Hunan battlefield during the War of Resistance Against Japan

Author: Luo Yuming/ Country:
Publisher:
Publishing Time: 2002-07-01
Features: First, air defense. In early 1935, the Hunan Provincial Government sent more than 10 personnel from the Provincial Secretariat, Provincial Security Bureau, staff of the Provincial Military Command, City Party Committee, and Police Bureau to the air defense training class organized by the Kuomintang government in Jianqiao, Hangzhou, to participate in the training. Based on the personnel who participated in the training, the Air Defense Association was established in Changsha in October 1936, with the Mayor He Wenyuan concurrently serving as the Association Chairman. In 1937, the Changsha People's Air Defense Committee was also established, with the Director of the Provincial Security Bureau Liu Yinggu concurrently serving as the Director. After the establishment of the air defense leadership organization, two aspects of work were carried out: First, conducting air defense education. In May 1936, the Provincial Air Defense Command held the first exhibition in Zhongshan Hall, Changsha, displaying various air defense alarms, first-aid rooms for blast injuries, and conducting demonstration performances. The exhibition lasted for 10 days, attracting more than 100,000 visitors. That winter, the Provincial Air Defense Command sent personnel to various government agencies, organizations, and schools in Changsha to give air defense lectures. In early September 1936, an air defense publicity week was also held. These activities popularized air defense knowledge and raised the air defense awareness of government officials at all levels and the general public. Second, establishing air defense observation posts (squads). In September 1936, the Provincial Air Defense Command established the Changsha Air Defense Intelligence Office on the top of Tianxin Pavilion in Changsha to oversee and guide the work of air defense observation posts (squads). At the same time, air defense alarm posts, fire watchtowers were set up on the bell tower of the Provincial Police Bureau, the National Commodities Exhibition Hall, and Tianxin Pavilion. A special post was established in Quantang, Changsha County, and independent posts were set up in Yangqiao, Malin Bridge, Jinggang, and Jinjing, respectively. With the full outbreak of the war of resistance, air defense posts (squads) were not only strengthened in the urban area of Changsha but also hundreds of air defense observation posts and auxiliary posts were set up in various parts of the province. This played a certain role in preventing enemy air raids in advance and reducing losses caused by enemy air raids. Although the above air defense preparations played a certain positive role, overall, they still represented a passive air defense, an official air defense, and had not yet considered how to protect the city or how to protect the people from enemy air raids. They had not mobilized the people, making it difficult to meet the needs of the war. After the outbreak of the war of resistance, Hunan's air defense preparations gradually became more active. From August to October 1937, the Provincial Government raised several million yuan from the public to purchase 24 German-made 2-centimeter caliber small anti-aircraft guns and 50 Browning anti-aircraft machine guns, forming the Hunan Provincial Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade to strengthen the air defense defense of the provincial capital Changsha and important cities. At the same time, protective equipment was installed, with guard posts set up in five places in Changsha: Tianxin Pavilion, the National Commodities Exhibition Hall, the Water Police Bureau, the Bell Tower, and the Spinning Mill. These guard posts were equipped with electric or hand-cranked air raid sirens, and were assigned to issue air raid warnings. Air raid bells, air raid balls, air raid flags, and air raid bells were installed throughout the city. During daylight air raids, two red balls or a large red flag were hoisted, while for evacuation, one red ball or a large red flag was hoisted, and for all-clear, one white ball or a white flag was hoisted. For emergency air raids, the red flag or red ball was taken down. At night, during air raids, a red lantern was hung, and it was taken down when the all-clear was issued. By 1941, Changsha had 174 air raid sirens, 757 air raid trenches, 298 air raid shelters, 141 shelters, 20 stretchers, about 10,000 yuan worth of medicine, 5 beds, 3 water