Hu Sheng's Theory: From the May Fourth Movement to the Founding of the People's Republic

Author: "From the May Fourth Movement to the Founding of the People's Republic" Research Team
Publisher:
Publishing Date: 2001-05-01
Features: Take a look at Lenin's remarks on populism, and you can see that China's situation is different from Russia. Since China cannot implement socialism at the moment, it must first develop capitalism before it can achieve socialism. However, this creates a contradiction: to develop capitalism, yet the capitalist path is not viable. Why can't we take a step-by-step capitalist approach? Because of the interference of imperialism and feudal forces, and the Chinese bourgeoisie lacks the ability to solve anti-imperialist and anti-feudal issues. This is the difficulty. Chairman Mao's New Democracy, in essence, sought to develop capitalism while solving anti-imperialist and anti-feudal problems, thus resolving the difficulty. After liberation, New Democracy had not been fully implemented for long when Chairman Mao urgently pushed for socialism, believing that the contradiction with the bourgeoisie had become the main contradiction. Therefore, he fiercely opposed capitalism, which was somewhat close to populism. But before the founding of the nation, Chairman Mao gradually moved toward the truth. When he proposed the idea of New Democracy, his understanding level surpassed that of others in the party. Before this, communists had always viewed capitalism as a reactionary force. Chairman Mao, however, said that China's capitalism was not excessive but insufficient and needed to be developed, as only through this stage could socialism be achieved. To allow capitalism to develop at the moment, it was necessary to overthrow the rule of imperialism and feudalism. Therefore, in the 30 years covered in this book, the real issue was not whether to choose capitalism or socialism, but whether to oppose imperialism and feudalism. Thus, the Communist Party should not exclude the intermediate forces that sought capitalist development but should unite with them. At that time, Chairman Mao set aside ideological differences and focused only on the anti-Japanese cause, establishing a united front on practical issues. This was not the case during the "Leftist" period. After the "Leftist" period ended and the anti-Japanese issue arose in 1935, the party united with anyone who opposed Japanese aggression, regardless of their ideology, which was entirely reasonable. This allowed us to reassess those in the Nationalist Party-dominated government for 22 years who were inclined toward capitalism or generally favored it. For example, figures like Hu Shi, who opposed the Nationalist Party's autocratic rule because they sought capitalist development, should have been united with rather than excluded by the party. Song Qingling did a good job in this regard, uniting Hu Shi in the Human Rights Defense League to seek unity, which was the right approach. The beneficial contributions of national capitalists at that time should also be acknowledged. Although they did not support the revolution, they were at least dissatisfied with the Nationalist Party and foreign imperialism, and they were struggling to survive under the reactionary regime. For instance, Wu Yunchu, seeing Japan's Kikkoman dominate the Chinese market, worked hard to produce Tianchu MSG. Although he did not express much political opinion, his actions at least upheld national interests in practice, demonstrating a sense of national independence, which should be considered progressive. He should not be denied simply because he did not participate in the revolution. Of course, there could be conflicts between the intermediate forces and the Communist Party. Some in the intermediate forces believed that there was no need for a thorough anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution or for radical change—only industrial development could solve China's problems. Therefore, they advocated industrial development for all and opposed people participating in the revolution, which created contradictions with the revolution and the Communist Party. While their push for industrial development itself was progressive and should be affirmed, their opposition to the revolution and their advocacy of industrial or educational salvation were wrong and required criticism. If everyone accepted such views, the revolution would fail, and the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal issues could not be resolved. Industrial and educational development alone could not solve these problems. Without resolving anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, China's industry and education could not truly develop. It was precisely on this point that the intermediate forces and the Communist Party had conflicts (this was also why Marxist thinkers had previously denied sociology, and there was some reason for it. But denying