Early Modernization in Hunan (1860-1916)

Author: Zhang Pengyuan
Publisher:
Publishing Date: 2002-12-01
Features: In any form of society, during its evolutionary process, crises are inevitable; with crises, the ruling class inevitably attempts to alleviate them, leading to the emergence of social relief systems and charitable causes. China is a traditional agricultural society, with its two greatest crises being natural disasters like floods and droughts, and man-made calamities such as extreme wealth inequality, both of which have been mentioned in the preceding text. To address these "natural and human misfortunes," storage systems and charitable causes have continuously been improved. This section will briefly discuss these two aspects.
(1) Storage Systems
Storage systems in China originated over two thousand years ago. In the early Han Dynasty, Jia Yi discussed the accumulation of grain to prevent famine, possibly being the earliest proponent of the "store grain to guard against hunger" theory. This idea was strongly supported by Chao Cuo. Initially implemented in border regions, it achieved considerable success. During the Sui Dynasty, the Shu Granary was established, and during the Tang Dynasty, the Yi Granary was set up, both proving effective in disaster relief. In the Song Dynasty, Wang Anshi used the funds of the Changping Granary to establish the Qingmiao system, but due to improper implementation, it faced widespread criticism. However, Zhu Xi revisited the Changping Granary system and implemented it in Zhejiang, achieving significant results in grain storage. Since then, establishing granaries to stabilize grain prices has become a tradition.
Granaries are divided into three types: Changping Granaries, Social Granaries, and Yi Granaries. Their names may vary depending on their location or the source of the stored rice, but their purpose remains relief. Changping and Yi Granaries are mostly located in county seats, while Yi Granaries are also built in rural areas. Social Granaries are entirely scattered in rural regions. Changping Granaries are public granaries funded by the government, accepting donations from wealthy families as well. Yi and Social Granaries are entirely funded by private donations, some managed by the government and others run by local communities. In Hunan, storage systems are referred to as Changping and Social Granaries, with the former being government-built and the latter privately built. In the 43rd year of the Kangxi reign (1704), it was stipulated that large and medium-sized counties must store at least 10,000 stones, while medium counties 8,000 stones, and small counties 6,000 stones, becoming a fixed regulation.
The functions of granaries are twofold: releasing grain and relief. The principle of "selling grain in spring and autumn" serves to stabilize prices. During the lean season, grain is sold at subsidized prices, ensuring the people have food. In autumn, when grain prices fall, the same amount is repurchased to meet the next year's needs, known as releasing grain. In years of famine, grain is distributed to disaster victims to maintain social stability, known as relief.
While Hunan's granary system occasionally faced management issues, it performed largely effectively. During the Yongzheng era, the storage capacity was set at 702,133 stones, and by the 13th year of the Qianlong reign (1748), the stored grain reached 1,256,414 stones, with over 500,000 stones in excess. Additionally, 49,306 stones had been lent out, 218,680 stones sold, and 118,925 taels of silver in storage, all not included in the calculation. On average, each county stored over 120,000 stones. At that time, Jiangsu and Zhejiang faced grain shortages, and Hunan allocated over 300,000 stones to assist them, showcasing its wealth. Generally speaking, the wealthiest counties included Changsha, Liujiang, Liling, Xiangtan, Yiyang, Ningxiang, Xiangxiang, You County, Chaling, Hengyang, Qingquan, Hengshan, Lingling, Qiyang, Chenzhou, Jingzhou, Cili, and Guiyang, all storing over 10,000 stones. The least affluent counties were Huayong, Yongding, Baojing, Yongshun, and Sangzhi. The poorest were Yongshui and Qianzhou, but their storage was still no less than several thousand stones.
The Xinhai Revolution overthrew the old regime led by the revolutionaries, but the situation was controlled by the constitutionalists. However, after the establishment of the Republic in 1912, the constitutionalists joined the Nationalist Party, which gradually gained power. The Nationalists took control of the entire situation, taking strong actions against Yuan Shikai, but with little local development. In 1913, Yuan Shikai's influence spread into Hunan, dimming the province's prospects. In 1915, Tan Yancheng took control of Hunan for a second time but left before making any significant changes. Later, rule by the Northern Army generals Fu Liangju and Zhang Jingyao made the people of Hunan even more suffering. In 1918, Wu Peifu left the north, and the people of Hunan united to drive out Zhang Jingyao. Tan Yancheng took command in Lingling and returned to Changsha in September, proposing the idea of provincial autonomy. His third term as governor marked a gradual improvement in Hunan's situation. However, he was soon replaced by his subordinate Zhao Hengtui, ending Tan's era in Hunan.
Hunan's lack of peace after the Republic was largely due to the conflict between the north and south, making it a victim of the turmoil. During this period, there was little development, and modernization progress was hindered. A political scientist once said, "Civil unrest has lost the spirit of governance, destroyed political systems, and ignored public interests." In other words, internal conflicts delayed modernization, and Hunan serves as a prime example.
The above briefly outlines the major trends of the late Qing and early Republic, serving as an introduction to this chapter. The following discussion will cover political participation, educational reform, judicial independence, and military innovation, all intertwined with the concept of modernization to explore substantive changes. A regional change may only have regional effects or even trigger national impacts, and this should be observed and explained.