taps, and 100 hand pumps. In counties such as Liuyang and Ningxiang, hundreds of fire engines, fire extinguishers, and water taps were set up to avoid losses caused by enemy air raids. To avoid losses caused by enemy air raids, in September 1936, the Provincial Security Command organized an air defense drill in Changsha. The Changsha Air Defense Corps, the police system, the provincial capital air defense forces, the anti-aircraft artillery and machine gun units, and the searchlight units practiced 15 items, including air raids by bombers and night raids, communication and liaison after discovering enemy aircraft, firefighting after discovering fires, first aid for injured and poisoned people, and guarding the city during air raids. The drill lasted for three days, day and night, with about 7,000 people attending. Second, strengthening military service management and actively handling military service work. According to the decision of the Kuomintang government to set up division commands in Hunan, in December 1936, the Provincial Military Service Administration established the Chenyuan Division Command and the Yongshun Group Command, and ordered the military service departments of to actively handle military service matters. On April 7, 1937, the Provincial Government sent a letter to various agencies, stating that the Military Government had added two division commands in Hunan, one being the Baoyong Division Command, with Tang Junde as the commander and the command headquarters in Shaoyang, and the other being the Hengyin Division Command, with Wang Shi as the commander and the command headquarters in Hengyang. Conscription was carried out throughout the province, with the method being: first, registering local soldiers in each county, providing a certain allowance monthly to prepare for future mobilization, and other ordinary people were selected two per hundred people as a unit, with the lottery deciding who should be conscripted. This provided a stable source of troops for the war of resistance. After 1935, the Hunan Provincial Government, following the instructions of the Nanjing Nationalist Government, made some preparations for the war of resistance. The development of these works raised the awareness of the people of Hunan for the war of resistance and strengthened their national defense awareness, while also laying a certain foundation in terms of human resources, material resources, and the preparation for the war of resistance in Hunan and even the entire country. Especially the construction of railways and highways made Hunan the throat and hub connecting the large southwest and the central and eastern regions, playing a vital role in supporting the protracted war. However, Hunan's war of resistance preparations were passive, limited, and very incomplete. It did not take corresponding effective measures for the military defense and the development of industrial and agricultural production in Hunan, especially the Provincial Government led by He Jian, who regarded the people as enemies, adopting a policy of resistance or suppression against the revolutionary activities and the anti-Japanese salvation movement of the people of Hunan. The people of Hunan were not mobilized, and the anti-Japanese enthusiasm hidden in the people was not awakened. The war of resistance preparations in Hunan were not completed. This made Hunan lag behind the increasingly developing anti-Japanese salvation situation and placed Hunan in a very passive position after the outbreak of the war.
I. Japanese Occupation of Yueyang and the "Wenxi Fire"
On October 24, 1938, after the Japanese forces occupied Wuhan, to ensure the security of Wuhan and its surrounding areas and to establish a forward position for attacking Hunan, they continued their southward advance, occupying Chaling on November 9 and Yueyang on November 11, opening the northern gateway to the interior of Hunan. The Japanese forces continued their southward advance, reaching the north bank of the Xinqiang River, preparing to cross the river, and repeatedly sent aircraft to cities such as Changsha, Hengyang, Liuyang, Pingjiang, and Changde. The Hunan Provincial Government was at a loss and unilaterally implemented Chiang Kai-shek's scorched-earth war policy, setting fire to the city at 2 a.m. on the night of November 12, destroying the ancient city of Changsha and causing great disasters to the people's lives and property. Because the 1st and 2nd were designated as Wen in the lunar calendar, the Changsha fire was also known as the "Wenxi Fire."
