One-Dimensional Hyper-Reality Implosion: A Study of Contemporary Western Communication Thought from a Critical Perspective

Author: Shi Yibin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-09-01
Features: Inheriting tradition while daring to innovate. When exploring the intellectual origins of Habermas, the British William Outhwaite believes that Habermas's entire works can reflect the influence of multiple thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Weber. "But the most important intellectual origin undoubtedly lies in the Marxist tradition of the Frankfurt School of Social Research." ③ It should be said that, like early critical theory, Habermas's theory remains a form of cultural critique, but the philosophical foundation of this critique has shifted. The former is primarily based on subject philosophy, operating on the dichotomy between subject and object, while the latter is grounded in a philosophical foundation of "inter-subjectivity," which is undoubtedly an innovation. Similarly, this innovation is also reflected in specific details. For example, regarding the issue of science and technology becoming a new form of control, questions such as who is controlling and how control is being exerted need to be addressed. Early critical theorists, such as Adorno and Marcuse, had already noticed this new form of control. For instance, Marcuse believed that as a new form of control, the dominance of science and technology is primarily manifested in the cultural industry. In his book One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse elaborated on this idea in detail. He argued that due to the highly developed technology of publishing and reproduction, the cultural industry emerged. Contemporary capitalist countries primarily use mass culture produced by the cultural industry to dominate the general populace. Mass culture is a consumer culture, one that lacks a spirit of negation and critique, leading people to indulge in a "false satisfaction" and thus become "cultural slaves," losing their resistance to the existing system. Therefore, Marcuse believed that, like ideology, science and technology have a clear instrumental and enslaving nature, serving a social function of ruling and enslaving people. He concluded that science and technology itself is a form of ideology.
Habermas inherited the tradition of the Frankfurt School in critiquing the cultural industry. Although he acknowledges that science and technology, like old ideologies, also pacifies people and prevents them from thinking, it has completely lost the oppressive and enslaving function of traditional ideologies. Therefore, he opposes Marcuse's view of equating the social functions of technological progress with those of traditional ideology. He argues that technology and science have become the foundation of legitimacy. They have lost their old ideological forms and have become a new form of ideology that worships science, i.e., techno-rational ideology. This new ideology no longer possesses the elements of false ideology or the invisible power to deceive people. Compared to all previous ideologies, this new ideology has lost much of its ideological nature. ① He criticizes Marcuse's view that science and technology exclude democracy and freedom, arguing that this is unrealistic. Habermas believes that contemporary capitalist society is a late capitalist society, different from the free competition stage of capitalism discussed in classical Marxist theory. This stage has some new characteristics, one of which is the change in the main contradiction. It is no longer the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but rather their cultural contradiction and cultural struggle. This is because, in contemporary capitalist countries, with highly developed productivity, science and technology have become the means of production, creating a large amount of material products. This gives the bourgeoisie more room to maneuver in adjusting the contradiction with the proletariat, such as by increasing workers' wages or transferring equity. Under these circumstances, class struggle naturally "lies dormant," but cultural struggle becomes prominent. The bourgeoisie uses highly developed science and technology to achieve cultural domination over the proletariat.
If Habermas's theory is a form of political communication studies, it is also a form of philosophical communication studies, possessing both philosophical and communication characteristics. McCarthy, from a philosophical perspective, divides Habermas's theory of communicative action into three levels: the first is general communication theory, also known as ordinary pragmatics; the second is a general socialization theory based on the theory of communicative capacity; and the third is a social evolution theory based on the previous two levels, which is essentially the reconstruction of historical materialism. ① Marxism views labor as the key to understanding the entire history of human development, but Habermas presents a different key: communication. Habermas argues that the history of human evolution should be seen as a history of communication—a history of how communication occurs, develops, gets distorted, and how it can be reconstructed. Habermas elevating communicative action to such a height is unprecedented. Whether one agrees with this or not, it can be discussed in the public sphere of academia, but one thing is certain: Habermas's communication studies can be considered a philosophical form of communication studies.
Another highlight of Habermas's theory is his dedication to constructing communication models for the critical school. Compared to early critical theory and the empirical school, a major characteristic of the former is that it critiques but does not build. In terms of the depth of critique, it is indeed penetrating and thought-provoking, but communication studies require both critique and construction, especially construction based on critique. Dennis McQuail's Mass Communication Models collects communication models from the empirical school. Does the critical school need to establish its own communication models? This itself is a controversial topic. Communication models are the most refined expression of communication theory, and as such, the critical school naturally needs to engage in model construction. Unfortunately, this idea has been largely ignored by most critical theorists (or considered the concern of the empirical school and dismissed). The lack of constructive effort in the critical school not only provides grounds for criticism from the empirical school but also hinders its own development. In the 1960s, the critical school began to borrow some research methods from the empirical school, but this was primarily to "use the enemy's weapons against the enemy" and serve critique, not a genuine form of construction. The critical theory of the entire Frankfurt School also gives off a tragic aura, like the brilliance of a setting sun. Under these circumstances, the constructive significance of Habermas's four validity claims and his "ideal speech situation," as proposed through ordinary pragmatics, is extraordinary. In my view, Habermas has actually proposed a communication model for the critical school, one that, like the models of the empirical school, can concisely and appropriately summarize the essence of his communication thought. In this sense, Habermas can be seen as a "pioneer" in creating communication models for the critical school.
Another feature of Habermas's communication studies is his particular focus on interpersonal communication mediated by language. Interpersonal communication is essentially equivalent to "communication" in Habermas's theory. Of course, what falls within Habermas's research scope is not limited to interpersonal communication but also includes mass communication, organizational communication, and other forms of communication. However, in Habermas's view, mass communication and organizational communication only carry negative meanings, so he holds a generally resistant or even hostile attitude toward these forms of communication. We have yet to fully understand the reasons for Habermas's preference, but Tao Dongfeng's discussion of mass communication and communication in his article Mass Communication and the Reconstruction of Publicness may provide a clue for understanding Habermas's "preference." Tao Dongfeng argues that in daily life, interpersonal communication is face-to-face, and the flow of information is bidirectional. In mass communication, the flow of information is generally unidirectional, and information or cultural products are produced by those who are not present at the production and dissemination sites. The audience's ability to participate in or engage with the communication process is extremely limited, making it difficult for them to influence the content. In other words, in mass communication, the relationship between the producers and consumers of information is fragmented. The symbolic form is produced and disseminated for the audience, but this process occurs when the audience is directly absent and cannot reflect. Therefore, it is extremely different from the dialogical context of daily life.
Given this, Habermas's focus on interpersonal communication in his effort to reconstruct communicative rationality in human interaction is not accidental. Additionally, Habermas's communication thought covers a vast range and has a multidisciplinary background.