sociology after liberation was no longer correct. I once discussed this issue with Mr. Fei Xiaotong). Therefore, Chairman Mao aptly said that the failure of the theories of "industrial salvation" and "educational salvation" was good news. Why was it good news? Because the realization of these theories was shattered, it might lead people to understand and sympathize with the revolution, which would be beneficial for anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. What was denied was this understanding, not these people, because they were fundamentally patriotic and wanted to save the country, not reactionary. They were just advocating the wrong path. Viewing things this way, we can conduct a deeper theoretical analysis of these intermediate forces. Now, people tend to believe that we should not dismiss those who oppose the revolution simply because they advocate industrial or educational salvation, but we also need to explain in more depth that these people are not entirely free from conflicts with the revolution. In practice, the intermediate forces were also constantly dividing, primarily on the issue of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. During the war of resistance, this division was particularly evident. The Communist Party held the banner of resisting Japan high, attracting many people and accelerating the division among the intermediate forces. Some had no socialist ideas but sympathized with the Communist Party because the party was firmly anti-imperialist and anti-feudal. For example, Zhang Shizhao had supported Mao Zedong in the 1920s, moved by Mao's perseverance in the struggle. This admiration contained some affirmation of Mao's revolutionary activities, but Zhang did not have socialist ideas. Some initially sought capitalist development but later, driven by patriotic sentiments for resisting Japan, moved closer to the Communist Party and eventually accepted socialist ideas, like Zou Taofen. His writings showed a complete transformation. Others sought capitalist development and had contradictions with the Nationalist Party on certain issues but, not opposing imperialism or fundamentally opposing feudalism, ended up aligned with the Nationalist Party, like Hu Shi. However, even in his later years, Hu Shi should still be considered part of the intermediate forces. Hu Shi had contradictions with the Nationalist Party on issues of democracy and human rights, and his opposition to retrogression was sharp. His main flaw was his lack of opposition to imperialism, especially American imperialism. With Japan threatening to conquer all of China, he naturally resisted Japan but joined Wang Jingwei's "Low Profile Club" before the July 7th Incident, believing resistance to be overly high-profile. This made him align with the Nationalist Party. Therefore, the division among the intermediate forces was primarily on the issue of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism, not democracy. For example, Zhang Xiruo, in 1936, opposed the December 9th student movement, but he eventually turned around after the full-scale war of resistance began. This shows that the war of resistance was a key factor, and the issue lay in knowing how to utilize it. If the "Leftist" line had been in charge at that time, it would not have been possible to make good use of this opportunity. Why did the Chinese revolution succeed? Firstly, it relied on armed struggle, and secondly, on the united front. A large number of intermediate forces joined in, changing the balance of political power, which was a decisive factor in public opinion. Therefore, when the People's Republic was established, Chairman Mao and the Central Committee were very cautious, ensuring that democratic parties were present in Beijing before the official announcement of the founding, even delaying the date. Unlike the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic during the Wang Ming period, which was hasty and reckless, the founding of the People's Republic was a product of "Leftism," driven by the idea of rapid victory and a lack of strategic thinking. During the "Leftist" leadership, there was no understanding of uniting or winning over intermediate forces. Therefore, this book will not only describe armed struggle but also depict and analyze the activities of the intermediate forces, their development and division, until most of them eventually stood with the revolution and the Communist Party, determining the success of the revolution. Of course, it will also describe the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, as well as their relationships with the intermediate forces. The Nationalist Party also tried hard to win over some intermediate forces after 1931, but very few stayed with them for long. In summary, this book will write about "three roles" and their complex and evolving relationships, rather than just two roles in a confrontation, making the content much richer.
