Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm of "Critiquing Buddhism"

Author: Jamie Hubbard
Publisher:
Publish Date: 2004-11-01
Features: This book is divided into three parts. Part "The Nature and Origins of Critical Buddhism," primarily explores the essence of critical Buddhist thought and its background. Paul Swanson's article "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism" provides a detailed overview of the concepts of critical Buddhism as proposed by scholars such as Hattori and Matsumoto, as well as the reactions their works have provoked in academic and sectarian circles. His conclusion is that critical Buddhism at least contains three layers of critique: philosophical, sectarian, and social. In his paper "Critical Buddhism and Return to the Source," Dan Lusthaus employs a broader historical perspective to understand critical Buddhism as an inevitable phenomenon of historical development and views it as an extension (or repetition) of debates about the Yogācāra concept of tathāgatagarbha since ancient times. In his article "Critical Philosophy Against Situational Philosophy," Hattori uses the confrontation between Descartes's (Rene Descartes) critical method in Western philosophy and Vico's (Giambattista Vico) emphasis on rhetoric to explain the opposition between critical philosophy and situational philosophy, and accuses Japan's recent preference for situational philosophy of being a disease of thought. He points out that the main danger of this disease lies in "using the voice of authority to peddle one's own rhetoric." Hattori also questions whether he himself has employed the voice of authority in his writings. My own paper "Aversion to Situations," attempts to clarify Hattori's critique of "the critique of situational philosophy." I examine the original meaning of the concept of situation from Aristotle's logical treatises, Vico's thought, the ideas of the eighteenth-century situational philosophers criticized by Hattori, and the ideological aspects of certain East Asian traditions, such as Taoism and Japan's philosophy of wa, which Hattori attacks as embodying consistency or conformity. In "Academia as Critique," Hattori questions the notion of academic objectivity proposed by Weber in his famous essay "Academia as a Vocation." Contrary to Weber—as mentioned above—Hattori tends to lean toward the behaviorist direction in contemporary Western academia, finding that the so-called ideal of objective scholars is merely another form of the authoritarian approach advocated by situational philosophy. On the surface, the discovery of so-called neutral "facts" represents the objectivity of academic research, but in reality, this very act is merely the covert application of subjective opinions. Hattori presents a wealth of evidence to support this claim. With a postmodern inclination in literary and critical theory, Hattori opposes the demand for objectivist methods in historical research, advocating instead for a narrative approach to history: "It can be shown that those who value situation also value objective facts, while those who emphasize critique also value language. The latter's task is to critique through refined linguistic methods, while the former merely discovers facts like situation." If the critique of academia, for scholars in the classroom, means abandoning the claim of self-proclaimed objectivity and risking the stigma of being labeled a demagogue, Hattori argues that this is also a (praiseworthy) path of moral improvement. In "The Limits of Critique," Griffith attempts to reposition Hattori's concept of critique within the more familiar philosophical context of epistemological internal and external analysis. He argues that the situational philosophy criticized by Hattori approaches epistemological internalism, which is criticized because it has caused numerous problems. To provide evidence, Griffith examines the debate between Hattori and Lambert Schmithausen (Lambert Schmithausen) over the meaning of the term nature (svabhāva) in Buddhism, to illustrate the extent to which critique can be meaningful in becoming a Buddhist. The last short essay is a response by Matsumoto delivered at the 1993 religious conference in the specialized working group on critical Buddhism.
The second part is titled "The Quest for Genuine Buddhism." One of the first aggressive articles in the critical Buddhism debate is Matsumoto's "The Yogācāra Concept Is Not Buddhism," which was first published in 1986 at a conference on Japanese Indology and Buddhist studies. In this paper, Matsumoto begins to treat dhatu-vāda as a schema of "generative monism" that opposes Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda and anātman, and criticizes this conceptual scheme for violating the teachings of genuine Buddhism. The next paper is by Sallie King, "The Yogācāra Concept Is Authentic Buddhism." The paper argues that the Yogācāra concept or tathāgatagarbha should be understood as a soteriological plan rather than an ontological metaphysics, hence, as the title suggests, it is "authentic Buddhism." King also finds that the Yogācāra tathāgatagarbha concept has no natural connection to social discrimination; on the contrary, they are precisely used to prove and inspire social engagement. One of the methods Matsumoto and Terao seek to prove is the traditional Buddhist hermeneutical approach to scripture. Yamabe Narimasa's article and the subsequent discussion with Matsumoto, "The Concept of Basis in Yogācāra and Yogācāra Texts," is of this type. In the paper, Yamabe argues that generative monism leads to unfair pluralism, and the conceptual features of the dhatu-vāda that Matsumoto defines are not actually found in the Yogācāra texts cited by Matsumoto. Although we could examine Matsumoto's articles on these issues more closely, Matsumoto's response and Yamabe's rebuttal (in the "Commentary Exchange" article) both indicate the complexity and subtlety of the issues they explore. While both express a desire for further discussion and clarification of their respective positions, due to space constraints, they cannot be fully elaborated here.