1. Causes of the "Wenxi Fire"
Regarding the causes of the "Wenxi Fire," the Nationalist Party's Central Propaganda Department and Political Department, in their explanation of the process of the Changsha fire, believed it was "caused by local military and police mistakenly believing rumors and the righteous indignation of the self-defense public." This view was supported by Zhou Enlai. After the founding of the People's Republic of China, Guo Moruo, in his book "Hóngbōqū" written in 1958, believed that "burning Changsha was a great achievement for Zhang Zhizhong and Pan Gongchan. They wanted to establish a great achievement, imitating the burning of Moscow by Tukhachevsky, and burning Changsha." (Zhang Zhizhong's "Recollections" P272) Zhang Zhizhong, however, strongly denied this, stating that he had only carried out Chiang Kai-shek's orders and that he himself had no fault, only that due to negligence in his work, the fire was set too early and too quickly. Is it really that simple? Not at all. Let's dispel the fog and reveal the truth. ,"The Wenxi Fire was a product of the Nationalist Party's scorched-earth war policy. The scorched-earth war policy was proposed by Li Zongren. In 1933, when Japanese forces occupied Northeast China and threatened North China, Li Zongren wrote an article titled "The Theory of Scorched-Earth War," promoting the spirit of "preferring to be jade and broken rather than earthenware and intact" to inspire the anti-war enthusiasm of the people of the country. After the full outbreak of the war, he actively advocated the scorched-earth war policy. Li Zongren's scorched-earth war theory was supported and actively promoted by most key officials of the Nationalist Party government. Chiang Kai-shek, in his speech at the Lushan Conference on July 17, 1937, stated that he would "risk the lives of the entire nation to seek the survival of the country." Wang Jingwei went even further, publishing numerous articles and speeches to advocate the scorched-earth war theory, claiming that the advance of Japanese forces was boundless, and our retreat could not be boundless, so there must be a dead end, and at this dead end, we must stand and no longer retreat, at any cost. Therefore, if we do not speak of sacrifice today, preparation is meaningless. We are a weak country, resistance requires sacrifice, and the extent of sacrifice should make every person and every piece of land turn into ashes, so that the enemy does not get anything." (Xiao Dongliang "History of Hunan's Anti-Japanese War" P167) Bai Chongxi was an active executor of the scorched-earth war policy. In early 1938, he advised Chiang Kai-shek to implement "digging and scorched-earth war," and under the name of the Military Council of the National Government, issued instructions to the leaders of the provincial governments in Southwest China to "act according to the circumstances and handle it accordingly." (Xiao Dongliang "History of Hunan's Anti-Japanese War" P168) Under the guidance of the scorched-earth war theory, the Nationalist Government broke the Yellow River embankment in Zhongmou County, Henan, creating the Huangfan area, which caused more than 10 million people to suffer from disasters, 900,000 deaths, and annual disasters. When Japanese forces approached Wuhan, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the burning of the city during the withdrawal, but due to the leak of the news, opposition from foreign merchants, and the hasty retreat, the plan to burn Wuhan was not realized. Chiang Kai-shek was very dissatisfied and shifted the target of the burning city to Changsha. "The Wenxi Fire" finally turned Chiang Kai-shek's scorched-earth war theory into reality.
Second, "The Wenxi Fire" was caused by Chiang Kai-shek's direct supervision, and Chiang Kai-shek was the main culprit behind the "Wenxi Fire." After Wuhan fell, Chiang Kai-shek came to Changsha, holding two military conferences on October 29 and November 1, attended by key officials of the Nationalist Party's government such as He Yingqin, Feng Yuxiang, Bai Chongxi, Chen Cheng, Zhang Zhizhong, and Zhang Qun. The conferences summarized the experience and lessons of the Wuhan battle and discussed the military deployment for continuing the war of resistance. At the meeting, Chiang Kai-shek severely criticized the failure to burn the city according to the spirit of scorched-earth war during the Wuhan withdrawal, resulting in the loss of transportation, water and electricity, and a large amount of materials and equipment to the enemy, demanding that Zhang Zhizhong burn Changsha when Japanese forces reached the city, saying, "We cannot stay, and we cannot let the enemy stay." "Whatever food and materials cannot be taken away must be burned, and this must not be forgotten." (Feng Yuxiang "What I Know of Chiang Kai-shek" P104) The conference also decided that scorched-earth war would be the new policy for future battles. On November 7, Chiang Kai-shek held a meeting of military and political personnel in Rongyuan, Changsha, instructing to implement "solid walls and clear fields," and that if Changsha could not be held, it would be burned to the ground, ordering Zhang Zhizhong to carry it out. After Yueyang fell on November 11, Chiang Kai-shek, worried that Changsha would fall into enemy hands, sent an urgent telegraph at 9 a.m. on the morning of December 12, with the instruction "arrive within one hour," ordering Zhang Zhizhong to "burn the entire city if Changsha is lost, and make sure to prepare carefully in advance." At the same time, the Director of the Staff Office, Lin Wei, also informed Zhang Zhizhong over a long-distance call that "Changsha must be treated with scorched-earth policy." (Zhang Zhizhong's "Recollections" P263) Under the instructions and repeated urgent telegrams of Chiang Kai-shek, the burning of Changsha was inevitable.
