Scholastic dialectic

Author: (English) Gilbert, translated by Wang Lu
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2000-08-01
Features: The freedom and equality of thought require certain external conditions, such as a legalized public sphere and a free market economy. However, having these conditions does not necessarily guarantee freedom and equality of thought; it also requires certain internal factors. The significance of this book lies in discussing the internal conditions of freedom and equality of thought from the evolution of dialectics in European intellectual history. Here arises a contentious issue in philosophy, which appears in different forms in different periods and is often encountered in the debates of Abelard (Aloelant). Between the extremes of extreme realism and nominalism, there are many different doctrines: at the center are the positions of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, i.e., moderate realism (realismus mitigatus). On one extreme is extreme realism, which is inspired by the sublime tendency of Platonic philosophy and is more concerned with types than with examples. They argue that the ideal type is the real enduring in all things. The soul is purified by philosophical asceticism, enabling it to contemplate the pure forms of beauty and justice steadily and reliably, undisturbed by the fleeting flashes of the beautiful and the unreliable and variable demands of special rights. Who doubts the nature of a triangle? What is more certain and clearer? But who can be certain that the figure he draws is truly a triangle and not an approximate sketch? What is more unconvincing and perplexing than the rational attempt to prove particular and substantial facts? Climb the calm and immortal mountain, raise your perspective, turn away from the noisy world, and turn toward the canyon. The general is enduring, but the individual appears and disappears at once: in the world there is only opinion, unless it is a complete illusion; while in the heavens, you will discover certain truths; here, pursuing them is merely "carving on snow, writing in waves." We are drawn, to escape the constant changes of history, to the unchanging world of ideas; no wonder Marxists find Plato their greatest enemy—yet, when they ask us to replace our love for the individual with love for humanity, or at least for something close to humanity, their tendency is not similar? However, due to a mysterious compensation, no philosophical tradition praises this world more beautifully and lyrically than Platonism. Aristotelianism rationally considers this world more lovable, but where are the poets who come from Aristotelianism? On the other extreme are the nominalists, who will stay in the physical world and refuse to embark on this journey. An ounce of fact is worth a ton of theory; our task is to deal with what we experience here and now. We must bring order to them and cannot escape reality. Nominalism at least gathers two currents: one from empirical science and the other from the poet's sensibility. Any attempt to shorten the patient examination and deep reflection on facts by quickly referring to a hypothetical ideal type is deeply dissatisfied with empirical science; it lists pseudo-scientific conclusions derived from the forced application of metaphysical concepts to the physical world that has not been physically tested; it firmly opposes replacing the effort to usefully combine, classify, and reclassify the results of strict and long-term observation and experimentation with the deep contemplation of metaphysical entities. Indeed, there is every reason to doubt any mysticism or pseudo-philosophy that would deprive natural science of its dignity or deny that the material world can provide real and certain objects of knowledge. ① Scientists oppose the overwhelming reality of general ideas, and in this regard, they are joined by poets, especially those who give direct and aesthetic appreciation to the vitality of individual life, are sensitive to fleeting moments, and can perceive the fragility and transience expressed in the dirges of death, for St. Thomas Aquinas considers these the highest talents of science. ② The emergence of abstraction merely conceals the covering of dead ideas. Behind both the claims of science and poetry lies the same belief: things are entirely individual and different; of course, for the sake of rationality, they must be classified, but the general characteristics expressed by this are merely labels of speech or the mind, i.e., names (nomenina) that cover a class of individual things. It is better to see things simply as things, rather than as examples. A scientist says that a scientific theory is not a dogma but a policy. A poet says, do not pay attention to philosophy unless philosophy can create a Juliet! The material world is real, composed of the particular and the individual, which, though difficult to understand for pure rational science, are true existents in the metaphysical sense, a series of irrepressible and thorny facts. Philosophy cannot take off unless it starts from them. A logical theory must incorporate such existents to yield results; universal reasons must operate through particularis (special reasons), which means that logic must be combined with a dialectic. However, these particular things embody different natures; they exist in different types, varying in quantity depending on the situation. The nature expressed by universal ideas in our minds is real, though not as an external universal but merely as realized in physical individuals. Human nature itself is not real, but humans are real; there is more to being a person than a mere posture of a speaker. According to an Augustinian maxim, a universal idea formally exists in the mind and fundamentally exists in things (formaliter in mente, fundamentaliter in re); it is not the ultimate object of contemplation but a means to achieve particular knowledge. 0 Thus, just as Gilbert should sing with Sullivan, logical theories should incorporate dialectics. This gives rise to the Aristotelian view of the world. A model of a real species is based on common grounds and is repeated and increased in many individuals; a series of unrelated things is not shaped by another world, nor is a batch of similar things shaped by another world. Here there is a genuine synthesis, as the nominalists' favorite empirical facts are protected; they are indeed elevated from the surface of phenomena to become objects of metaphysical concern; the universal forms remain unchanged and certain while becoming closely connected with the world of physical science. Most of us often take it for granted, apart from many highly individual things, that there are real types in the world. I am looking at birds, recognizing a tern and two gulls, and then, with my companions, I consider the different foods of animals and what causes them to grow, and so on; our thoughts are filled with such general ideas, and no word is beyond drawing a line around it; whether real or not, they certainly belong to the primary material of our rational consciousness. Tertullian says, tell me, how can you show that names are names? And Boethius says, logic nonderebussed deest; in the question of whether deductive philosophy is a reasoning from language to non-linguistic facts, it is neutral. Logic cannot sacrifice the essence for the sake of vividness; it may be more hidden than other arts—but not hidden in the verbose sentences that St. Thomas Aquinas lacked. In any case, there are many things that are the easiest to deal with without hesitation; for if the licentious are excessively licentious, then the temperate are generally overly temperate: the paradox must lie in the simple and vivid truth, and many challenges can only be issued once, such as the signal from a pilot to a navigator: "If the friendly plane stops attacking me, then expect arrival at 07:45," or diplomatic negotiations: "In politics, one can never say never," or exclamation: "Oh, yesterday you replied, time has reversed." However, all judgments aimed at forming part of a rational explanation should be able to be separated into their logical components and then reconstructed; without sidings and sidetracks leading to a marshaling yard, it would be impossible to assemble a long train of goods. A strict rational method once seemed to be a specialized and all-encompassing method. After going through such a period, other methods began to emerge. Philosophy oscillated between one extreme and another, from Descartes to Fichte, from reason to instinct, from classical to romantic. The arts swung between symmetry and novelty, unsure how to agree, with Bach and Handel followed by Beethoven and Berlioz, Pope succeeded by the Lake Poets, corresponding to Kingsley with St. Pancras. Personal life reflects the rise and fall of rationalism. Who is satisfied with the strict rational attempt? The more obviously successful this attempt is, the deeper the anxiety, and the stronger the drive to turn to poetry and vague language that offers no explanation.