Phenomenological enigma in the period of Wittgenstein's philosophical transformation

Author: Xu Yingjin
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-04-04
Features: Despite having little knowledge of the European phenomenological movement, Wittgenstein independently proposed his own version of "phenomenology" upon his return to Cambridge in early 1929. His view of phenomenology can be summarized as the following belief: it is possible to represent directly given phenomena using a so-called "phenomenological language," a task that the everyday-physical language cannot fulfill. However, through an in-depth exploration of the nature of "pre-figuration,"2 Wittgenstein had to admit that any attempt to represent direct experience would inevitably involve expressions of physical language, and this involvement would come at the cost of sacrificing the independence of the "phenomenological language." This discovery ultimately led Wittgenstein to abandon his "phenomenology." The discussion in this book will focus on this brief yet significant "phenomenological phase" in Wittgenstein's philosophical transition. The research is based on the following documents: besides the short essay "On Logical Forms" where Wittgenstein explicitly expressed his stance on phenomenology, it will also include the newly published collection of Wittgenstein's transitional period documents, the "Vienna Edition," particularly Volume 11, "The Great Typescript." Through the interpretation of these materials, the author will present to the readers the research paths Wittgenstein took in his studies of expressions of "sensory pre-figuration" under the headings of "phenomenological construction" and "phenomenological critique." The key points the book attempts to argue can be summarized as follows:
(1) Wittgenstein's "phenomenological phase" can be regarded as the starting point of his long-term academic interest in "the philosophy of psychology"—an interest that persisted until the end of his life but was not reflected in his early work "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus."
(2) By interpreting "atomic propositions" as the simplest description of "sensory pre-figuration" (rather than avoiding a positive explanation of what atomic propositions are, as in "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"), Wittgenstein's "phenomenological phase" reveals an astonishing kinship between his philosophical stance at that time and Russell's empiricist version of "logical atomism."
(3) By denying any attempt to use language to designate or describe pre-figuration and by demonstrating the absolute nature of pre-figuration itself, Wittgenstein's critique of his own "phenomenological" concept actually revives the dichotomy between "unsayability" and "sayability" that he had already made during the period of "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus." In "The Great Typescript," this dichotomy is refined in his analysis of expressions of time, space, and person, leading to distinctions such as "memory time" versus "physical time" and "visual space" versus "Euclidean space," and so on.
(4) From another perspective, Wittgenstein's deconstruction of the concept of "phenomenological language" can also be seen as an inevitable consequence of taking the concept to its ultimate extreme, because this deconstruction actually reinforces rather than weakens the belief he already held when writing "On Logical Forms," namely: the physical system must be strictly distinguished from what is directly given in the phenomenon. In other words, what Wittgenstein does in this deconstruction is merely to expose the inherent contradiction between this belief itself and his insistence on the "sayability" of phenomena—the illusion of "phenomenological language" also stems from this insistence.
(5) However, according to Wittgenstein's intention, the vast logical difference between "sensory pre-figuration" and physical language (as the only possible language) does not mean that the latter has no connection with the former, but only that their relationship does not follow the so-called "original—copy" model, but rather the "screen presentation—film operation" model. The latter model also implies that phenomena themselves can be evoked (or, phenomena can be encompassed) within the physical language/physical system—even though phenomena cannot indeed be described by physical language.
(6) In this way, Wittgenstein leads us to bid farewell to the ambitious and outdated goal of "perfectly representing direct pre-figuration," opening up a new realm of thought where both the "overview of grammar" and the formation of his own later philosophy take place. However, since he was still reluctant to immediately abandon the term "phenomenology," Wittgenstein temporarily retained it in "The Great Typescript," though at this point, the term "phenomenology" had been equated with "grammar." In the text of "Philosophical Investigations," even this limited retention was abandoned.
(7) The book argues that only with a thorough understanding of Wittgenstein's critique of "phenomenological language" in "The Great Typescript" can the critique of "private language" in "Philosophical Investigations" be understood productively (because the former critique actually constitutes the prototype of the latter). According to the author's view, the key point of the "private language argument" is not to deny the role of sensory pre-figuration in our linguistic games about sensation, but to reinterpret the nature of their role. Wittgenstein argues that sensation is never the referent of a word or the source of the meaning of a name, but rather something that is presented in a specific context, with absolute self-evidence—while also constituting the logical premise for the unfolding of our linguistic games about sensation. From this argument, it follows that indexical terms like "I," "now (immediacy)," and "this" do not indicate the characteristics of pre-figuration itself, and that discussing the spatio-temporal forms of phenomena and the personal forms of phenomena is misleading. Thus, the two cornerstones supporting the "private language" view—"there must exist private pre-figurations that can only be presented to 'I'" and "there must be a specially designed vocabulary to refer to these pre-figurations"—are both undermined.
(8) Building on the points in (7), the author will show the readers where traditional interpretations of the "private language argument" miss the mark. It is well known that the popular strategy for interpreting this argument is to link it to Wittgenstein's emphasis on the importance of "following rules," because it is said that rules cannot be privately made and followed. However, the problem that these interpreters overlook is a deeper explanation of why "rules that are privately made and followed are not genuine rules." To explain this "why," the book will guide the readers to revisit the distinction between "memory time" and "physical time" in "The Great Typescript," and on this basis, accuse the proponents of "private language" of misusing the term "rule" and confusing the aforementioned distinction. The author argues that only with an understanding of this premise can we integrate Wittgenstein's emphasis on "following rules" into a complete "private language argument."
(9) Finally, the book will explain why later Wittgenstein cannot be interpreted as a crude relativist—one who is willing to acknowledge the relative utility of language rules followed by a specific community and advocates removing the role of sensation from linguistic games about sensation—because Wittgenstein rejected only the sayability of sensory impressions, not their existence itself. To put it more clearly, according to Wittgenstein's standards, the following assertion by a relativist—"when a color sample is given to a normal person, what he sees has nothing to do with his corresponding behavior"—is itself a typical expression of skepticism and therefore cannot survive in Wittgenstein's attack on skepticism.