"Critical Buddhism" is often associated with the controversial works of Hattori and Matsumoto, but they are not the only scholars engaged in critical Buddhist studies. The renowned Tibetan Buddhist scholar Nyima Rinchen is one such critical scholar. Hattori and Matsumoto frequently mention him as a mentor who guided their critical Buddhist thought. Nyima's article "The Core Factors of Indian Buddhism Transmitted to Tibet" is one of the early papers that inspired Hattori and Matsumoto. The paper examines Buddhist philosophy from the perspective of the famous "Samye Monastic Debate." The Samye Monastic Debate was a well-known debate between the Chinese Chan master Mahayana and the Indian monk Vasubandhu. Mahayana believed that self-nature is originally pure and that the path is absolute, advocating sudden enlightenment; Vasubandhu emphasized the cultivation of the Six Perfections. Nyima equates the critique of the Yogācāra concept of tathāgatagarbha with the critique of the mystical intuition of liberation (mukti, vimoksa), pointing out that "the purpose of Buddhism is not liberation but the attainment of bodhi for the sake of great compassion (mahākaru?a)." Therefore, he sides with Vasubandhu, arguing that Buddhism must practice perfect charity, which is one of the Six Perfections. Of course, the critique of Chan sudden enlightenment is not a new idea. As scholars of the Caodong sect and instructors at Caodong-affiliated universities, Hattori and Matsumoto naturally should clarify the concept of Chan. In his 1993 book "A Critical Study of Chan Thought," Matsumoto critiques those traditional Chan concepts considered sacred and unshakable, particularly the very concept of "Zen" itself. As demonstrated in the included article "The Meaning of Zen," Matsumoto points out that "if Zen (or the practice of meditation) means terminating all conceptual thought, then such a thought is a negation of Buddhism itself." Similarly, Hattori, in his 1992 book "Dōgen and Buddhism," launches a fierce critique of the internal understanding of Dōgen within the Caodong sect. Hattori argues that the critique of Dōgen's hannya-shingyō (the sudden awakening to the true nature of existence) is key to understanding his thought, and Dōgen's critique is primarily not found in the standard 75-volume Hokke Genkō, but in the 12-volume Hokke Genkō compiled posthumously, intended to replace the 75-volume version. Steven Heine's paper "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's Hokke Genkō: The 75-Volume vs. 12-Volume Debate" examines this evidence in detail. Heine finds that the methods favored by different sects and academic interpretations are always intertwined with contemporary social concerns, making it very difficult to absolutize any one method. He advocates applying historical, linguistic, philosophical, and ethical methods simultaneously, even when the boundary between academic discourse and apologetic discourse is unclear. The last four articles in the second part evaluate the value of critical Buddhism from different perspectives. Gregory's "Is Critical Buddhism Truly Critical?" uses the thought of Zongmi as a case study to explore whether the quest for "genuine Buddhism" in critical Buddhism itself presupposes certain conceptualizations of Buddhist essence, thereby becoming an object of its own critique. Gregory tends to view Buddhism as "a product of complex changes." What he seeks in Zongmi's thought is not whether it is "genuine Buddhism," but rather the reasons and conditions that gave rise to it. Similar to King's conclusion, Gregory argues that the Yogācāra concept can be understood as a positive force for social change. He finds that Zongmi's theory of sudden enlightenment is not associated with transcendentalism in language, but rather emphasizes the significance of language in response to the more radical critiques of language in the Praj?āpāramitā tradition.