In the high tide of Marxist dissemination after the May Fourth Movement, people focused not only on Marx's critique of capitalism in economics but also on his materialist conception of history. When introducing Marxist philosophy to the Chinese people for the first time, few discussed dialectics, and even fewer talked about materialism from the perspective of epistemology, but many thinkers showed great enthusiasm for the materialist conception of history. Communist Li Dazhao and Three Principles of the People's Nation Hu Hanmin were among the most diligent in studying and interpreting the materialist conception of history. Through the articles published by Li Dazhao, Hu Hanmin, and others, it can be seen that their fascination with the materialist conception of history stemmed from finding answers to how to effectively carry out social reform and revolution. They viewed the materialist conception of history as a scientific method for social transformation. Since the Xinhai Revolution, why had China's democratic revolution failed to succeed, and why had reactionary warlord politicians seized the fruits of the revolution and seized state power? This had long troubled the democratic revolutionaries. Thus, democratic thinkers explained the failure of the democratic revolution by pointing to the low quality of the Chinese people and their lack of awakening. At that time, progressive public opinion fervently discussed the so-called "national character" issue, trying to find the root cause of the failure of the democratic revolution in the ideological sphere. From Sun Yat-sen's efforts to awaken the masses in the "consciousness of the awakened awakening" style, to the May Fourth Movement's promotion of literary and ethical revolution, all followed this line of thought. Li Dazhao's "Ming Yi" during the struggle against Yuan Shikai also referred to this matter. He further made philosophical generalizations, viewing "the change of human thought" as the cause of all historical phenomena, using it to explain that the decisive force behind the success or failure of the Chinese revolution lay in "national thought" and "popular will." Sun Yat-sen also made the same philosophical judgment in "Psychological Construction": "The mind is the source of all things." "Therefore, the prosperity or decline of politics depends on the awakening or decline of the people's hearts." These philosophical analyses led to different specific conclusions, but the overall trend was undoubtedly a call for a new popular ideological revolution. After the May Fourth Movement, advanced individuals realized that relying solely on an "ideological revolution" could not save China and turned to "social revolution," which created the need for theoretical interpretation of this transformation. People finally discovered that Marx's materialist conception of history was the best social philosophy that met this need. Li Dazhao's series of important essays on interpreting Marxism published between 1919 and 1920 were all closely tied to the theme that fundamental transformation of society must start with solving economic problems. Although he still believed that Marx's materialist conception of history had an oversight in neglecting the role of the spirit and should be "corrected," his main argument was unequivocally in favor of the materialist conception of history, praising the basic principles that material life determines spiritual life and that the socio-economic state determines a society's political, legal, cultural, and moral state. He identified this basic principle of the materialist conception of history as the correct methodology for guiding social transformation. At this time, Hu Hanmin, the main assistant to Sun Yat-sen, also wrote many articles introducing and interpreting the materialist conception of history, making conclusions similar to or close to Li Dazhao's on fundamental social issues. Especially regarding social ethics, Hu Hanmin used the materialist conception of history to systematically analyze the objective basis for the transformation and renewal of moral concepts with the development of social economy in China. The widespread dissemination of the materialist conception of history led the advanced intellectual circles in China to gradually shift their focus to examining China's economic conditions, particularly its economic structure, thereby strongly arguing that the task of transforming society could not be achieved solely through ideological or moral revolutions, nor could it be accomplished through piecemeal local reforms; only by means of social revolution to thoroughly transform existing economic relations and completely change the existing social system built on these relations could the fundamental social problems of China be solved and the aspiration of the pioneers to establish a democratic and prosperous new China realized. The widespread dissemination of Marxism after the May Fourth Movement provided the advanced intellectual circles in China with correct theoretical guidance, enabling them to gain a clearer understanding of the goals and methods of transforming society, which was undoubtedly the most important theoretical achievement of the "social transformation" trend. The Chinese delegation proposed numerous specific resolutions at this conference, most of which were about abolishing the privileges of the foreign powers in China, demanding their discussion and adoption. The final results of these resolutions can be divided into four categories:
First category: Principally accepted but with many restrictions and reservations. This category includes three resolutions: abolishing foreign postal services, withdrawing foreign radio stations, and respecting China's wartime neutrality. These issues are largely unrelated to unequal treaties or the development of foreign power in China, yet they were significantly discounted. For example, regarding the abolition of foreign postal services, it was agreed that foreign post offices would be abolished only in areas outside foreign-controlled concessions and railway before 1923, while the position of foreign postal directors must remain unchanged. The withdrawal of foreign radio stations also had similar restrictions.
Second category: Modified to become a dead letter before being passed. For example, the resolution on resolving existing treaties with China originally had two demands: first, to publish all treaties signed with China by stronger powers; second, to re-examine their scope and effectiveness, with only those compatible with the principles announced at the conference being considered valid and unlimited in duration. The focus was on the latter. However, after modification, the resolution only included the item of publishing treaties. Another example is the resolution on abolishing spheres of influence, which was modified to replace "abolition" with "not supporting," meaning that no new spheres of influence would be established in the future, but existing ones were unaffected. There was also the resolution that foreign powers could not conclude treaties with each other without China's knowledge, which was actually changed to violate the "four principles" proposed by U.S. representative R. Hottinger at the conference, becoming a resolution that was of no benefit to China.
Third category: Formally accepted or partially accepted, but with many conditions set by the foreign powers themselves. This category involves issues for which the Chinese government and public had a strong demand for abolition.