### Section 2: The Emergence of Political Participation
Most political scientists believe that "political participation" is a crucial aspect of political development, with some even calling it a revolution in political science. Participation typically encompasses a healthy representative system and independent public opinion. Representative systems are particularly important because their representatives are elected directly by the people, serving as the core of modern political development. Under the influence of this trend, participation emerged in China. Long before the Wuxu Reform, figures like Zheng Guanying, Chen Chi, Chen Qiu, Tang Zhen, He Qi, and Hu Liyuan all discussed the issue of the national assembly. Kang Youwei even clearly stated, "Establishing assemblies to communicate with the people and base decisions on public opinion" and conveyed this idea directly to the emperor. However, such discussions were merely a prelude; the Wuxu Reform failed before achieving anything. After its failure, the Qing court turned reactionary, rejecting modernization. Yet, years later, it could no longer resist the tide of the times, opting for preparatory constitutionalism under pressure from constitutionalists and external factors, thus giving birth to political participation.
After the establishment of the Republic, under the democratic trend, participation was further encouraged. There were central assemblies with both the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as provincial and county assemblies. Unfortunately, Yuan Shikai did not tolerate the existence of political parties, arbitrarily dissolving the national assembly, making political participation a fleeting phenomenon. After revealing his imperial ambitions, Yuan also suppressed local assemblies, returning China to a state of autocracy. After Yuan's death, the national assembly was reopened, and local assemblies were restored, but political struggles soon resumed, leading to another dissolution. The second election in 1919 occurred during the division of the north and south. The third election in 1922 saw only 11 provinces participate, rendering it largely ceremonial. The third reopening of the old national assembly in 1923 was marred by Cao Kun's (bribery), turning representatives into "piglet" legislators, rendering the national assembly devoid of genuine participation. Later, amid the chaos of Northern Warlord conflicts and the Nationalist Northern Expedition, it was not until 1936 that the Nationalists returned power to the people, allowing for a new national assembly.
This summarizes the evolution of political participation during the late Qing and the Republic. Generally speaking, China's parliamentary politics was still in its infancy. The following discussion will begin with local self-governance and conclude with national participation. The people of Hunan engaged in local parliamentary construction at home and sent representatives to participate in central politics. Therefore, discussions will cover urban-rural self-governance, provincial and county assemblies, and the national assembly, attempting to answer three questions: First, at the nascent stage of political participation, what is the extent of its development? This concerns people's political awareness, such as whether they understand the sanctity of their votes and the number of voters. Second, have elected officials been effective? Do they truly speak for the people's interests? Third, China must industrialize—do legislators recognize this issue? How much of their parliamentary discourse addresses social and economic development? If these questions receive reasonable answers, the future of political participation can be envisioned.
Hunan's modern education also faced resistance. Although the decade of development during the late Qing Dynasty left a strong impression, it was far from satisfactory, due to several reasons. First, financial difficulties. As mentioned in the section on finance and budgets, the chaos and disarray of the fiscal system significantly impacted education. In 1901, the Qing court ordered all provinces to establish primary and secondary schools, emphasizing "raising funds locally" for schools and "allowing private donations" for kindergartens. Due to central fiscal constraints, this was the only option. Local governments, facing financial shortages, could only make excuses. The only source of revenue for education was school land, but as mentioned earlier, school land was extremely limited, hindering large-scale schooling. For example, in Lanshan County, there were only a few primary schools with poor facilities and meager teacher salaries. The Lanshan County Gazetteer stated, "The salary of a primary school principal is not as high as that of a government clerk, and the salary of a primary school teacher is not as high as that of a rural laborer." Thus, the quality of teachers was poor, and educational standards were low. The situation in Cili County was even worse. By 1912, the county had one high school, nine primary schools, and 133 elementary schools, but excluding the annual funding of 200,000 strings of cash for high schools and primary schools, the elementary schools "either struggled to survive or begged door-to-door, left to their own devices," with some even like mayflies, born in the morning and dead by evening.
Second, teacher shortages. As previously mentioned, teacher shortages were a persistent issue. In a transforming society, the difficulty of new endeavors lies in their initial stages: In 1902, Governor Yu Liansan reported the challenges of establishing schools: "It is not difficult to establish a basic scale but difficult to find qualified teachers." In reality, schools could neither achieve a basic scale nor secure enough teachers, leading to the necessity of sending students abroad for study and limiting it to Changsha. Most overseas studies were short-term courses, but given the urgent need for teachers, short-term courses were a temporary solution.
Third, local turmoil disrupted education. The late Qing and early Republic were eras of significant regional instability, with frequent banditry affecting schools, leading to frequent closures. Some schools were occupied by troops as barracks, with doors used as beds and desks as firewood, rendering schools unable to function and eventually closing down.
Fourth, conflicts between the old and new hindered educational development. Hunan's conflict between the old and new was more pronounced than in other provinces. The conservative faction led by Wang Xianshan opposed the new policies, contributing to their failure. Without imperial support, modern education could not have advanced. Although they could not openly oppose it, they secretly resisted it everywhere, significantly hindering Hunan's educational progress. Take textbooks as an example. Wang Xianshan claimed not to oppose modern education but argued that compiling textbooks was unnecessary. He said, "Primary schools can read the Four Books and Five Classics," so there was no need for additional textbooks. For middle schools, "there are the Five Classics for reading and the Canon of the Hundred Schools and historical texts for exploration, so there is no need for textbooks." For universities, "given the books already studied, they are already classified by subject—classics, history, ethics, and literature—allowing for leisurely and thorough study, with lifelong benefit without exhaustion. Why would there still be time for other pursuits?" He opposed the inclusion of natural sciences in textbooks, stating, "The study of crafts is materialistic, differing from the metaphysical focus of middle schools, and not a priority for governing the state." The delay in compiling textbooks was partly due to Wang's stance.