Auction Theory and Practice

Author: Migurom
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-07-01
Features: This book first introduces the method of mechanism design in auction theory, reviews the significant contributions of Vickrey, Clarke, and Gross to the theory of mechanism design, and introduces the Envelope Theorem and several important conclusions. Through the single-crossing condition, it proves the equilibrium in different auction types, proposes a general method for comparing the revenues of non-standard auction models, and studies revenue maximization auctions in the single-item case. After removing the private value assumption and relaxing the independence assumption, it discusses some issues caused by type correlation and valuation correlation. Subsequently, in a broader context, it analyzes some issues related to auctions. On this basis, the book studies the mechanism design problem in multi-item auctions, combining its application in practical problems such as spectrum auction design, focusing on uniform-price sealed-bid auctions, simultaneous ascending-bid auctions, and combinatorial auctions. This book can serve as a textbook for graduate and undergraduate students in economics, management, e-commerce, and related fields, as well as a reference book for researchers in related fields.