs within the autonomous scope of the village committee with the support of superiors. Village autonomy has to some extent changed the relationship between townships and village committees. The township government now relies not only on simple administrative orders but also more on the resources at its disposal to mobilize the enthusiasm of village committees. For village committees, they actively complete the tasks assigned by superiors because many of their tasks require the support and help of superiors. Therefore, village cadres maintain good relations with superiors more to do the affairs within the autonomous scope of the village committee.