As mentioned above, one of the interesting aspects of Hattori and Matsumoto's thought is that they are not confined to a narrow Buddhist academic scope but actively engage with contemporary intellectual and moral issues. Perhaps for this reason, their thought has elicited strong reactions from scholars worldwide. This response is vividly demonstrated in Lin Zhiqiang's "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Joy in Buddhism." In the paper, Lin applies Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, Habermas, and an earlier example of "critical Buddhism" in modern China to explain the conflict between the modern project and postmodernism, pointing out a path beyond the opposition between situation and critical Buddhism. In "The Yogācāra Concept and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies," Takakura Naomichi, a prominent scholar of the Yogācāra tradition and a teacher of Hattori and Matsumoto, provides an overview of the Yogācāra concept from the perspective of Buddhist tradition, while also reflecting on the role of critical Buddhist methods in current Buddhist studies. Kyoto University's Kimura Fumitoshi is one of the scholars who have recently responded to Hattori and Matsumoto's critique. His article "A Reconsideration of Critical Buddhism" offers valuable comments on many of the issues involved and his perspective on the debate. He reflects on the role of Buddhist academia in cultural critique. One of the important features of Hattori and Matsumoto's critique is its connection to social critique. The third part, "Social Critique," provides four papers that directly address this issue. Hattori's article "On the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" was first published at the Tribal Liberation Center, during a period of unrest in the Caodong sect caused by long-standing institutional discrimination. Hattori critiques the Caodong sect's preachers for using Buddhist karma and punyā (merit) doctrines to justify social inequality. If affirming karma and punyā is the primary goal of critical Buddhism, does this mean that social injustice can, or must, be understood as an inevitable result of individual past karma? Hattori argues that the individual's understanding or experience of karma is entirely different from the authoritative use of karma as an ideology that takes for granted the "status quo" of social inequality. In his article "Buddhism and the Gods: A Critique of Japanese Nationalism," Matsumoto critiques extreme Japanese nationalists, including famous figures like Kawabata Yasunari and, for linking the glory of Japanese culture to militaristic nationalism through the concept of the "fundamental meaning of the state." Matsumoto also sees themes similar to those of Yogācāra in the later works of Mishima Yukio, finding that Mishima has moved from the rational world of literary intellectualism into a world of pure action—one that undoubtedly led to his death—because "pure Japanese nationalism must be a philosophy of death." The role of the Japanese intellectual world in promoting Japanese racial centrism and cultural chauvinism has recently been the subject of increasing study. As mentioned above, Hattori specifically points out that the punyā doctrine provides an ideological background for this tendency. In "Tendai Punyā Thought and the Turn to Japanese Ethnocentrism," Habito (Ruben Habito) draws attention to a wealth of medieval texts. As Tanaka Yoshiro discovered the popularity of punyā, Kuroda Toshio discussed its support for power structures, Habito reiterates these ideas, and finds that the unconditional affirmation of the real world by punyā thought leads to an "inverted Copernican revolution," placing Japan at the center of the universe rather than as a marginal land in Buddhist history relative to India; viewing Japan as a blessed land that will be the eternal realm of the "Amaterasu descendants," rather than being trapped in the Buddhist concept of the "" (mappō, the age of the decline of the Dharma). The last article in the book is Matsumoto's "The Hokke Sutra and Japanese Culture." The paper continues to discuss Japanese cultural chauvinism and challenges the notion that the thought of the Hokke Sutra is imbued with harmonious inclusivism. Matsumoto argues that the Hokke Sutra points to a Mahayana Buddhist teaching that is entirely opposed to the so-called harmonious ideology ascribed to it. Matsumoto also examines the issue of (gōyō hōtatsu) in the context of the Hokke Sutra, noting that "gōyō hōtatsu is merely the worship of the Buddha's miracles. This is the symbolization of a vāna-mātra concept." He argues that this is precisely what stands in opposition to Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda and the thought of the Hokke Sutra. In his final reflection on how the concept of dhatu has permeated the Hokke Sutra and influenced the interpretation of Japanese culture, Matsumoto criticizes the view that the uniqueness of Japanese culture stems from mystical concepts of unity with nature. He says, "The Japanese are not always in a mystical state surrounded by flowers and trees; we are not vegetarian humans. What makes us a unique nation, just as the West is Western, is that we can think."