Third, "The Wenxi Fire" was the result of national defeatist sentiment. From the beginning of the war, there were calls for national extinction in the Nationalist Party government and the army, believing that China's weapons were inferior and that the war would inevitably be lost. Zhou Fohai gathered Tao Xisheng, Wang Jingwei, and Zeng Zhongming in his residence in Nanjing Xiliwan to form the "Low-Tone Club," spreading defeatist theories. As the war expanded, the Nationalist Party lost troops and territory, and defeatist sentiment became rampant not only in the government and the army but also among the people. A student from Hunan wrote to Mao Zedong from the countryside in Hunan, saying that many people in the countryside believed that "China could not win the war and would perish." (Mao Zedong's "Selected Works" Volume 2 P409) After Wuhan fell, people became even more pessimistic about the prospects of the war of resistance, generally believing that "the war of resistance was hopeless, and the areas east of the Yuehan Railway would all be abandoned." Under the influence of defeatist sentiment, the people of the provincial capital Changsha were in a state of panic, with rumors spreading everywhere. Especially when Japanese forces attacked Yueyang and Yueyang had not yet been abandoned, rumors spread in Changsha that the situation in Yueyang was unclear and that transportation to Changde had been cut off. After Japanese forces occupied Chaling, people believed that Japanese forces could reach Changsha within two days. By the evening of December 12, when Japanese forces advanced to Miluo, some people believed that Japanese shallow-water warships could reach Changsha within three hours, and rumors spread that Zhang Zhizhong had left Changsha for Shaoyang. This created a panic atmosphere in Changsha about the city not being held, causing people to flee in all directions and neglect their duties. Under the influence of defeatist sentiment, the military and police responsible for burning the city were panicked and did not follow the prearranged plan, hastily setting fire to the city. The third Changsha battle adopted Xue Yue's "furnace battle" method, which involved completely destroying roads, clearing the middle area of empty space, luring the enemy deep, and setting up deep ambush zones as the foundation to try to reverse the balance of power between the enemy and us, luring the invading enemy to the decisive battle area and forming a natural furnace from all sides to encircle and eliminate them. Based on this strategic guidance, the Ninth Theater adopted a strategy of resisting step by step, luring the enemy deep, placing the main force on both flanks, and luring the enemy to the area south of the Miluo River and north of the Laodao River for encirclement and annihilation. In terms of the choice of the decisive battle time, it was not when Japanese forces were strong across the Miluo River to attack Changsha, but when Japanese forces were blocked from attacking Changsha and began to retreat, choosing to implement the decisive battle in the area north of the Laodao River and south of the Miluo River. This was because when Japanese forces reached the Laodao River, they had been hindered by the Nationalist Party's army step by step, their strength had been considerably exhausted, and their fighting spirit had been worn down, while the surrounding and blocking units of the Nationalist Party had ample time to gather, thus achieving the goal of avoiding the enemy's sharp edge and striking the enemy's fatigue, using the vigorous fighting spirit and combat effectiveness of the defending army to strike the exhausted Japanese forces, which naturally led to victory. The third Changsha battle was different from the second Changsha battle. It did not adopt a tactic of fighting to the death and putting itself in a passive position, but rather adopted a strategy of retreating to fight, achieving the purpose of delaying and consuming the enemy, gaining time, and killing enemy combat power after reaching a certain place, and then immediately transferring positions to the enemy's flank, restoring combat effectiveness, and preparing for a decisive battle with the Japanese forces. This strategy was applied very successfully. For example, at the beginning of the battle, at the Xinqiang River,