Uncertainty of knowledge

Author: (USA) Immanuel Wallerstein / Country: Mainland China
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2006-01-01
Features: Prigogine believed that Newtonian mechanics describes stable dynamic systems. But just as Braudel thought that "narrating the history of events" describes only a part—just a very small part—of historical reality, Prigogine believed that stable dynamic systems are only a part of natural reality—just a very small part. In unstable systems, initial conditions—conditions that are usually and necessarily specific—if slightly different, can produce vastly different results. In Newtonian mechanics, the influence of initial conditions is fundamentally ignored. Just as Braudel thought that the "longue durée" has a significant impact on macro structures rather than micro structures, Prigogine believed that "irreversibility and probability are striking in macro physics" (1997, 45). Later, just as Braudel thought that "events are like dust," Prigogine believed that "for brief interactions, the diffusion period is irrelevant" (1997, 44). However, what Braudel said in his essay "The Longue Durée" is exactly the opposite of what Prigogine stated: "In short, in long-term interactions, diffusive elements dominate" (1997, 54). Braudel believed that there are multiple social times, and only in the ultra-long durée (which Braudel thought, if it exists at all, could only be the time of saints) are general laws meaningful. Social sciences that study general laws, like Newtonian mechanics, assume that equilibrium is everywhere. This point was criticized by Prigogine: "The approximate equilibrium laws of nature are universally applicable, and when they are far from equilibrium, they become a mere appendage of mechanism. At this point, matter needs new properties. Matter becomes 'more active.'" (1996, 75) Prigogine is not troubled by the concept of an 'active nature'; on the contrary: "It is precisely because we are both 'actors' and 'observers' that we can understand some aspects of nature." (1997, 150) However, the difference between Braudel and Prigogine lies in their starting points. Braudel had to contend with the view in historiography that ignores "structure" (i.e., "durée"), while Prigogine was forced to fight against the neglect of "non-equilibrium" states and the neglect of different consequences caused by specific initial states (i.e., "time") in physics. Therefore, Braudel has always emphasized the importance of the "longue durée," while Prigogine emphasizes the importance of the "direction of time flow." Just as Braudel did not want to jump out of the den of event history and into the tiger's den of the ultra-long durée, but insisted on staying in the middle durée that cannot be excluded; Prigogine also did not want to give up reversible time and jump into the pit of chaos and inexplicable phenomena. P47