Bukharin: A Political Biography - Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (1888-1938)

Author: Stephen F. Cohen (USA) / Country: Mainland China
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2005-12-01
Features: The right wing of the Politburo will soon regret their tacit approval of the complete destruction of the left wing. With the help of the right wing, Stalin eliminated the common enemy that bound him to his former allies. The right wing may have acted out of confidence in their political strength. On the surface, this strength seemed invincible (Trotsky had once predicted that the right wing would soon "hunt down Stalin"). The main symbol of revolutionary authority was in their hands: the post of Prime Minister, the party's theoretical journal and ideological organs, the Comintern, trade unions, and so on. However, any commentator on Soviet affairs would understand that these were merely superficial, "honorific" sources of power, while the party machine under Stalin's control held increasing, "functioning" real power. This separation between true authority and apparent authority was from the beginning a characteristic of Soviet politics, but it developed further in the 1920s because the power of the Secretariat expanded as a result of factional struggles. At the 15th Party Congress held in October 1926, this phenomenon of separation became clearly evident. First, reports were given in order by Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky; only at the 10th session did Stalin deliver the report on the party, which was traditionally the decisive one. This unusual agenda seemed to indicate that the right wing held supreme power, but in the same month, Stalin's two other allies, Rudzutak and Kuibyshev, became full members of the nine-man Politburo. Although the right wing still regarded Kalinin and Voroshilov as firmly supporting their policies, it was precisely at this point that Stalin gained a potential majority in the Politburo that was not influenced by Bukharin, Rykov, or Tomsky. The shift in the balance of power was not the only development that led to conflict between Stalin and the right wing of the Politburo. Many troubles both at home and abroad in 1927 raised serious doubts about the continued feasibility of Bukharin's policies (even after they had been modified to become more realistic). The difficulties at hand probably shook Stalin's confidence in the economic foresight of his partners who "hundred percent supported the New Economic Policy," making him more inclined to listen to other opinions and determine his own course. By 1927, the future Stalinist industrialization experts, led by Kuibyshev, had already occupied key economic leadership positions, obviously including positions in the Supreme Economic Council, and had begun formulating their own industrialization policies. In addition, Bukharin and Rykov's shift toward planning, increased investment in basic industries, and agricultural collectivization prompted various interpretations of these changes. For example, in the state planning agencies, there were already highly divergent understandings of the Five-Year Plan. Even before the leftists were expelled from the party, the Stalinist planner S.G. Strumilin had already shouted the philosophical slogan guiding the Stalinist industrial revolution: "We are not bound by any laws. No fortress is unconquerable for Bolsheviks." P.436-437